In the May number of Current History Magazine appeared a general review of the battle of Jutland by Mr. Thomas G. Frothingham, with a footnote and diagrams by Professor Westcott of the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis. The article was brought to the attention of Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, one of the most noted naval experts of Great Britain, and was also sent to Mr. Arthur Pollen, an internationally recognized naval writer in England, both of whom contribute comments on the American writer's article. Since his review appeared Mr. Frothingham has joined the National Army of the United States as Captain.—Editor.
There is only one thing certain in naval history, and that is that every great sea fight—as to the circumstances of which we have detailed information—has been criticised as indecisive and as not fought in the way which it should have been. Ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, whose fairness and accuracy as a naval historian have been generally recognized, has said: "Every historian ought to feel a sense of the most lively gratitude toward Nelson; in his various encounters he never left any possible room for dispute as to which side had come out first best." Unfortunately, this is going rather too far, for the merits of every one of Nelson's battles have been disputed, and his way of fighting each has been adversely criticised. This fate he shares with the great De Ruyter and with less important men. Rodney and Lord Howe, as commanders in general actions, were fiercely criticised. Lord Hawke did not receive the customary recognition of his services until seventeen years after the great battle of Quiberon Bay. Roosevelt tells us that: "In every one of De Ruyter's last six battles each side claimed the victory." If we had minute accounts of the talk that went on in the gardens and porches of ancient Athens we should, without doubt, learn that Salamis was far from being decisive and that, anyhow, it ought to have been fought in a different way. It is just as well to remember this whenever we are discussing a naval battle, whether of old date or recent. Land battles have not been treated in quite the same fashion. Their results have not been disputed so often, nor has the manner in which they were fought been so often adversely criticised.
Perhaps we may account for this difference in the treatment of conflicts on the two elements by noting the fact that naval historians and critics of naval operations have but rarely been men of naval experience, while the historians and critics of military operations have usually been soldiers. There has, of course, been some conflict of opinion as to the results of fighting on shore, as we can see on comparing the communiques of the contending sides in the present war. Even after allowing for the unprecedented mendacity of the German authorities and the unprecedented gullibility of the German public there is still some sign of an honest difference of opinion. The difference is not due to lay or unprofessional ignorance.
As regards naval operations in war—indeed, as regards naval affairs in general—it has been shown times without number that it is impossible for any one without naval experience to take a comprehensive or accurate view of naval conditions. This is by no means to disparage what shoregoing writers have done in naval history or in the discussion of some subjects largely though not totally naval. As long as they record facts they do very valuable work. It is when they express opinions and draw inferences from very technical data that they are almost certain to go astray. As a searcher in authoritative records and a narrator of detailed occurrences James is distinctly superior to Mahan; but who would give a fig for James's opinions? Whereas Mahan's govern the naval thought of the world.
JUTLAND RECORDS INCOMPLETE
Thomas G. Frothingham's "Review of the Battle of Jutland" in The New York Times Current History Magazine is a valuable account of the events of the engagement. It would not have been possible within the limits of his article to have related every incident, but he has made a judicious selection of those which he does bring forward. He had, of course, to depend on his sources; and on some important points these contained little or no information. Anything like a full account from the German side was virtually nonexistent. It would have been instructive to have put the German naval authorities into the witness box and to have subjected them to that species of cross-examination which consists in a comparison of some of their statements with others and with the statements of their opponents. It would be here that a writer with the true instinct of a historian, which Mr. Frothingham evidently does possess, could render valuable service had the necessary materials been at his disposal.
A writer who draws inferences from data by no means full and perhaps open to dispute can hardly expect to carry conviction to every reader. It might be sufficient to deal with Mr. Frothingham's general conclusion concerning the battle of Jutland; but it will be well before doing so to notice also one or two minor but still important inferences which he draws from the events of the battle.
GERMAN FLEET'S OBJECT
Mr. Frothingham maintains that the German fleet came out with the object, and no other, of engaging the British fleet, a force known to be greatly superior in number of ships and power of ordnance. He apparently, but not quite clearly, suggests that the Germans knew how the British fleet would be employed and how it would be disposed. It would be difficult to put any other construction on the words—"With the object of engaging a fleet usually so disposed and so employed, the Germans came out from their bases." Surely this is a pure assumption which can only be supported by other assumptions founded on improbability rather than on probability. There is another assumption which is more plausible and which is supported by evidence—indirect, it is true, but copious. The war had been going on for more than a year and a half, and yet the German High Sea Fleet, in spite of its name, had sedulously refrained from venturing on the high seas. This made it the object of perpetual taunts by the enemies of Germany. There was some not completely suppressed restlessness among the German people.
It has been an almost invariable rule in war that the fleet which keeps on lying in port is eventually forced to put to sea by public opinion. The tone and wording of many official German statements justify the conclusion that the German fleet put to sea with the object, not of meeting the British fleet, but of returning to port with the assertion that the British fleet had kept out of the way and that the North Sea had been "swept" for it in vain. Contrary to the probable expectation, Sir David Beatty's force was met with and there seemed a chance of being able to attack him with the whole strength of the German Navy. Unforeseen opportunities of the kind have frequently occurred in naval war, and may be expected frequently to occur again.