Three critical days of the offensive have then given the enemy at the cost of enormous losses a not very magnificent result. We now know that the program was to reach Compiègne on the second day. General von Hutier must be greatly disappointed.
The attack was begun with fourteen divisions, at full strength, in the line. They included at the centre divisions of the Prussian Guard and four other crack divisions. About twice as many divisions have now been thrown into this battle, ten already holding the sector and the rest being fresh reserves.
These figures may be measured by the fact that the total German forces in the west amount to 207 divisions, and that of these before the offensive only sixty-two were in the general reserve, the rest being engaged on the front. The more we consider in the light of material considerations like these what the German command essayed and what it has accomplished the more we shall appreciate the valor of the French armies and the qualities of their chiefs; and it is impossible to do justice to either without such reflection.
FRENCH HOLD GAINS
On June 12 Mr. Perris reported that the French were holding their gains and gave these further details of the counterattack the day before:
The French lines hold all the way round from the important position of Mery Plateau by the hamlets of St. Maur and Antheuil to Marest and Chevincourt. Time after time, last night and this morning, the gray-coated masses of General von Hutier came on, only to be mowed down by waves of fire from the 75s and machine guns, and their remnants dispersed with bayonet and grenade.
Yesterday's French counterattacks met great bodies of the enemy prepared to force another advance. Four divisions were found to be ranged in a space of two miles. Hence the frightful intensity of the combat and the abnormal slaughter.
The French tanks did very good service, and fleets of airplanes, British as well as French, swept down upon the battlefield before and behind our infantry, dropping bombs and raining down volleys of bullets wherever a group of enemy soldiers was seen. The numerical inferiority of the French was thus made good.
The block of wooded hills was very difficult to defend, even if the enemy had got no further than Mareuil. The woods prevented long views and open fields of fire; the deep ravines invited infiltrations; the Oise Valley at the back left supply and relief columns open to the German guns, and the Matz Valley, on the west, was the plain path of envelopment. These are the reasons why this corner was not held longer.
Among the wheat and beet fields of the gently rolling plateau further west, on the other hand, the defense had more advantage. There are folds of ground enough to hide its batteries and reserves, but in every direction there are open lines of fire, room for manoeuvre and nume rous railroads. Striking northeast from the Estrées Railway, the French threaten the German centre.