REASON AND UNDERSTANDING ACCORDING TO COLERIDGE.
There is a remarkable discrepancy in the statements of Coleridge respecting reason and understanding.
(1.) Friend, vol. i. pp. 207-8. (Pickering.)—
"That many animals possess a share of understanding perfectly distinguishable from mere instinct we all allow. Few persons have a favourite dog, without making instances of its intelligence an occasional topic of conversation. They call for our admiration of the individual animal, and not with exclusive reference to the wisdom in nature, as in the case of στοργὴ, or maternal instinct: or of the hexangular cells of the bees.... We hear little or nothing of the instincts of the 'half-reasoning elephant,' and as little of the understanding of caterpillars and butterflies."
Aids to Reflection, vol. i. pp 171-3. (Pickering.) Here, after quoting two instances from Hüber about bees and ants, he says,—
"Now I assert that the faculty in the acts here narrated does not differ in kind from understanding."
Does Coleridge mean to tell us that bees and ants have the same faculty (understanding) as dogs and elephants?
(2.) Friend, vol. i. pp. 216-7.—