"He asked me was that necessary if we had a friendly agreement? I said it would be a less convincing proof of friendliness if Germany prepared her third squadron, and we should have no option. Still, I said, this was not so serious as the proposal to add a third ship every second year to the German construction program. This would put us in great difficulties so far as securing the good opinion of the public in England about the value of an agreement. We should certainly have to proceed at once to lay down two keels to each one of the new German additions, and that would cost money and cause feeling. It was true that each country could bear the additional cost without difficulty. They were rich and so were we. If it was for the purpose of the navy our people would not complain, in my opinion, of the addition of another shilling to the income tax, but it would be a great pity. He asked was that really likely to be our program, the laying down of two additional keels for each German one. I said that I had no doubt that it would be the result, and the Government would be turned out if they failed to accomplish it; and therefore some modification seemed to be of the utmost importance, if the agreement was to be a real success."
"After a pause he said he would consider this and 'die Sache überlegen.' The conversation up to this point had been largely in German, I taking to English whenever there was a delicate topic, and the Chancellor occasionally speaking English, but nearly always German. In order to avoid misunderstanding repeated sentences in the other language. I was impressed by his evident desire to meet us wherever he could, and I derived considerable hope from the manner and emphasis with which he said that he would reconsider the question of the ships. But I must add that he went on to say that the question of the new squadron was vital, and that some new ships would be necessary in it. Could I suggest any way out, for they must keep to the plan of a new law. I observed that it was not for me to venture to make any suggestion to his Excellency, but that a spreading out in size of the new program might make a difference. He said, 'Perhaps, eight or nine years'; I added, 'or twelve, if he could not do better.' He again said that he would take this matter into serious consideration and consult his experts. 'My Admirals,' he said, 'are very difficult.' 'That was an experience,' I observed, 'which we sometimes found in England also.'"
THE KAISER AND VON TIRPITZ
On the following day, Feb. 9, Lord Haldane had an interview with the Emperor, the Chancellor, and Admiral Tirpitz on the navy, at which Tirpitz held out for the new German naval program, which was discussed at great length. Lord Haldane wrote:
"I insisted that fundamental modification was essential. The tone was thoroughly friendly, but I felt that I had come to the most difficult part of my task of getting material fit to bring back for the consideration of my colleagues. The utmost I was able to get was this: The Emperor was so disturbed at the idea that the world would not believe in the reality of the agreement unless the shipbuilding program was modified that he asked me what I would suggest. I said that it was a too technical matter for me to discuss here, but that if he would not drop the new law—which I saw he felt he could not—he might at least drop out a ship. This idea was never abandoned, but Admiral Tirpitz combated it so hard that I said: 'Well, can we not spread the tempo?' After much talking we got to this, that, as I insisted that they must not inaugurate the agreement by building an additional ship at once, they should put off building the first ship till 1913, and then should not lay down another till three years after, (1916,) and not lay down the third till 1919."
"Admiral Tirpitz wanted us to give some understanding about our own shipbuilding. He thought the two-power standard a hard one for Germany, and, indeed, Germany could not make any admission about it. I said it was not a matter of admission. Germany must be free and we must be free, and we should probably lay down two keels to their one. In this case the initiative was not with us, but with them. An idea occurred to all of us on this observation that we should try to avoid defining a standard proportion in the agreement, and that, indeed, we should say nothing at all about shipbuilding in the if the political agreement was concluded the Emperor should at once announce to the German public that this entirely new fact modified his desire for the fleet law as originally conceived, and that it should be delayed and spread out to the extent we had discussed. For the rest, each of us would remain masters in our own houses as far as naval matters were concerned."
"The Emperor thought the agreement would affect profoundly the tendency in shipbuilding, and he certainly should not desire to go beyond the three ships. The fact of the agreement was the key to everything. The Chancellor, he said, would propose to me this afternoon a formula which he had drafted. I said that I would see the Chancellor and discuss any further territorial questions with him, and would then return as speedily as I could and report the good disposition which I had found to my colleagues, and leave the difficulties of not being able to stop shipbuilding more completely, and, indeed, all other matters to their judgment. I could only assure the Emperor that I had been much struck with the friendly disposition in Berlin, and that he would find a not less friendly disposition in London."
NO AGREEMENT REACHED
Lord Haldane mentions that he was in communication with M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, and recounted his conversations to him. The Ambassador quite appreciated that the purpose of the mission was to create a detente, as distinguished from an entente. M. Jules Cambon reported his conversation with Lord Haldane to M. Poincaré.
Lord Haldane had another conversation with the Chancellor in the hope of arriving at a formula with regard to the navy. The Chancellor said that the "forces he had to contend with were almost insuperable. Public opinion in Germany expected a new law and the third squadron, and he must have these. I said we could not contest Germany's right to do in these matters, and indeed in other matters, as she pleased. But why not postpone the shipbuilding for longer and adapt the law accordingly? * * *"