We are now introduced to the Baron de Carondelet, a name which afterwards became conspicuous in the History of Louisiana, and familiar to the citizens of the United States. He was appointed governor of the province, and entered upon his duties in 1792. "The sympathies and partialities of the people of Louisiana began to manifest themselves strongly in favour of the French patriots, principally in New-Orleans." The Baron thought it to be his duty, especially as he was a native of France, "to restrain excesses against monarchical government." He began by stopping "the exhibition of certain martial dances and revolutionary airs" at the theatre. He afterwards thought it necessary to adopt stronger measures to suppress the growing inclination to popular doctrines, and betook himself to the custom of the country, the New-Orleans common law, or rather the law of its governors, to ship off the obnoxious persons, without any form of trial or condemnation. He caused six individuals to be arrested and confined in the fort, and soon afterwards, "shipped them for Havana, where they were detained a twelve month." This may be a very pretty military mode of getting rid of disagreeable or troublesome people—the summary arrest—the fort—the ship and banishment; but we cannot reconcile it to our notions of liberty and law.
We pass over, as matters well known, the plans of Genet at this period, and the proceedings of the Baron to defeat them.—The Baron also followed up, with great perseverance, "his favourite plan for the separation of the western people from the Union," and he continued to do so, subsequent to the ratification of the treaty between the United States and Spain. The report made by Power, the Baron's agent, of the dispositions of the western people, was altogether unpropitious to his design. He, however, delayed the delivery of the posts, to which the United States were entitled, under various pretences; still having the separation in view. His proceedings to effect this object are detailed, and will be read with interest. It is needless to say, that no ray of success shone upon his enterprise. Power, the active agent of the mischief, came very near to be tarred and feathered at Louisville, and was afterwards arrested by General Wilkinson, at Detroit. The Baron must have opened his eyes in astonishment at his egregious miscalculation of the dispositions of the West, when Wilkinson informed him, "that the people of Kentucky had proposed to him to raise an army of ten thousand men to take New-Orleans in case of a rupture with Spain."
Our author gives a concise account of the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, and again by France to the United States. The negotiator by whom the latter transfer was conducted, on the part of France, was M. Marbois, and his work is the most satisfactory authority for the curious details of that extraordinary proceeding. The general character of the transaction, and the terms of purchase, are sufficiently known; but M. Marbois lets us into some of the secrets of the negotiation, and of the reasons which induced the first consul to part with this valuable territory as soon as he had acquired it. We will be brief with them.
The cession of Louisiana by France to Spain in 1763, was not only, as we have seen, a cause of violent discontent to the inhabitants of that province, but was considered in all the maritime and commercial cities of France, as impolitic and injurious; and a general wish prevailed to recover the colony. This did not escape Bonaparte, who did not delay to renew with the court of Madrid, a negotiation on the subject; having also in view a diminution of the power of England, which was never out of his mind. Profiting by the ascendancy he acquired by the victory of Marengo, he easily persuaded the Prince of Peace to restore Louisiana to France. This was done by a treaty made in October 1800. It was stipulated that the surrender should be made six months after. The treaty of 21st March 1801, renews these dispositions; but Louisiana continued for some time longer under the dominion of Spain. The differences between the United States and the French republic were terminated by a convention at Paris, on 30th of September 1800; and on the next day the treaty above mentioned with Spain was concluded at St. Ildephonso. As the war between France and England still continued, the cession of Louisiana to France was not made public; nor was possession taken. This difficulty was not removed for some time. In October 1801, preliminaries of peace were signed at London, followed up by the treaty of Amiens in March 1802. In the following September General Victor was appointed governor general of Louisiana; and Laussat the prefect sailed for New-Orleans in January.
The retrocession of the province to France created much uneasiness and alarm in the United States. The free navigation of the Mississippi became daily of more importance, and it was apprehended that the French would not be found as peaceable neighbours as the Spaniards. Every one remembers the short and uneasy existence of the insincere peace of Amiens. A renewal of the war was seen to be inevitable, and the American cabinet perceived that, in such an event, France would postpone the occupation of Louisiana. This state of things was justly thought to be favourable to an arrangement with France on the subject of the deposit at New-Orleans and the navigation of the river. Mr. Monroe was sent to that country for this purpose, where Mr. Livingston, our minister, had been pursuing it for many months; his overtures received little or no attention. The debates in our senate are not forgotten, on the motion of Mr. Ross; nor the prospect then in view of our taking by force of arms what it was believed would never be gained by treaty. In the spring of 1803, war was clearly inevitable between France and England; and Bonaparte knew that Louisiana, in that event, would be at the mercy of his enemy. He at once determined to change his policy in regard to that province, and to part with it, as the only means of saving it from England. On the 10th of April 1803, he entered upon the execution of his design, and called two counsellors to him, and addressed them "with that vehemence and passion which he particularly manifested in political affairs." He said he knew the full value of Louisiana, and had been desirous of repairing the fault by which it was lost—that "a few lines of a treaty have restored it to me, and I have scarcely recovered it when I must expect to lose it." Looking to the strength it would give to the United States, he said: "But if it escapes from me, it shall one day cost dearer to those who oblige me to strip myself of it, than to those to whom I wish to deliver it." After some remarks upon the naval strength in the Gulf of Mexico, and the ease with which they might take Louisiana, he added;—
"I think of ceding it to the United States. I can scarcely say that I cede it to them, for it is not yet in our possession. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall only transmit an empty title to those republicans whose friendship I seek. They only ask of me one town in Louisiana, but I already consider the colony as entirely lost, and it appears to me that in the hands of this growing power, it will be more useful to the policy and even to the commerce of France, than if I should attempt to keep it."
The counsellors differed in their opinions, diametrically, each giving his reasons at large. The first consul decided the question immediately; he promptly declared, that
"Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New-Orleans that I will cede, it is the whole colony without any reservation. I know the price of what I abandon, and I have sufficiently proved the importance that I attach to this province, since my first diplomatic act with Spain had for its object the recovery of it. I renounce it with the greatest regret. To attempt obstinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiate this affair with the envoys of the United States. Do not even await the arrival of Mr. Monroe: have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston."
We hope and believe that one of the predictions of this luminous mind will not be fulfilled, although we have lately seen some appearances of its accomplishment.
"Perhaps it will also be objected to me, that the Americans may be found too powerful for Europe in two or three centuries: but my foresight does not embrace such remote fears. Besides, we may hereafter expect rivalries among the members of the Union. The confederations, that are called perpetual, only last till one of the contracting parties finds it to its interest to break them, and it is to prevent the danger, to which the colossal power of England exposes us, that I would provide a remedy."