Wishing you all possible success, I am, faithfully yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
Hudson Maxim, Esq., Lansing, N.J.
MR. MEYER’S SPEECH.
The National Security League brought its two-day Peace and Preparation Conference to a close on June 15, 1915, with a luncheon in the Hotel Astor at which more than 1,000 men and women listened to George von L. Meyer, ex-Secretary of the Navy, as he announced that the navy of the United States was utterly unfit for war with any first-class nation. Mr. Meyer was interrupted many times by applause, and the loudest outburst came when he placed the blame for what he termed the present demoralized state of the navy squarely up to Secretary Josephus Daniels. He said, in part:
In calling attention to these defects I have not done so from a desire to criticise the present head of the navy, although I do believe that he is responsible for the demoralized condition of the personnel and the decreased efficiency of the navy.
In advancing his argument for a greater navy Mr. Meyer contended that such a step would be the best safeguard against war. He asserted that we would have had no war with Spain in 1908 if we had had four more ships like the Oregon. With such a powerful fighting force, he argued, no nation at that time would have dared to meet us. Spain would have yielded without a fight, and this country would have saved $500,000,000. He continued:
The only attack we need consider is an attack from some great naval power, and for that reason we need an adequate navy because it tends toward peace, because it discourages attack and serves the best interests of the country, while an inadequate navy is a vast expense to the country and does not serve as a protection.
Of the thirty-five battleships that we have today only twenty-one are in commission and ready for emergency. Of those twenty-one, three have broken shafts, and the fourth is a turbine battleship which was put out of commission because it needs to be thoroughly overhauled. In addition to that, there are seventy fighting vessels which are not ready to be called upon for an emergency because they are out of commission and would require a long overhauling. We lack battle cruisers, scout cruisers, aeroplanes, and armed airships.
Our submarine fleet is in a critical condition. The complement of torpedo vessels has been reduced from 15 to 25 per cent. to get men to commission new boats. This reduction in personnel is a serious handicap, reduces the efficiency of the destroyers, affects contentment, and prevents the boats being kept in good condition. The Atlantic fleet needs 5,000 men, according to the evidence of the Commander in Chief of that fleet. The reserve fleet at Philadelphia was largely depleted in order to get a new crew for the Alabama when she was ordered to Hampton Roads to enforce neutrality; and the naval force of Hampton Roads was a pitifully weak one: One small submarine, one little torpedo destroyer diverted from Annapolis, and one reserve battleship, of which the fleet in Philadelphia had been robbed in order to put her in commission.