In July, 1830, Sampson Arnold Mackey delivered a course of six "astro-historical lectures" in a large room near the Philanthropic Institution. The attendance was full, considering the subject, and I was surprised at the admiration which many well-educated persons expressed for his strange theories, to which they seemed to give full assent. To me his calculations and etymologies appeared as good as those of Pluche, Sir W. Drummond, Volney, and Dupuis, but no better. I met him at the house of the late Dr. Wright, then resident physician to Bethlehem Hospital. He was quiet and unassuming; but so perfectly satisfied that he had proved his system, that though ready to explain, he declined to answer objections, or defend his opinions. As a remarkable example of "the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties," he excited sympathy, and I believe that he disposed of all the copies of his various works then unsold.
H. B. C.
U. U. Club.
DO CONJUNCTIONS JOIN PROPOSITIONS ONLY?
(Vol. viii., pp. 514. 629.)
As my name appears to have been referred to by two of your correspondents, Mr. Ingleby and H. C. K., in connexion with the above question, I request to be permitted to state my real views upon it, together with the grounds upon which they rest. In doing this I can only directly refer to the observations of H. C. K., not having seen those of Mr. Ingleby to which he makes allusion.
Admitting that there are many conjunctions which connect propositions only, I am unable to coincide with the view of my friend Dr. Latham and other grammarians, that the property is universal. And I agree with Mr. Ingleby, as quoted by H. C. K., in thinking that the incorrectness of that view may be proved. We possess the power of conceiving of any distinct classes of things, as "trees," "flowers," &c. And we possess the power of connecting such conceptions in thought, so as to form, for instance, the conception of that collection of things which consists of "trees and flowers" together. If we possess the power of performing this mental operation, we have clearly also the power of expressing it by a sign. This sign is the conjunction "and." It is assumed, what consciousness indeed makes evident, that the power of forming conceptions is antecedent to that of forming judgments expressed by propositions.
But even if we proceed to form a judgment, as "trees and flowers exist," it may still be shown that the conjunction "and" connects the substantives "trees," "flowers," and not propositions. For if we reduce the given proposition to the form, "trees exist and flowers exist," the conjunction becomes wholly superfluous. It adds nothing whatever to the meaning of the separate propositions, "trees exist," "flowers exist." Omit, however, the conjunction between the substantives in the original proposition, and the sense is wholly lost. What meaning can we attach, except by a convention, to the form of words "trees flowers exist." Now there is, I conceive, no more obvious principle in grammar than that the doctrine of the elements of speech should be founded upon the examination of instances in which they have a real meaning—in which their employment is essential, not accidental.