On the 21st of December, 1859, General Miramon, at the head of the forces of the Mexican Republic, met an army of Liberals at Colima, and overthrew it. The first accounts of the action represented the victory of the Conservatives to be complete, and as settling the fate of Mexico for the present, as between the parties headed respectively by Juarez and Miramon. Later accounts show that there was some exaggeration as to the details of the action, but the defeat of the Liberals is not denied. It would be rash to attach great importance to any Mexican battle; but the Liberal cause was so depressed before the action at Colima as to create the impression that it could not survive the result of that day. Whether the cause of which Miramon is the champion be popular in Mexico or the reverse, it is certain that at the close of 1859 that chief had succeeded in every undertaking in which he had personally engaged; and our own political history is too full of facts which show that a successful military man is sure to be a popular chief, whatever may be his opinions, to allow of our doubting the effect of victory on the minds of the Mexicans. The mere circumstance that Miramon is personally victorious, while the Liberals achieve occasional successes over their foes where he is not present, will be of much service to him. That "there is nothing so successful as success" is an idea as old as the day on which the Tempter of Man caused him to lose Paradise, and to the world's admission of it is to be attributed the decision of nearly every political contest which has distracted society. Miramon may have entered upon a career not unlike to that of Santa Aña, whose early victories enabled him to maintain his hold on the respect of his countrymen long after it should have been lost through his cruelties and his disregard of his word and his oath. All, indeed, that is necessary to complete the power of Miramon is, that some foreign nation should interfere in Mexican affairs in behalf of Juarez. Such interference, if made on a sufficiently large scale, might lead to his defeat and banishment, but it would cause him to reign in the hearts of the Mexicans; and he would be recalled, as we have seen Santa Aña recalled, as soon as circumstances should enable the people to act according to their own sense of right.
Before considering the probable effect of Miramon's success on the policy of the United States toward Mexico, there is one point that deserves some attention. Which party, the Liberal or the Conservative, is possessed of most power in Mexico? The assertions made on this subject are of a very contradictory character. President Buchanan, in his last Annual Message, says that the Constitutional government —meaning that of which Juarez is the head—"is supported by a a large majority of the people and the States, but there are important parts of the country where it can enforce no obedience. General Miramon maintains himself at the capital, and in some of the distant provinces there are military governors who pay little respect to the decrees of either government." On the other hand, a Mexican writer, a member of the Conservative party, who published his views on the condition of his country just one month before the President's Message appeared, declares that the five Provinces or States in which the authority of Miramon was then acknowledged contain a larger population than exists in the twenty-three States in which it was not acknowledged. Of the local authorities in these latter States he says,—"It is a great mistake to imagine that they obey the government of Juarez any more than they obey the government of General Miramon, or any further than it suits their own private interest to obey him. It would be curious to know, for instance, how much of the money collected by these 'local authorities' for taxes, or contributions, or forced loans, and chiefly at the seaport towns for custom-house duties, goes to the 'national treasury' under the Juarez government." In this case, as in many others of a like nature, the truth probably is, that but a very small number of the people feel much interest in the contest, while most of them are prepared to obey whichever chief shall succeed in it without foreign aid. Of the active men of the country, the majority are now with Miramon, or Juarez would not be shut up in a seaport, with his party forming the mere sea-coast fringe of the nation. All that is necessary to convert him into a national, patriotic ruler is, that a foreign army should be sent to the assistance of his rival: and that such assistance shall be sent to Juarez, President Buchanan has virtually pledged the United States by his words and his actions.
In his last Message to Congress, President Buchanan dwells with much unction upon the wrongs we have experienced from Mexico, and avers that we can obtain no redress from the Miramon government. "We may in vain apply to the Constitutional government at Vera Cruz," he says, "although it is well disposed to do us justice, for adequate redress. Whilst its authority is acknowledged in all the important ports and throughout the sea-coasts of the Republic, its power does not extend to the city of Mexico and the States in its vicinity, where nearly all the recent outrages have been committed on American citizens. We must penetrate into the interior before we can reach the offenders, and this can only be done by passing through the territory in the occupation of the Constitutional government. The most acceptable and least difficult mode of accomplishing the object will be to act in concert with that government." He then recommends that Congress should authorize him "to employ a sufficient military force to enter Mexico for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future." And he expresses the opinion that justice would be done by the Constitutional government; but his faith is not quite so strong as we could wish it to be, as he carefully adds, "This might be secured in advance by a preliminary treaty."
