Mr. Bryan might well have abstained from issuing his statement to the German-Americans. To make any impression he should have explained why he now thinks it the duty of neutrality to furnish contraband to England, when in 1914 he stated in his Commoner that the President had blazed a new way when he, without conference with other nations, committed this nation to the policy that furnishing the "contraband of money" was inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality. What are the influences that have now changed his views? Mr. Bryan is neither frank nor consistent, hence not impressive.
A “SOFTENED” NOTE.
[The First and Second German Notes.]
Washington, June 12, 1915.
My attention has been called to a number of newspaper editorials and articles which, in varying language, asks the question, "Why did Mr. Bryan sign the first note to Germany, and then refuse to sign the second?" The argument presented in the question is based on the supposition that the two notes were substantially the same and that the second note simply reiterates the demands contained in the first. They then declare it inconsistent to sign one and refuse to sign the other. The difference between the two cases would seem obvious enough to make an answer unnecessary, but, lest silence on the subject be taken as an admission of inconsistency, the following explanation is given:
The notes must be considered in connection with the conditions under which they were sent. The first note presented the case of this Government upon such evidence as we then had. It was like the plaintiff's statement in a case, his claim being based on the facts as he presents them. I did not agree entirely with the language of the first note, but the difference was not so material as to justify a refusal to sign it. Then, too, I was at that time hoping that certain things would be done which would make it easier for Germany to acquiesce in our demands.
The three things which I had in mind which, in my judgment, would have helped the situation were: First, an announcement of a willingness upon our part to employ the principle of investigation, embodied in our thirty peace treaties; second, action which would prevent American citizens from traveling on belligerent ships or on American ships carrying contraband, especially if that contraband consisted of ammunition; and, third, further insistence upon our protest against interference of our trade with neutrals. I thought that these three things were within the range of possibilities, and that two, or at least one was probable.
Some weeks have elapsed since the first note was sent, and we have not only failed to do any of these things hoped for, but Germany has in the meantime answered and in her answer has not only presented a number of alleged facts which, in her judgment, justified the deviation which she has made from the ordinary rules applicable to prize cases, but she has suggested arbitration. A rejection of the arguments which she presented and of the allegations made, together with a reiteration of the original demands, creates a very different situation from that which existed when the first demand was made.
As I have before stated, my fear has been that, owing to the feeling existing in Germany, the Government might, upon receipt of such a note under such circumstances, break off diplomatic relations and thus create a situation out of which war might come without the intention of either side. I am sure that the President does not want war and I am confident that our people do not want war; I have no reason to believe that either the German Government or the German people desire war.
But war, a calamity at any time, is especially to be avoided now because our nation is relied upon by both neutrals and belligerents as the one nation which can exert most influence toward bringing this war to an end. If we were, by accident, to be drawn into the conflict, we would not only surrender the opportunity to act as a mediator, but we might become responsible for drawing other nations into this contest. When we see how one nation after another has been dragged into this war we cannot have confidence in the ability of any one to calculate with certainty upon the results that might follow if we became embroiled in the war.