[118] Nothing is more noteworthy than this passage of the Summa. (Pars Prima, Qu. 15, a. 1, ad. 1.) Et sic etiam Aristoteles, lib. 3. Metaphys. improbat opinionem Platonis de ideis, secundum quod ponebat eas per se existentes, non in intellectu. In many other places, St. Thomas cites the doctrines of Plato on the faith of Aristotle. In support of the allegations of the text, consult the Summa. P. 1, qu. 16, a. 6. Ibid. ad. 1, et qu. 12, a. 2, et qu. 88, a. 3, ad. 1. Ibid. qu. 84, a. 5. Ibid. qu. 16, a. 7.
[119] F. Milone, in his Neapolitan edition, adds the following note: "Throughout this entire passage we find a mixture of the Platonic and the Augustinian, (p. 1, qu. 15, a. 3,) where St. Thomas appears to intend to collect from St. Augustine the true meaning of Plato, or again to remand to Plato the admirable design of the ideology of St. Augustine. Sed contra, ideæ sunt rationes in mente divina existentes, ut per Augustinum patet; sed omnium quæ cognoscit, Deus habet proprias rationes; ergo omnium quæ cognoscit habet ideam. Respondeo dicendum, quod cum ideæ a Platone ponerentur principia cognitionis rerum et generationis ipsarum, ad utrumque se habet idea prout in mente divina ponitur. Et secundum quod est principium factionis rerum, exemplar dici potest, et ad practicam cognitionem pertinet; secundum autem quod principium cognoscitivum est, proprie dicitur ratio, et potest etiam ad scientiam speculativum pertinere. There is not, I say, in all our own Marsilius, a more respectful and favorable comment upon Plato; but the key is found in that observation on which the whole thing depends, ut per Augustinum patet." Worthy of consideration under this head are also the articles 3, 4, and 5, under the 79th question.
[120] De Trin. lib. xii. § 24. Vide etiam Retract. lib. 1 cap. 4. Arnob. Contra Gentes, lib. 11. § 14. Tertull. De Anima, cap. 24 and 28.
[121] De Trin. lib. xii. § 2, 3, 5, 12, 23. Ibid. lib. xv. § 10. Ibid. lib. xiv. § 6, 11.
[122] Lib. x. cap. 24.
[123] De Gen. ad Litt. lib. xii. cap. 31, § 59.
[124] The Civilta Cattolica, (series v. vol. viii. 585) seems to have wished to continue the series of these opposing arguments of the antagonistic schools, where, in the name of those whom I call psychologists, it speaks thus: "To maintain the essential distinction between the sense and the intellect, it is not necessary to attribute to the latter the immediate perception of a divine object, as, to maintain the essential distinction between the body and the spirit, it is not necessary to ascribe to the second a divine existence. It suffices that as the spirit is differentiated from the body by the immateriality of its essence, so the intellect should be differentiated from the sense by the immateriality of its cognoscitive power." If it be so, the ontologists will respond, that in the above passage the word sense signifies only that with which we perceive bodies; so that to sense is given as its term or object that which is corporeal, and to intellect that which is spiritual. Now, S. Augustine had at first adopted the same language; but afterward he recognized its imperfection, and in his Retractations (lib. i. cap. 1, 3, 4) declares that the word sense ought to include also the intimate sense with which the soul perceives what passes within itself. Then this has as object that which is spiritual. Therefore the spirituality of its object cannot any longer serve to differentiate intellect from sense. (Vid. La Scuola of F. Milone, p. 32, et seq.)
[125] St. Aug. lib. 83, Quæst. ad qu. 81.
[126] Difesa di Malebr. diss. prelim. § 25.
[127] St. Damasus was of Spanish extraction. He was elected pope in the year 366, being then sixty years old. During the latter years of his life the celebrated St. Jerome acted as his secretary, and mentions him in his epistles as "an incomparable person and a learned doctor." He is classed by writers with Basil, Athanasius, Ambrose, and such like men, who have been eminent for their zeal, learning, and holy lives.