ENGLAND'S PACIFIC SPIRIT
First—The memorandum bears witness to the pacific spirit of the British people. Here are some of its words:
"The commercial jealousy about which we [in Germany] hear so much is based on a wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly Germany's rise as a commercial power after 1870 and during the following decades was a menace to British commercial circles which with their industries and export houses had held a virtual monopoly. The increasing commerce with Germany, which was the leading country in Europe as regards British exports, had, however, given rise to the wish to maintain friendly relations with their best customer and business friend, and had driven all other considerations into the background. Notably, in commercial spirit and the effort to further our common commercial interests.
"At the English cities to which I was invited (by the Chambers of Commerce and municipalities) I was well received everywhere. * * * In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and co-operation—at Court, in society, and from the Government.
"On account of our fleet alone England would not have drawn the sword any more than on account of our trade, which has been alleged to have produced jealousy and finally war. * * * It was possible to arrive at an understanding in spite of the fleet, and without a 'naval holiday,' [intermission of naval shipbuilding.]"
Second—The memorandum shows that the attitude of the British Government, and in particular of Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Minister, was entirely pacific. The admirable characterization of Sir Edward it contains is too long to quote, but it testifies to his perfect straightforwardness and constant wish to maintain good relations with Germany, and after describing how "the simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the respect even of his opponents," it adds: "This is a true picture of the man who is decried [in Germany] as 'Liar Grey' and instigator of the world war."
The memorandum goes on to show how sincerely Sir Edward had worked for peace, first in 1913, during the Balkan troubles, when he went hand-in-hand with Germany, "hardly ever supporting the French or Russian claims. He conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm, and tact." Frequently, when appealed to by Lichnowsky to use his influence with the Russian Government to arrange difficulties between it and Germany, "Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention contributed in no small degree to smooth the matter over."
Third—A still weightier evidence of the good-will of the British Government is supplied by the account given of the concessions made to German wishes in Asia and Africa. "Sir Edward Grey," says the memorandum, "after having outstanding points of difference with France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements with us. It was not his object to isolate us, but to the best of his power to make us partners in the existing association. As he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, so he also wished to do his best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and, by a network of treaties, which would no doubt have led in the end to an agreement on the troublesome question of naval armaments, to insure the peace of the world.
THE BAGDAD RAILWAY
"His plan was, in his own words, without interfering with England's existing friendship, which had no aggressive aims and does not entail any binding obligations, to arrive at a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany to bring the two groups [of powers] nearer." In pursuance of this policy, the British Government went a very long way to meet German wishes in respect to the Bagdad Railway. They agreed to let it be prolonged to El Basra; they included the whole of Mesopotamia as far as that town in the German sphere of influence, and also the whole district of the Bagdad and Anatolian railway, i. e., all the centre of Asia Minor.