Epitaph (Vol. iii., p. 57.).—The name of the "worthie knyght" is Sir Thomas Gravener, as A. B. R. might have seen in the printed Catalogue of the Harleian MSS. Who he was, is a more difficult question to answer; but there was a family of that name settled in Staffordshire, as appears from MS. Harl. 1476. fol. 250. The epitaph in question (at fol. 28 b of the old numbering, or 24 b of the new, not fol. 25 b.) is inserted among several short poems written by Sir Thomas Wyatt; and the epitaph itself has a capital W affixed to it, as if it were also of his composition: but I do not find it inserted in Dr. Nott's edition of his poetical works, in 1816; nor does this MS. appear to have been consulted by Dr. Nott. And here I may take the liberty of remarking, how desirable it is that your correspondents, in sending any extracts from old English MSS. to the "Notes and Queries," should adhere strictly to the original orthography, or else modernise it altogether. A. B. R. evidently intends to retain the ancient spelling; yet, from haste or inadvertence, he has committed no less than forty-four literal errors in transcribing this short epitaph, and three verbal ones, namely, itt for that (l. 11.), Hys for The (l. 14.), and or for and (l. 17.). Another curious source of error may here be pointed out. Nearly all the MSS. contained in the British Museum collections are not only distinguished by a number, but have a press-mark stamped on the back, which is denoted by Plut. (an abbreviation of Pluteus, press), with the number and shelf. Thus the Harleian MS. 78., referred to by A. B. R., stands in press (Plut.) LXIII. shelf E. In consequence of the Cottonian collection having been originally designated after the names of the twelve Cæsars (whose busts, together with those of Cleopatra and Faustina, stood above the presses), it appears to have been supposed that other classical names served as references to the remaining portions of the manuscript department. In A. B. R.'s communication, Plut. is expressed by the name of Pluto; in a volume of Miss Strickland's Lives of the Queens of Scotland, lately published, it is metamorphosed into Plutus; and the late Dr. Adam Clarke refers to some of Dr. Dee's MSS. in the Sloane (more correctly, Cottonian) library, under Plutarch xvi. G! (See Catalogue of his MSS., 8vo., 1835, p. 62.) The same amusing error is more formally repeated by Dr. J. F. Payen, in a recent pamphlet, entitled Nouveaux Documents inédits ou peu connus sur Montaigne, 8vo., 1850, at p. 24. of which he refers to "Bibl. Egerton, vol. 23., Plutarch, f. 167.," [Plut. CLXVII. F.], and adds in a note:
"On sait que dans nos bibliothèques les grandes divisions sont marquées par les lettres de l'alphabet; au Musée Britannique c'est par des noms de personnages célèbres qu'on les designe."
μ.
Probabilism (Vol. iii., p. 61.).—Probabilism, so far as it means the principle of reasoning or acting upon the opinion of eminent teachers or writers, was the principle of the Pythagoreans, whose ipse dixit, speaking of their master, is proverbial; and of Aristotle, in his Topics.
But probabilism, in its strict sense, I presume, means the doctrine so common among the Jesuits, 200 years ago, and so well stated by Pascal, that it is lawful to act upon an opinion expressed by a single writer of weight, though contrary to one's own opinion, and entirely overbalanced, either in weight or numbers, by the opinion of other writers.
Jeremy Taylor, in his Ductor Dubitantium, tells us that this doctrine, though very prevalent, was quite modern; and that the old Casuists, according to the plain suggestions of common sense, held directly the contrary, namely, that the less probable opinion must give way to the more probable.
All this may be no answer to the deeper research, perhaps, of your enquirer,—but it may possibly be interesting to general readers, as well as the following refined and ingenious sophism which was used in its support:—They said that all agreed that you could not be wrong in using the more probable, best supported,
opinion of the two. Now, let that in the particular case in question be A, and the less probable B. But the doctrine that you may lawfully take the less probable in general is the more probable doctrine; meaning at that time the doctrine of the greater number of authorities: therefore they said, even upon your principles it is lawful to take B.