All correspondents on June 14 united in the conclusion that the counterblows of the Allies and the brilliant reaction of the French from Courcelles to Mery ended the fourth phase of the great German offensive. Mr. Perris summed up the situation as follows on June 14:
The front has subsided into actions of no more than local importance. The five days' battle west of the Oise has ended for the Germans, after an advance varying from two to six miles, in a very costly reverse, and for the Allies in a brilliant success of good generalship and indomitable spirit in the ranks.
Beside the losses of the enemy, the French loss of the Thiescourt hills and the wooded part of the valley opposite is of little importance. The offensive which was to give a decision against them is far from finished, but in relation to the resistance it encounters it shows a falling, not a rising, gamut of power.
The first push toward Amiens ended in ten days, having entailed upon the Allies the sacrifice of a tract forty miles deep and serious casualties. The following attack in the north lasted about as long, but with much slighter gains. The German success on the Chemin des Dames brought the Crown Prince's vanguard to the Marne, twenty-five miles from its starting point, but that it touched much less vital ground is proved by the transfer of its centre of pressure to the Ourcq Valley near Villers-Cotterets.
From these results to those of the present week's fighting there is a marked descent, and this failure occurs in what must be accounted one of the most critical directions the enemy can pursue. The ambitious character of his design is now clear. It is not merely to divide the British from the French army and then destroy one of them, but also by a single series of converging operations to destroy them both.
His approach to Amiens as the centre of their joint communications and to Hazebrouck as the door to the Channel ports has been followed by an approach along four converging lines to the region of Paris, the centre of French administrative life. In fact, the attainment of all these objectives would not end the war, for I am sure there is in France, and there probably is in the other countries concerned, a deadly resolution that it shall not be ended in any such way; that, if Paris should be destroyed—which heaven forfend—another capital shall be found, and that there shall be no surrender while there is an army on its legs.
This offensive has had two aims—to reach the crescent north and east of Paris, whence a general attack could be launched, and to draw down, disperse, and harry the allied reserves preparatory to the final "Kaiserschlacht," the crowning blow along the whole line. Its relative failure is a great encouragement.
PETAIN'S MASTERLY TACTICS
Walter Duranty, in reviewing the fourth phase of the offensive, sent the following cable dispatch to The New York Times on June 13:
It has been said that the secret of Pétain's rise in three years from the position of Colonel to Commander in Chief of the French armies is his knowledge of when to launch counterattacks. The ability to select the right place and time for a sudden stroke which nullifies the enemy's gains has been the attribute of great captains throughout history, and is one of the cardinal bases of successful strategy. In that one word, counterattacks, lies the explanation of the triumphant French resistance in the present battle against vastly superior numbers—that and the indomitable courage of the defenders.