Another form of torpedo is that known as the locomotive torpedo, of which there are several kinds; some are propelled by liquid carbonic acid, which is carried in a strong tank and acts through a compact engine in driving the propeller. One of these is steered by electricity from the shore, and is known as the Lay-Haight torpedo, and can run twenty-five miles per hour. The Whitehead torpedo is also propelled by liquid carbonic acid, but is not steered from shore. Its depth is regulated by an automatic device actuated by the pressure of the water. The Howell torpedo is driven by a heavy fly wheel which is set in rapid rotation just before the torpedo is launched. It has but a short range and is intended for launching from ships. Another torpedo is propelled and steered from shore by rapidly pulling out of it two fine steel wires which, in unwinding, drive the twin screw propellers. This is the Brennan torpedo. The Sims-Edison torpedo is both propelled and steered by electricity from the shore, transmitted to a motor and steering relay in the torpedo by an insulated cable. This cable has two cores and is paid out by the torpedo as it travels through the water just as a spider pays out its web. The cable is about half an inch in diameter and two miles long, and the torpedo can be driven at about eighteen miles per hour with a current of thirty amperes and 1,800 volts pressure.

Still another auxiliary weapon of defense is the dynamite gun, or rather, a pneumatic gun, that throws long projectiles carrying from 250 to 450 pounds of dynamite, to a distance of about two miles. The shells are arranged to explode soon after striking the water, by an ingenious battery that ignites the fuse as soon as the salt water enters it. The gun, which is known as the Zalinski gun, is some sixty feet long and fifteen inches in caliber, the compressed air being suddenly admitted to it from the reservoirs at any desired pressure by a special form of valve that regulates the range. These guns are to be mounted in deep pits and fired at somewhat higher elevations than ordinary guns, but it has great accuracy within reasonable limits of range.

FIELD FORTIFICATIONS.

In field fortification an enormous quantity of work was done during our last war. Washington, Richmond, Nashville, Petersburg, Norfolk, New Berne, Plymouth, Vicksburg, and many other cities were elaborately fortified by field works which involved the handling of vast quantities of earth, and, where the opposing lines were near together, ditches, abbatis, ground torpedoes, and wire entanglements were freely used. In some cases the same ground was fortified in succession by both armies, so that the total amount of work expended, in this way, would have built several hundred miles of railway. Around Richmond and Petersburg alone the development of field works was far greater than Wellington's celebrated lines at Torres Vedras. In all future wars, when large armies are opposed to each other, it is probable that field works will play even a more important part than in the past. The great advantage of such works, since the introduction of the deadly breech loading rifles and machine guns, was shown at Plevna, where the Russians were almost annihilated in attempting to capture the Turkish intrenchments.

SIEGES.

It is not proposed to go into historical or other details of this branch of the subject, but to give in a condensed form some account of siege operations. According to the text books, the first thing to be done, if possible, in case of a regular siege, is to "invest" the fortress. This is done by surrounding it as quickly as possible with a continuous line of troops, who speedily intrench themselves and mount guns bearing outward on all lines of approach to the fortress, to prevent the enemy from sending in supplies or re-enforcements. As this line must be at considerable distance from the fort, it is usually quite long, and so is its name, for it is called the line of "Circumvallation." Inside of this line is then established a similar line facing toward the fort, to prevent sorties by the garrison. This line is called the line of "Countervallation," and should be as close to the fort as the range of its guns and the nature of the ground will permit. From this line the troops rush forward at night and open the trenches, beginning with what is called the first parallel, which should be so laid out as to envelop those parts of the fort which are to be made the special objects of attack. From this first parallel a number of zigzag trenches are started toward the fort and at proper intervals other parallels, batteries, and magazines are built; this method of approach being continued until the besieged fort is reached, or until such batteries can be brought to bear upon it as to breech the walls and allow the attacking troops to make an assault.

During these operations of course many precautions must be observed, both by the attacking and defending force, to annoy each other and to prevent surprise, and the work is mostly carried on under cover of the earth thrown from the trenches. These operations were supposed to occupy, under normal conditions, about forty-one days, or rather nights, as most of the work is done after dark, at the end of which time the fort should be reduced to such a condition that its commander, having exhausted all means of defense, would be justified in considering terms of surrender.

The Theoretical Journal of the siege prescribes just what is to be done each day by both attack and defense up to the final catastrophe, and this somewhat discouraging outlook for the defenders was forcibly illustrated by the late Captain Derby, better known by the reading public as "John Phœnix," who, when a cadet, was called upon by Professor Mahan to explain how he would defend a fort, mounting a certain number of guns and garrisoned by a certain number of men, if besieged by an army of another assumed strength in men and guns, replied:

"I would immediately evacuate the fort and then besiege it and capture it again in forty-one days."

Of course the fallacy of this reasoning was in the fact that the besieging army is generally supposed to be four or five times as large as the garrison of the fort; the primary object of forts being to enable a small force to hold a position, at least for a time, against a much larger force of the enemy.