Meanwhile his baseline had been extended twenty miles to the west—to near Noyon. He had occupied about 650 square miles of new territory and had reduced his nearest approach to Paris from sixty-two to forty-four miles.
Then, on June 9, with even a greater array of men and material, he attempted to invert the western bow-like side of the salient already formed by turning it outward. He made a fierce attack from a twenty-mile front between Montdidier and Noyon in the direction of Compiègne. With this objective attained, his Picardy front would have been sufficiently broadened to enable him to resume his journey down the Somme. Moreover, he would have been within striking distance of Paris. He gained seven miles, which was later reduced to less than six by French counterattacks. French counterattacks and a thrust of American marines on his flanks in the three succeeding days not only held him in a vise, but revealed his tremendous losses and the extraordinary means he had expended in preparations. By June 12 his failure, the ramifications of which actually demonstrated his defeat, was an established fact. Then, on the following Saturday, June 15, this failure was acknowledged by the sudden launching of an Austrian offensive in Italy. How this was an acknowledgment we shall see in the proper place.
UPPER MAP: WHERE THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE BEGAN ON MAY 27, 1918
LOWER MAP: WHERE IT WAS STOPPED, MAY 31
SECOND MARNE BATTLE
Held at the Ypres and Arras barriers in the north it was inevitable that Ludendorff's next move would be in the south. The railways freed by the expansion of the Picardy salient in March, the unhampered concentrations made possible at Péronne, St. Quentin, La Fère, and Hirson, and the admirable surface of the Laon Plateau for purposes of manoeuvring large bodies of troops—all pointed to the line northwest of Rheims as the probable point of attack. Then, when it came on May 27, consternation reigned among military critics as they observed the apparent ease with which the Germans carried, first, the mighty Chemin des Dames, protected on the east by Craonne and its three plateaux and on the west by the Ailette and the Oise, and then the south bank of the Aisne, with its formidable prepared fortifications at Soissons. The German feints in the Lys salient and before Amiens in the preceding week were said to have distracted Foch, who had thus been outgeneraled. And when the Marne was reached between Dormans and Château-Thierry, it was remembered how the Third German Army under General von Hausen had swept across the river at that identical spot on Aug. 25, 1914.
In the first three days of the drive the Germans with the greatest auxiliary force of tanks, machine guns, and poison gas projectors they had ever mobilized employed twenty-five divisions, or 325,000 men. When they doubled their base line and had reached the Marne and were trying to deploy they were using forty divisions containing over 400,000 of their best troops. When the offensive quieted down in the first days of June it was estimated that they had lost fully 30 per cent. of the total in casualties. On the other hand, they claimed to have captured over 45,000 prisoners and taken 400 guns. They had come thirty miles and had occupied 650 square miles of territory. But they were held.
What is the explanation of this seeming paradox? Foch could by calling on a certain number of reserves easily have held the Chemin des Dames until—he had been flanked and enfiladed out, between Neufchatel and Rheims on the east and from the Oise where it enters the Aisne on the west. He might have held out longer on the southern bank of the Aisne, but the result would have been the same—losses equaling if not surpassing those of the enemy and the surrender of thousands of guns and large quantities of war material. Finally, he would have gained nothing and might even have been unable to hold the Marne.
It is obvious that he did none of these things. But what did he do? He left his front protected by only sufficient men and guns to produce the greatest possible losses among the enemy as he slowly advanced south and concentrated heavily on the enemy's flanks. It was he and not Ludendorff who decreed that the Germans should reach the Marne between Dormans and Château-Thierry, and nowhere else. But it was Pétain who executed the plans of Foch.