Thus has the President pledged the country to help Juarez establish his authority over Mexico, in words sure to be read and heeded throughout America and Europe. His actions have been quite as much to the purpose. He placed himself in communication with Juarez in 1859, and recognized his government to be the only existing government of Mexico as early as April 7th, through our envoy, Mr. McLane. That envoy floats about, having a man-of-war for his home, and ready, it should seem, to receive the government to which he is accredited, in the event of its being forced to make a second sea-trip for the preservation of the lives of its members. As the sole refuge for unpopular European monarchs, at one time, was a British man-of-war, so are feeble Mexican chiefs now compelled to rely for safety upon our national ships.
To predict anything respecting Mexican affairs would be almost as idle as it would be to assume the part of a prophet concerning American politics; but, unless Miramon's good genius should leave him, his appearance in Vera Cruz may be looked for at no very distant day, and then we shall have the Juarez government entirely on our hands, to support or to neglect, as may be dictated by the exigencies of our affairs. That base of operations, upon the possession of which President Buchanan has so confidently calculated, would be lost, and could be regained only as the consequence of action as comprehensive and as costly as that which placed Vera Cruz in the hands of General Scott in 1847. If the policy laid down by President Buchanan should be adopted and pursued, war should follow between the United States and Mexico from the triumph of Miramon; and in that war, we should be a principal, and not the mere ally of one of those parties into which the Mexican people are divided. Logically, war is inevitable from Mr. Buchanan's arguments and General Miramon's victories; but, as circumstances, not logic, govern the actions of politicians, we may possibly behold all Mexico loyal to the young general, and yet not see an American army enter that country. The President declares that in Mexico's "fate and in her fortune, in her power to establish and maintain a settled government, we have a far deeper interest, socially, commercially, and politically, than any other nation." The truth of this will not be disputed; but suppose that Miramon should establish and maintain a settled government in Mexico, would it not be our duty, and in accordance "with our wise and settled policy," to acknowledge that government, and to seek from it redress of those wrongs concerning which Mr. Buchanan speaks with so much emphasis? Once in a responsible position, and desirous of having the world's approval of his countrymen's conduct, Miramon might be even more than willing to promise as much as Juarez has already promised, we may presume, in the way of satisfaction. That he would fulfil his promises, or that Juarez would fulfil those which he has made, it would be too much to assert; as neither of them would be able, judging from Mexico's past, to maintain himself long in power.
For the present, if not forever, Juarez may be left out of all American calculations concerning Mexico; and as to Miramon, though his prospects are apparently fair, the intelligent observer of Mexican politics cannot fail to have seen that the glare of the clerical eye is upon him, and that some faint indications on his part of a determination not to be the Church's vassal have already placed his supremacy in peril, and perhaps have caused conspiracies to be formed against him which shall prove more injurious to his fortunes than the operations of Liberal armies or the Messages of American Presidents. The Mexican Church, full-blooded and wealthy as it is, is the skeleton in the palace of every Mexican chief that spoils his sleep and threatens to destroy his power, as it has destroyed that of every one of his predecessors. The armies and banners of the Americans of the North cannot be half so terrible to Miramon, supposing him to be a reflecting man, as are the vestments of his clerical allies. Even those armies, too, may be called into Mexico by the Church, and those banners become the standards of a crusading host from among a people which of all that the world has ever seen is the least given to religious intolerance, and to whom the mere thought of an established religion is odious. Nor would there be anything strange in such a solution of the Mexican question, if we are to infer the character of the future from the character of the past and the present. A generation that has seen American democracy become the propagandists of slavery assuredly ought not to be astonished at the spectacle of American Protestantism upholding the State religion of Mexico, and that religion embodying the worst abuses of the system of Rome. It was, perhaps, because he foresaw the possibility of this, that "the gray-eyed man of destiny," William Walker himself, was reconciled last year to the ancient Church, and received into her bosom. As a Catholic, and as a convert to that faith from heresy, he might achieve those victories for which he longs, but which singularly avoid him as a man of the sword. It is the old story: Satan, being sick, turns saint for the time: only that it is heart-sickness in this instance; the hope of being able to plunder some weak, but wealthy country having been too long deferred for the patience even of an agent of Fate.
That our government means to persevere in its designs against Mexico, in spite of the misfortunes of the Liberals, is to be inferred: from all that we hear from Washington. The victories of Oajaca, Queretaro, and Colima, won by the Conservatives, have wrought no apparent change in the Presidential mind. So anxious, indeed, is Mr. Buchanan for the triumph of his plan, that he is ready to seek aid from his political opponents. Leading Republicans are to be consulted personally, and they are to be appealed to and asked patriotically to banish all party and "sectional" feelings from their minds, while discussing the best mode of helping "our neighbor" out of the Slough of Despond, so that she may be enabled to meet the demands we have upon her,—not in money, for that she has not, and we purpose giving her a round sum, but in land, of which she has a vast supply, and all of it susceptible of yielding good returns to servile industry. There is a necessity for this appeal to Opposition Senators, as the Juarez treaty cannot be ratified without the aid of some of their number. The ratification vote must consist of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting; and of the sixty-six men forming the Senate, but thirty-nine are Democrats, and two are "South Americans." The Republicans, who could muster but a dozen votes in the Senate when the present phase of the Slavery contest was begun, have doubled their strength, and have arrived at the honor of being sought by men who but yesterday regarded them as objects of scorn. Nor is it altogether a new thing for the administration to depend upon its enemies; and the practical adoption of the "one-term" principle in our Presidential contests, by virtually depriving all administrations of strict party support, has introduced into our politics a new element, the first faint workings of which are beginning to be seen, but which is destined to have grave effects, and not such, in all cases, as are to be desired.
But it is not from the ambition or the perverseness of the President that Mexico has much to fear. Were it not for other reasons, which proceed from the "Manifest Destiny" school, the country would laugh down the administration's Mexican programme, and it could hardly be expected to receive the grave consideration of the Senate. What Mexico has to fear is the rapid increase of the old American opinion, that we were appointed by Destiny to devour her, and that in spoiling her we are only fulfilling "our mission," discharging, as we may say, a high moral and religious duty. It is not that we have any animosity toward Mexico, but that we are the Heaven-appointed rulers of America, of which she happens to be no small part. By a happy ordination, and a wise direction of our skill as missionaries militant, we never waste our time and our valor on strong countries; and as wolves do not seek to make meals of lions, preferring mutton, so we have no taste for those very American countries which are inhabited by the English race, and in which exist those great political institutions of the enjoyment of which we are so proud. The obligation to take Mexico is admitted by most Americans, though some would proceed more rapidly in the work of acquisition than others; but no one hints that we ought to have Canada. Our government has repeatedly offered to purchase Cuba of Spain, which offer that country holds to be an insult; but it has not yet thought proper to seek possession of Jamaica. Destiny, in our case, is as judicious as it is imperative, and means that we shall find our account in doing her work. Had she favored some other nations as much as we are favored, they might have flourished till now, instead of becoming wrecks on the sandy shores of the Sea of Time.
The conviction that Mexico is to be ours is no new idea. It is as old, almost, as the American nation. We found Spain in our path very soon after she had behaved in so friendly a manner to us during the Revolution; and one of the earliest thoughts of the West was to get her out of the way. This was "inevitable," and "Manifest Destiny" was as actively at work in the days of Rodgers Clarke as in those of Walker, but with better reason; for the control that Spain exercised over the navigation of the Mississippi was contrary to common sense. In a few years, the acquisition of Louisiana (nominally from France, but really from Spain) removed the evil of which the West complained; but the idea of seizure remained, and was strengthened by the deed that was meant to extinguish it. That Louisiana had been obtained without the loss of a life, and for a sum of money that could be made to sound big only when reduced to francs was quite enough to cause the continuance of that system of agitation which had produced results so great with means so small. Enmity to Spain remained, after the immediate cause of it had ceased to exist. War with that country was expected in 1806, and the West anxiously desired it, meaning to invade Mexico. Hence the popularity of Aaron Burr in that part of the Union, and the favor with which his schemes were regarded by Western men. Burr was a generation in advance of his Atlantic contemporaries, but he was not in advance of the Ultramontanes, only abreast of them, and well adapted to be their leader, from his military skill and his high political rank; for his duel with Hamilton had not injured him in their estimation. His connection with the war party, however, proved fatal to it, and probably was the cause of the non-realization of its plans fifty years ago. President Jefferson hated Colonel Burr with all the intensity that philosophy can give to political rivalry; and so the whole force of the national government was brought to bear against the arch-plotter, who fell with a great ruin, and for the time Mexico was saved. Then came Napoleon's attack on Spain, which necessarily postponed all attempts on countries that might become subject to him; and before the Peninsular War had been decided, we were ourselves involved in war with England, which gave us work enough at home, without troubling "our neighbor." But the events of that war helped to increase the spirit of acquisition in the South and the Southwest, while they put an end forever to plans for the conquest of Canada. The "aid and comfort" which the Spaniards afforded to both Indians and Britons, from Florida, led to the seizure of Florida by our forces in time of peace with Spain, and to the purchase of that country. The same year that saw our title to Florida perfected saw the end of Spanish rule in Mexico. The first effect of this change was unfavorable to the extension of American dominion. Mexico became a republic, taking the United States for a model. Principle and vanity alike dictated forbearance on our side, and for some years the new republic was looked upon with warm regard by the American people; and had her experiment proved successful, our territory never could have been increased at her expense. But that experiment proved a total failure. Not even France herself could have done worse for republicanism than was done by Mexico. Internal wars, constant political changes, violations of faith, and utter disregard of the terms of the Constitution,—these things brought Mexico into contempt, and revived the idea that North America had been especially created for the use of the Anglo-Saxon race and the abuse of negroes. As a nation, too, Mexico had been guilty of many acts of violence toward the United States, which furnished themes for those politicians who were interested in bringing on a war between the two countries. The attempt to enforce Centralism on Texas, which contained many Americans, increased the ill-will toward Mexico. The end came in 1846, when we made war on that country, a war resulting in the acquisition of much Mexican territory,—Texas, Upper California, and New Mexico. It cannot be said we behaved illiberally in our treatment of Mexico, the position of the parties considered; for we might have taken twice as much of her land as we did take, and not have paid her a farthing: and we paid her $15,000,000, besides assuming the claims which Americans held against her, amounting to $3,250,000 more. The war "blooded" the American people, and made the idea of acquiring Mexico a national one; whereas before it had a sectional character. The question of absorbing that country was held to be merely one of time; and had it not been for the existence of slavery, much more of Mexico would have been acquired ere now, either by purchase or by war. There have been few men at the head of Mexican affairs, since the peace of 1848, who were not ready to sell us any portion of their country to which we might have laid claim, if we had tendered them the choice between our purse and our sword. We paid $10,000,000 for the Mesilla Valley, and for certain navigation privileges in the Colorado river and the Gulf of California,—a circumstance that shows how resolute is our determination to have Mexico, and also that we are not disposed to have the process of acquisition marked by shabby details.
The law that governs the course of conquest is of a plain and obvious character. Occasionally there may arise some conqueror, like Timour, who shall sweep over countries apparently for no other purpose but to play the part of the destroying angel, though it is not difficult to see that even such a man has his uses in the orderings of Providence for the government of the world. But the rule is, that conquest shall, quite as much as commerce, be a gainful business. Conquerors who proceed systematically go from bad lands to good lands, and from good lands to better ones. To get out of the desert into a land flowing with milk and honey is as much the object of modern and uncalled Gentiles as ever it was with ancient called and chosen Jews. Historians appear inclined to censure Darius, because, instead of invading Hellas, equally weak and fertile, he sought to conquer the poor Scythians, who conquered him. The Romans organized robbery, and had a wonderful skill in selecting peoples for enemies who were worth robbing. "The Brood of Winter," who overthrew the Roman Empire, poured down upon lands where grew the grape and the rose. The Saracens, who were carried forward, in the first instance, by fanaticism, had the streams of their conquests lengthened and broadened and deepened by the wealth and weakness of Greeks and Persians and Goths and Africans. Had those streams poured into deserts, by the deserts they would soon have been absorbed, and we should have known the Mahometan superstition only as we know twenty others of those forms of faith produced by the East,—as something sudden, strange, and short-lived. But it was fed by the riches which its votaries gained, the reward of their piety, and the cement of their religious edifice. The Normans, that most chivalrous of races, and, like all chivalrous races, endowed with a keen love of gain, did not seize upon poor countries, but upon the best lands they could take and hold,—the beautiful Neustria, the opulent Sicily, and the fertile England, so admirably situated to become the seat of empire. So, it will be found, have all conquering, absorbing races proceeded, not even excluding the Pilgrim Fathers, who, if they paid the Indians for their lands, generally contrived to get good measure for small disbursements, and to order things so that the lands purchased should be fat and fair in saintly eyes.