In regard to this point we remark, first, that obscure passages ought to be interpreted in conformity with those which are clear, and not the reverse. The passages we have cited which proclaim the indissolubility of the marriage-bond are clear. Those which are cited in proof of the exception are obscure. It is not clear on the face of them how far the permission to dismiss the guilty wife extends, and the conclusion that this permission includes the permission to marry another woman is a mere inference. The Catholic interpretation, that the permission extends no further than a divorce a mensâ et thoro, harmonizes those passages with all others in the New Testament which speak on the subject, and is, therefore, in itself more probable.
We remark, secondly, that the opposite interpretation is intrinsically improbable, because it contravenes the evident scope and intention of our Lord's words, which were to abrogate the special dispensations of the Mosaic law, and introduce a stricter law in conformity with the original institution of matrimony. Our opponents explain the law as giving the wife an equal privilege of divorcing her husband with that conceded to the husband. But, according to the law of Moses, the woman could not divorce her husband for any cause whatever. If, now, our Lord gave her this privilege, he relaxed the Mosaic law in an important respect. This is highly improbable, seeing that it is only by inference that we can apply the permission given the injured husband to dismiss his wife to the injured woman in similar circumstances. We admit fully that, our Lord did intend to give woman an equal right in the premises with that which he conceded to man. But, if that right had been the one claimed by our opponents it is not to be supposed that he would have failed to express it in clear and distinct terms. We argue that, as his whole scope was to make the law of marriage stricter, and as the law of Moses gave women no right of divorce, our Lord did not concede to Christian women that right. Our opponents admit that no more was conceded to men than to women, therefore no right of divorce was conceded to men.
We remark, thirdly, that the divorce permitted by our Lord cannot have been a divorce a vinculo, from the concession of our opponents, who admit that the guilty party is not released from it so as to be capable of contracting a second marriage.
They admit that the guilty party commits adultery by attempting another marriage, and that the person marrying the one divorced commits adultery. Adultery is not possible where there is no vinculum matrimonii subsisting. But there can be no vinculum except between two parties. It is absurd that a woman should be bound to keep faith with the man who has another lawful wife. Therefore, on the principles of our opponents, since the guilty party is still in the bonds of the first marriage, the innocent party is so also.
Let us now examine the passage itself, which permits the dismissal of a guilty consort, to see if it can fairly be interpreted in accordance with the doctrine we have endeavored to establish. Our opponents argue that the sense of the passage is as follows: "Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, commits adultery, unless the cause of his putting her away was adultery on her part." Therefore, they say, if she was put away for the crime above mentioned, he does not commit adultery, though he marries another. The mere verbal construction admits of this interpretation, but does not positively require it. It may fairly be understood to mean this: "Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, commits adultery, and whosoever shall marry another commits adultery." That is, he who puts away his wife for any lesser cause, causes her to commit adultery, and exposes himself to the danger of committing the same sin, on account of the facility given by the civil law to both parties to contract second marriages, and also because of the danger in which a woman is placed, when cast off by her husband, of giving herself up to a bad life through want and desperation, especially in a state of society which is morally corrupt. And, much more, the one who actually does contract a second marriage during the lifetime of the wife whom he has repudiated commits adultery, by contracting an invalid marriage. Both acts are a violation of the marriage vows, the desertion of the wife, and the formation of a second, unlawful union with another; and, therefore, both are classed together, although it is only the latter which is strictly and technically called adultery.
Our opponents may justly say that the text does not require this interpretation, and that, if this really was the sense and meaning of our Lord, the apostle has expressed it in an elliptical and obscure manner. Very true. And if we had no other information than that which is furnished by St. Matthew, the real doctrine of our Lord would be doubtful. This is nothing strange or surprising. The sacred writers frequently speak in an obscure, in artificial, and elliptical manner, which obliges us to interpret their meaning from sources extraneous to the text. There is no evidence that all the words used by our Lord himself to explain his doctrine to the by-standers in public, or to his disciples in private, have been recorded with verbal accuracy or completeness. St. Matthew gave a brief summary of Christ's doctrine in his own language, which was intelligible to his readers at the time, because they already knew the law which had been promulgated in the Christian church. We hope to show hereafter what this law was, from evidence furnished by the early Christian writers and by the uniform canonical practice of the church. Meanwhile, we think we have proved that the general scope of the language of the New Testament sustains the doctrine of the indissolubility of Christian marriage.
Our second and third propositions have been established in the process of maintaining the first, and flow from it obviously. It is evident that, where the vinculum matrimonii subsists between two persons, either of them who attempts marriage with a third party violates the rights of the lawful consort, and makes an invalid contract, whatever the civil law may decide to the contrary. It is also evident that our Lord did permit a final dissolution of the connubium between married persons for one cause, and one only. If this dissolution is not a divorce a vinculo, it must be a mensâ et thoro. We leave the subject here for the present, hoping to resume it again at a convenient opportunity; and we respectfully recommend to our learned readers, who are desirous of investigating it fully, the work of Perrone, De Matrimonio Christiano, 3 vols. Rome, 1858.