We have room only for a single example to illustrate the truth of our position. We select the mental power termed by Dr. Brown “anger;” in phrenology, “Combativeness.” In his description of this feeling, Dr. Brown is truly eloquent. His organ of Combativeness must have been large, or he could not have described the feeling with such vividness and accuracy.
“There is a principle in our mind,” says he, “which is to us like a constant protector; which may slumber, indeed, but which slumbers only at seasons when its vigilance would be useless; which awakes, therefore, at the first appearance of unjust intentions, and which becomes more watchful and more vigorous in proportion to the violence of the attack which it has to dread. What should we think of the providence of nature, if, when aggressions were made against the weak and unarmed, at a distance from the aid of others, there were instantly and uniformly, by the intervention of some wonder-working power, to rush into the hand of the defenceless a sword or other weapon of defence? And yet this would be but a feeble assistance, if compared with that which we receive from those simple emotions which Heaven has caused to rush, as it were, into our mind for repelling every attack. What would be a sword in the trembling hand of the infirm, of the aged—of him whose pusillanimous spirit shrinks at the very appearance not of danger merely, but even of arms by the use of which danger might be averted, and to whom, consequently, the very sword which he scarcely knew how to grasp would be an additional cause of terror? The instant anger which arises, does more than many such weapons. It gives the spirit which knows how to make a weapon of every thing, or which itself without a weapon does what even a thunderbolt would be powerless to do in the shuddering grasp of a coward. When anger rises, fear is gone. There is no coward, for all are brave.”—Brown’s Lects. Hedge’s ed. vol. ii. p. 32.
This is a correct description, as far as it goes, of the feeling or emotion which may be termed instant anger, and which depends on Combativeness. But he confines himself to the simple emotion as it rises in view of provocation or insult, or any threatened injury. It is true he speaks of resentment being “too long protracted,” (which depends on Destructiveness, and this is another example of confounding primitive elements of the mind with each other,) and disproportionate to the offence; transferred from the guilty to the innocent; rising too soon, when it should be entirely suppressed; and as not confined to the individual aggrieved; but it is all in such a manner as to show conclusively that he thinks the subject exhausted with a description of what in common language is usually termed anger. But phrenology teaches that the element of the mind, which is at the foundation of anger, is “an active impulse exerting an influence on the mental constitution, independent of unjust attacks.” Dr. Brown has confined his description of the faculty to one mode of manifestation or activity, which is precisely analogous to the case we have supposed above from chemistry. But how imperfect is the description till we are told that this elementary feeling is the basis not only of anger or resentment at injury, but constitutes in every mind, according to its strength, the propensity to oppose; that it aids the good man to carry through his plans of benevolence, as well as the bad to execute his purposes of malice; that united with deficient intellect and weak moral sentiment, it makes the quarrelsome, vaunting boxer, while in a different combination it is an important element in the character of the unflinching philanthropist; that it not only gives boldness to the soldier on the field of battle, and fills with indignation the mind of an injured person, but imparts energy to the messenger of peace, and even enables gentle and virtuous woman better to fulfil the important duties of her station. We want to know what is that element of mind which is the basis of anger, and then the influence of this element in all its varieties of combination.
We are not aware that this representation is in the least open to the charge of exaggeration. Nor is the defect of which we speak confined to the system of Dr. Brown. It extends to all the systems of the old philosophers, and almost to every part of those systems; nor could their principles of investigation and the data they had at command, or which they would use, furnish any remedy. If they went to the extent of their powers or their data, we should not complain; and yet if there are additional helps or data, why should we not employ them?
There is one more topic connected with this part of the subject upon which we would remark, viz. the nomenclature of phrenology. We cannot better introduce what we have to say, than by quoting the language of Dr. Whately, published in the second number of this Journal, page 47.
“I am convinced that, even if all connection of the brain with the mind were regarded not merely as doubtful, but as a perfect chimera, still the treatises of many phrenological writers, especially yours,” (Mr. Combe’s,) “would be of great value, from their employing a metaphysical nomenclature far more accurate, logical, and convenient, than Locke, Stewart, and other writers of their schools.”
Higher authority on this subject than Dr. Whately could not be cited. But the testimony of many persons of high authority might be quoted. Even the opponents of phrenology will express their admiration of its classification and nomenclature; and that, too, while they profess entire unbelief in the truth of the system, not reflecting that this excellency is an important argument in favour of its truth. Simplicity and clearness are only attributes of truth; and the principle is without exception, that of two systems, that which is most simple and clear is most accordant with truth. Such ever has, and ever will be, the verdict of mankind.
Without claiming perfection for phrenology in regard to classification and nomenclature, we think its advantages in this respect to mental science will be incalculable. Every writer on metaphysics usually tills some scores of pages on the importance of being precise in the use of language, and the danger of employing terms in a loose and careless manner; and no one who looks at the history of metaphysical science will consider such cautions as unnecessary. One half or three fourths of the controversies which have taken place in reference to the philosophy of the mind, have doubtless arisen from a misunderstanding of terms. This is true not only in regard to subjects purely metaphysical, but many controversial treatises on religious doctrines would never have been inflicted on the world, had the parties understood each other. We do not claim for a knowledge of phrenology the quality of a sovereign universal remedy for those evils. There are many subjects of controversy not directly connected with the science; and difference of opinion as often arises from difference of feeling as from difference in intellectual apprehension. Even phrenologists, equally well versed in the principles of their science, will sometimes have different views. But with them, controversies and discussions do not arise from a misunderstanding of language. Although there is still terra incognita within the limits of the system, and many indefinite points, some of which probably never will be settled in our mortal state, yet the harmony of phrenologists on the science of the mind is scarcely surpassed by that of other philosophers on the science of matter; and even where only a partial acquaintance with the science is possessed, such is the clearness of its classification and the definitions of its terms, that misunderstanding in relation to subjects legitimately involving such language is almost necessarily excluded from minds of ordinary discipline and capacity.
We entirely accord with the opinion of Dr. Whately, that if the science were regarded “as a perfect chimera,” still the “employing a metaphysical nomenclature,” to which it has given rise, “would be of great value.”