The strength of real assents in comparison to notional ones is shown, and the difference in this point of view between assent and inference; the latter being clearest in purely abstract matters. Not but that assent is always unconditional or absolute; still, its material, when real, is so much more vividly apprehended that the assent elicited is much more energetic and operative. Thus also when notional assents become real, as they may in consequence of some special circumstances, their hold upon the mind and control upon action is much increased.
This subject is illustrated by a discussion of religious assents, with special reference to the being of God, and to the Holy Trinity; it is shown that the former truth, and the constituent parts of the latter, can be, and usually are, the objects of real assent, though the latter in its completeness or unity can only be notionally apprehended; and though the definition of the Divine Being may give only a notional idea. The implicit assent which unlearned Christians give to all the definitions of the church is also explained.
The absolute and unconditional character of assent is next treated, and it is shown that it has this character even when given without good grounds, or when those grounds are forgotten; and that it is not necessarily conceded to convincing proofs, and may disappear while the inference which led to it still remains. Without this character the act is not assent at all, or at least is only that notional form of it called by the author opinion, which he defines as assent to the probable truth of a proposition. The possibility and continual occurrence of full assent without intuition or demonstration is defended against those who, though really they have no doubt about some theoretically uncertain matters, yet "think it a duty to remind us that, since the full etiquette of logical requirements has not been satisfied, we must believe those truths at our peril."
The distinction is drawn between simple or unconscious assent and the conscious, reflex, or complex assent, as the author calls it, which, when the thing believed is true, has the name of certitude, and is irreversible or indefectible. In simple assent we do not give any place, or in any way incline mentally to the opposite belief, though we may examine the grounds of our own for various reasons; but when we are certain, we explicitly refuse to admit any thing opposed to it. The occurrence of false or supposed certitudes does not suffice to prove the non-existence of real ones; and certitude is not to be confounded with infallibility, which is a faculty applicable "to all possible propositions in a given subject matter," while certitude is "directed to this or that particular proposition."
The next part is the discussion of the act of inference. In its most perfect or formal state it can be used without limitation only upon abstractions; it "comes short of proof in concrete matters, because it has not a full command over the objects to which it relates, but merely assumes its premises." Hence, even when what we do assume is true, as shown in an earlier part of the work, processes of inference in concrete matters may easily end in mysteries. In many cases it cannot profitably be used, owing to the labor required for taking account of all the circumstances, as well as the real difference of the first principles from which our syllogisms proceed. We are, therefore, obliged to resort to informal inference, in which arguments and probabilities are estimated in the mass, and have a different force to different individuals, according to the character in them of what Dr. Newman calls the illative sense. He concludes by treating of the exercise of this combining and directing faculty in its application to religious inferences, both in natural and revealed religion, and shows that by means of it we may fairly arrive at certitude regarding Christianity, and that such a method is at least as likely to succeed as more formal demonstrations. The lawfulness and reasonableness of assent in religious matters, as well as in others, without such demonstrations, may be regarded as one of the main objects of the work, though by no means its only one.
De l'Unité dans l'Enseignement de la Philosophie au Sein des Ecoles Catholiques d'après les Recentes Decisions des Congregations Romaines. Par le P. H. Ramière, S.J. Paris, 1862.
