For instance, for many years it was thoroughly believed by all the best football men that the kicking game could not be played against the wind under even the most favorable circumstances. This theory has, however, fallen through, and it is generally concluded that with fast, good rushers, and strong, accurate kickers, the running game can with advantage be supplemented with a few timely kicks.
The opening of the game has been discussed; the next point is the placing of the men on the first down by the opponents. This is something of vital interest to the captain, for if the opponents have any strong line of play they will undoubtedly develop it early in the game. To discover and prevent the surprise is, therefore, the end to be aimed at, for a strong play successfully made at this point seriously weakens the adversaries, not only taking from them the actual ground, but upsetting their confidence and nerve as well.
Upon the use of the quarter depends the style of this first defensive play. Some captains keep him back of the line where he may assist the half-backs; others send him up into the line as an extra rusher. Neither of these two plans can be said to be the right one in all cases, for there are two elements which govern the play and should enter into the decision. The first is the relative skill of the rushers and halves. It is always possible for a captain to say whether he is strongest “in the line” or “behind it,” and the quarter is most needed with the weaker set of players. The second is the wind. If this is very strong and straight with the opponents, there is the greatest necessity of checking their running before they shall have advanced the ball within kicking distance of the goal, even though by doing this the captain for the time being leaves his halves and back less secure. Therefore the wise captain brings up his quarter into or just behind the rush line, and concentrates all his strength on preventing the gain of five yards on three downs. In this way he can oblige his opponents to kick or lose the ball before they are far enough advanced to be in dangerous proximity to his goal. Of these two elements, then, it may be conclusively argued the wind is the greater, and if very strong, should decide him to bring his quarter up, even though his line of forwards be exceptionally strong.
The next point worthy of consideration is the offensive and defensive play about the goals. Most important are: guarding a goal against the wind, and trying for a goal with the wind. The former is of the most vital importance, and time spent upon studying the situation will prove of advantage to every captain. Let us suppose the case of a touch-back (i. e., where the ball has crossed the goal-line, but without compelling a safety), for it is generally at this point that the condition becomes most serious. The captain finds himself driven back into his own goal and facing a wind and a team encouraged by success. His own team, on the contrary, are tired with the effort of contesting the ground, and they are also nervous with the feeling that the least slip on their part means a goal or a touch-down. The privilege of a kick-out—at best a privilege of less than twenty-five yards start—seems pitifully small in the face of the odds. The situation is the same as at the kick-off upon beginning, with the exception of the proximity of the goal and the attendant danger. The ball may be place-kicked or drop-kicked down the field or out of bounds; it may be dribbled and passed back for a punt or run. There is one thing which must not be done, and that is to kick or pass the ball out toward the centre of the field or across the goal, for as surely as the ball falls into the enemy’s hands in front of the goal, they will, if their play be accurate, not fail to score. Next to be borne in mind is that when the ball does go into their hands it must be either a down or a fair, i. e., it must not be a fair catch, but must go out of bounds, or into their hands on the roll with a rusher close enough to make them have it down. There are three ways to accomplish this: the first is to place or drop-kick the ball down the edge of the field and out of bounds, or accomplish the same result by a dribble and punt; the second is to attempt the running game until two downs are exhausted, and then kick out of bounds; and the third, and most aggressive of all, to kick the ball a short distance ahead but well up in the air, and putting all the men on side, rely upon getting possession of the ball in air or in the scramble as it falls. If the last plan is adopted every man in the line must go forward with one idea in his mind, and that is to prevent a fair catch at all hazards.
Another question is often discussed regarding the protection of a goal, and that is: Is a man ever justified in running round behind his own goal with the ball on the chance of getting out far enough on the other side to gain ground? The only answer to this question lies in the head of the man who has to do it. There are some who can be trusted to know when it can be done, but most should be told to never do it unless at that point in the game a safety will turn the balance of the score, and they should not do it in the first half.
But to pass to the attack. A side has advanced the ball within kicking distance of their opponents’ goal, having the wind and the ball with them. Should they at once attempt a field-kick, or by running try to get nearer, or even rely upon a touch-down? If they try a field-kick, should it be a drop at goal, or should they punt the ball just short of the goal and chance a muff or a fumble by their adversaries to yield a touch-down? Unless a team is remarkably strong in the running game, and has been making their five yards, it is silly to try a touch-down or nothing. Again, unless there is plenty of time remaining, it takes too long to work the ball up to the line and get it across, beside the many risks of losing possession of it in the meantime. Finally, a punt up in front of the goal is too decidedly a confession of the lack of a good drop-kicker.
As a rule, then, the first down had better be utilized by getting the ball in front of the goal if it is off at the side of the field. The second down should be an attempt to get somewhat nearer only in case the snap-back and quarter are sure men. Otherwise the drop-kick should be tried after the first down. One thing to be said in favor of trying the drop-kick at once, without attempting to bring the ball in front of the goal, is that the adversaries are then much less prepared for the try, and hence the kicker has a more uninterrupted aim and longer time. After the first down the opponents concentrate their attention more upon the kicker.
These are salient features, but, of course, there is an infinity of detail, of which the present article does not give space to speak.
