Comment by Mr. Arthur Pollen
Arthur Pollen, the English naval critic, offers the following observations on debatable phases of the battle:
I have read Mr. Frothingham's article, and it seems to me to be substantially accurate as a synopsis of the officially published events of the afternoon and evening. The writer's comments also seem to be judicious and fair. The battle raises, however, so many and such large problems, strategical, tactical, and technical, that it is impossible for any writer to exhaust the matter, or even to indicate the disputable points in so small a space as Mr. Frothingham has been able to devote to it.
In one or two not unimportant particulars I hold a different view of the facts and different opinions from the writer. For example, it seems to me that the Grand Fleet did not, as Mr. Frothingham states on Page 339, at 6:25 form in battle line astern of the battle cruisers. The plan published with the dispatches makes it seem more probable that the van of the Grand Fleet followed a course considerably to the north though parallel to that of the battle cruisers, and that it was not until about 7:05 that they turned from an easterly to a southerly course and formed astern of the Vice Admiral commanding the battle cruiser fleet. The story of the action might have been very different had circumstances permitted of the Grand Fleet going into action astern of the Vice Admiral at 6:15.
Again, Page 337, I cannot agree that it is evident that the German fleet was not forced into action with the Grand Fleet, but that Vice Admiral Scheer deliberately chose to engage that force. There is nothing to show that Scheer suspected Jellicoe was on the scene until he began to turn from north to southeast about a quarter of an hour before the Grand Fleet was sighted.
Again, Page 339, I cannot agree that it was the night disposition of the fleet that was the crucial decision. It is true it ended the battle for the night, but the decision which gave the battle its character was taken earlier in the day, when the enemy was allowed to open the range under the cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens. In the existing atmospheric conditions and light it was impossible for gunnery to be effective, even at 12,000 and 9,000 yards and the only terms on which the German fleet could be defeated and sunk would have been those of close action. The refusal of close action was due to the menace of the German destroyer attacks, used on this occasion for purposes of defense and to afford an opportunity of evasion, with masterly skill and decisive effect. The dispositions and tactics of the night action are a different matter, but of these we are still completely ignorant.