The pieces of silver with which redemptions are to be made are in no sense to be regarded as money. They are distinctly merchandise, possessing a commercial value precisely equivalent to the number of money units received or surrendered therefor, and when the notes have been redeemed, and the commercial equivalent has been given therefor, the government’s responsibility ends. The government assumes no obligation to maintain silver bullion at a given ratio to gold, but it does assume to make each unit of money the equal of 25.8 grains of gold. In other words, the fluctuations in the value of silver are confined to it in its bullion shape, and cannot enter into its form as money. The idea that paper currency must be redeemed in gold, as money, or silver, as money, is erroneous. It is redeemed in those metals because they have value as merchandise. In domestic transactions this fact is often lost sight of, but it becomes manifest in international exchanges when the metallic money passes strictly on its merits as bullion, and without regard to the stamp it bears. For these reasons the Treasury should not be understood as guaranteeing the weight or fineness of the metal, except in its immediate transactions, although to facilitate its ready acceptance between reputable merchants, the affixing of the government’s seal upon the pieces would be a very proper practice.
Nor is there any mechanical difficulty in the way of the operation of the plan. The silver could be fashioned into pieces of different sizes graduated upon a decimal scale of grains, with the smallest piece containing fifty grains, being somewhat larger than the current dime. By limiting redemptions, then, to fifty dollars and multiples thereof, our pieces will in every conceivable instance enable us to make the exchange, or redemption, to the accuracy of a single grain on each dollar, which is certainly sufficiently close for all practical purposes.
In contrast to the national banking system, the bonds could be retired without derangement to our finances, the metals forming a basis upon which our outstanding currency could directly rest—thus obviating the extravagant features of that system and stripping us of the impediment of an immense debt. And not only this: the encouragement natural bimetallism would hold out to owners of bullion of both kinds would cause our national vaults to be filled to overflowing with the sinews of war, and make us the best equipped nation on the earth for a prolonged struggle, should such a struggle come.
By providing a means for the remonetization of silver at the market rate we are doing its friends a greater kindness than they ask. Free coinage on seemingly more favorable terms would result in immediate overproduction and a glutted market, from which condition it would be most difficult to escape. If there be any merit in the contention that a “demand” for the metal is what is needed, and that that demand will enhance its price, so much the better, for in that case not only will the condition of the silver industry improve, but the government itself will be benefited by the enhancement in the value of the metal it already holds and may hereafter acquire. The example set by the United States would be gladly imitated by other nations, and the use of silver as a basis for money would speedily rival that of gold.
Viewed as an experiment the trial of it would be inexpensive and without peril, while congressional debates pending its consideration would give no cause for apprehension or disturbance to business, since the gold standard would not be jeopardized. But why should it be regarded as experimental when the most elementary and most familiar business principles are followed?
The question may be raised whether the preservation of the gold standard is desirable, since, it is claimed, it is gradually appreciating in value. To this it may be said that the peril of the gold standard does not consist in the fact that it is rising, but that it has been hitherto accompanied by the non-use of silver in final redemptions. That an appreciating dollar is necessarily an evil is, moreover, fairly debatable. During the period from 1864-1872 (which our Democratic friends delight to laud as the most prosperous in our history), although we were nominally on a bimetallic basis, contracts were made on that of the greenback, which rose during that time an average of ten per cent per annum, to wit: from 49.2 cents in 1864, to 89 cents in 1872. In other words the debtor who borrowed $492.00 in 1864 was obliged, eight years later, to pay his creditor $890.00 of like purchasing power as he had received, in addition to a considerably higher interest than now current. I do not wish to be considered as standing sponsor for the rising dollar, but it is a pertinent question to ask those who decry the gold standard for this reason, why the same cause did not have the same effect in each instance.
The objection may be made that I would make of a silver mere commodity, but the point is not well taken, inasmuch as the mint offerings are transmuted into paper currency, which is virtually making silver, money; moreover, the silver itself is retained in its present form of subsidiary coinage. Silver is not a moral being possessed of rights and sensitive to insults; it is a mere thing whose function it is to serve us in any way we may deem most conducive to our interests. If under the system of natural bimetallism it does this best, the question as to its money or commodity character is vain. Moreover, under Gresham’s law, one metal under the fixed ratio is not only “reduced to a commodity,” but is absolutely expelled from circulation and as a basis for circulation; and we have also seen that in the last analysis both silver and gold are commodities under any system of specie payments.
Under a republican form of government, where frequent and extreme changes from one policy to another must be guarded against, that policy should be adopted which most nearly conforms to justice, and which the sense of the largest majority commends. What proposition, then, could be fairer and more apt to commend itself to the general intelligence than that the metals should be monetized at their commercial values from day to day, or what policy more likely to remain unaffected by the mutations of parties and politics?
In conclusion let me sum up the salient points: We have seen (1) that the chief weakness of the present system is the non-availability of silver for final redemptions; (2) that “currency reform” is inadequate because of its unpopularity and in failing to increase the primary basis of money by the addition of silver; and (3) that the principle of the fixed ratio is fallacious and impracticable. On the other hand, we have discovered Natural Bimetallism to be the application of the principles of everyday business to that business which underlies all others,—national finance,—and that the advantages resulting therefrom are: It dispenses with the necessity of an international agreement with its attendant uncertainties, perils, and delays, and at the same time points out the way to a sound and permanent home policy upon which all our factions could unite. It practically restores to silver its unlimited coinage at its just market rate, injects a healthy stimulus into the languishing silver industry, preserves our admirable system of subsidiary coinage, and utilizes both metals as companion pillars of our national credit. It coaxes gold to the mint, keeps it there, and does away permanently with bond issues. It provides for the retirement of the greenbacks, supplies their place with currency equally sound but less hazardous, and insures the absolute parity of every dollar in circulation with every other, and with gold. In fine, as every true principle must, and as only a true principle can, it answers every condition of the problem to which it applies, and commends itself as the best, if not the only, way out of our financial embarrassments.