The front of the attack was twenty miles in length, as compared with a front of thirty miles in the attack on the Chemin des Dames and fifty miles in the first phase of the offensive on March 21, and so far it is only on the central half of this smaller front that any considerable impression has been made on the French lines.
Whatever may have been the exact design, there had not been this time the same extreme scruple to conceal troop movements, and for some days past the exceptional traffic of convoys, the suspicious activity of the enemy batteries in the correction of ranges and other signs had given warning of what was afoot.
HEAVIER GERMAN LOSSES
One consequence was that, when the German infantry advanced yesterday morning, it had to meet a volume of fire very different from that which had answered the surprises of St. Quentin and the Aisne Heights. French gunners had thoroughly studied the ground before them and were all ready to deluge every path of approach directly that graycoat waves appeared. From the beginning, therefore, the German losses have been heavier than on the earlier occasions, and this must affect the development of the action.
In other respects the now familiar von Hutier manoeuvre appears to have been repeated, shock battalions carrying light machine guns and machine rifles concentrating upon local breaches in our line and leaving the task of cleaning up islands of resistance to the support troops while they pressed on rapidly to exploit the first success. It will probably be found that the operation was begun with about fifteen divisions in the line, approximately 150,000 men, giving a density of one division to a mile and a third.
Faced with a force superior in all arms, long resistance of the first line is impossible, but it is significant that at 8 o'clock yesterday morning, that is after four hours of a terrible storm of gas and explosive shells, followed by four hours of hand-to-hand struggle, our allies were still in a large part of the field fighting within what is called the zone of advanced posts, and only the centre had fallen back on the zone of principal resistance. Plemont Hill, overlooking Lassigny, was still holding out at that hour, although the front had lain immediately beneath it. The villages of Le Fretoy and Courcelles were lost during the morning, but were recovered by counterattacks, in which the French troops showed the highest spirit.
Up to late last night the only result that von Hutier could regard as in any degree justifying the effort made and the losses suffered was the capture of the villages of Ressons-sur-Matz and Mareuil-la-Motte, whereas on the French left before Ribecourt, by Le Tretoy to Courcelles, and on the right from Belval to Cannectancourt, the advance varied from one to two miles. At the centre it rather exceeded three.
This is a poor gain, judged by precedent, and was bought at an exorbitant price, but it has a certain tactical and perhaps superior consequence.
Later on June 10 Mr. Perris gave this further description of the progress of the fighting:
"This is the real battle," said a French staff officer, meaning to contrast today's fierce fighting between forces unequal indeed, but not crushingly so, with the attack on the Chemin des Dames. Here the French had a stronger line, their reserves were nearer, and they had sufficient notice to bring their batteries at every point into effective action. Effective, do I say? At many points it was a massacre of the columns of assault, and there is unanimity as well among the prisoners as among our own combatants that the ranks of the enemy have been torn and plowed with shot and shell. Never, perhaps, has the German Army paid so dearly for an advance which nowhere exceeds five miles.