F. Ramière is well known as the head of the admirable confraternity of "The Apostleship of Prayer," and the author of a number of excellent works on spiritual subjects, and also on the great religious questions of the day. We have recently been indebted to him for some extremely able essays in defence of the rights of the Holy See, for which he has received the eulogium of the Holy Father himself. The work whose title is given above has been sent to us by the reverend father himself, we presume on account of the article translated, with some preliminary observations of our own, from F. Vercellone, on the ideology of St. Augustine, which appeared in a recent number; and we beg to thank him for his kindness. We had not before had the pleasure of reading it, although it has been eight years published. We have read it with attention, and, we are happy to say, with much satisfaction. The learning and logical force of the author command our respect, and his calmness, candor, impartiality, and truly Christian charity win our esteem, throughout the whole course of his argument. The argument is divided into three parts. In the first part, the author sustains the possibility and the great importance of unity in philosophical instruction, and lays down the conditions by which it can be obtained. In all that he says under this head we fully and cordially concur with him. In the second part, he discusses traditionalism; and here again we find ourselves in perfect agreement with all his positions. In the third part, he attacks the grand difficulty of the origin of rational cognition, and, of course, discusses the vexed question of ontologism. It would be a futile effort to attempt a critical appreciation of this part of F. Ramière's work in a brief critical notice, and we will not attempt it. An opinion on these very grave and much controverted topics, in order to be worth attention, must be supported by elaborate arguments, and based on deep and patient study of all the principal authors, ancient and modern, whose works are the great sources of philosophical knowledge. We agree perfectly with F. Ramière, that thorough discussion, carried on in the spirit of moderation, directed by a pure love of truth, and regulated by obedience to the authority of the church, is the only road by which we can attain to that degree of unity in philosophical doctrines which prevails among all truly orthodox theologians in respect to dogmatic and moral theology. We desire to see this discussion go on, and hope for a good result from it; and as a necessary preparation, we cannot too earnestly insist on the necessity of a more thorough study of scholastic philosophy than has been common among those who have written on these subjects in the English language. Both in theology and philosophy, we hold it as certain that we must follow the great fathers and doctors of the church as our guides and masters, or go astray and lose our labor. The essential truths of philosophy must be contained in that system which the church authorizes, and in which she trains up her clergy.
As we understand them, there is no difference between F. Vercellone and F. Ramière on this point. We are not authorized to speak for Dr. Brownson, who is the great philosophical writer among American Catholics; but we think he would agree with us fully in this judgment; and that the passage in a contrary sense, quoted by F. Ramière, is to be regarded as one of those obiter dicta which his mature, deliberate wisdom would not ratify. We cheerfully acknowledge that the doctrine which F. Ramière so lucidly exposes as the Thomistic doctrine of the origin of cognition is sufficient as a basis of rational certitude and natural theology, and we are perfectly agreed with him that this is the main point to be secured. As for the profound and difficult, and therefore intensely interesting and attractive, questions which relate to the nature of the intellectual light itself, and the objective truth seen by its aid, it does not seem to us that they have yet been as thoroughly discussed as they need to be, in order to bring the various schools into a closer agreement. This is certainly so as respects philosophy in the English language, which is yet in its cradle, and we think it is true universally. Of course, the great question to be settled at the outset is, how far the boundary of philosophical doctrine, as rendered certain by the consent of the great doctors, intrinsic evidence, and the decisions of the supreme ecclesiastical authority, extends; and where opinion begins. The true understanding of the famous decisions of 1861 is absolutely necessary to this end, so far as ideology is concerned; and F. Ramière has given an explanation of their sense and intention which perfectly agrees with that of F. Vercellone in a supplement to the article which we translated. It is, namely, the intuition of the essence of God, and created things in that essence, as the natural, intellectual light of reason, which we are forbidden to affirm.
Are we, therefore, required, as an only alternative, to adopt the Peripatetic philosophy as taught by the Thomists? It would seem that this has not yet been sufficiently proved. The works of Gerdil, Vercellone, and others, who profess to find in Plato, St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, St. Anselm, and other great authors, a philosophical wisdom which supplies a want not fully satisfied by St. Thomas, have not yet been marked by any note of disapprobation. It is true that F. Ramière tells us that Gerdil changed his opinions in his later years. But F. Vercellone denies this, on the authority of Cardinal Lambruschini. F. Ramière is extremely tolerant of opinions differing from his own, where he thinks he has only a greater probability on his side. He does not censure the following of these great authors, or discourage the study of them; but he thinks they are misunderstood, and that a better study of them would result in making us all Peripatetics and Thomists. Let us by all means, then, especially those who have youth, strength, and leisure, study the old masters of philosophy more deeply than we have done, and truth and unity will be the gainers. F. Ramière protests strongly, however, against the high esteem which some Catholic writers have expressed for Gioberti. As it happens that one of our correspondents has done the same in the present number, we feel bound to assure F. Ramière, and our readers generally, that we detest, as much as any one can, the rebellious conduct of Gioberti toward the sovereign pontiff, that we have no sympathy with his hatred of the Jesuits, and condemn every thing in his works which the Holy See intended to censure when they were placed on the Index. Nevertheless, as F. Perrone has had the generosity to place his name on the list of illustrious Catholic writers, we do not think it improper to give him credit for the genius he undoubtedly possessed, or the true and elevated teachings which his works may contain. