We do not think the ultimate resort to force can be safely omitted from an effective League of Peace. We sincerely hope that it may never become necessary, and that the deterrent effect of its inevitable use in case of a breach of the league obligation will help materially to give sanction to the laws of the league and to render a resort to force avoidable.

We are not peace-at-any-price men, because we do not think we have reached the time when a plan based on the complete abolition of war is impracticable. So long as nations partake of the frailties of men who compose them, war is a possibility, and that possibility should not be ignored in any League of Peace that is to be useful. We do not think it necessary to call peace-at-any-price men cowards or apply other epithets to them. We have known in history the most noble characters who adhered to such a view and yet whose physical and moral courage is a heritage of mankind.

To those who differ with us in our view of the necessity for this feature of possible force in our plan, we say we respect your attitude. We admit your claim to sincere patriotism to be as just as ours. We do not ascribe your desire to avoid war to be a fear of death to yourselves or your sons; but rather to your sense of the horrors, injustice, and ineffectiveness of settling any international issue by such a brutal arbitrament. Nevertheless, we differ with you in judgment that, in the world of nations as they are, war can be completely avoided.

We believe it is still necessary to use a threat of overwhelming force of a great league with a willingness to make the threat good in order to frighten nations into a use of rational and peaceful means to settle their issues with their associates of the league. Nor are we militarists or jingoes. We are trying to follow a middle path.

Now what is the machinery, a resort to which we wish to force an intending belligerent of the league—it consists of two tribunals, to one of which every issue must be submitted. Issues between nations are of two classes:

First—Issues that can be decided on principles of international law and equity, called justiciable.

Second—Issues that cannot be decided on such principles of law and equity, but which might be quite as irritating and provocative of war, called non-justiciable.

The questions of the Alaskan boundary, of the Bering Sea seal fishing, and of the Alabama Claims were justiciable issues that could be settled by a court, exactly as the Supreme Court would settle claims between States. The questions whether the Japanese should be naturalized, whether all American citizens should be admitted to Russia as merchants without regard to religious faith, are capable of causing great irritation against the nation denying the privilege, and yet such nations, in the absence of a treaty on the subject, are completely within their international right, and the real essence of the trouble cannot be aided by a resort to a court. The trouble is non-justiciable.

We propose that for justiciable questions we shall have an impartial court to which all questions arising between members of the league shall be submitted. If the court finds the question justiciable, it shall decide it. If it does not, it shall refer it to a Commission of Conciliation to investigate, confer, hear argument, and recommend a compromise.

We do not propose to enforce compliance either with the court's judgment or the Conciliation Commission's recommendations. We feel that we ought not to attempt too much—we believe that the forced submission and the truce taken to investigate the judicial decision or the conciliatory compromise recommended will form a material inducement to peace. It will cool the heat of passion, and will give the men of peace in each nation time to still the jingoes.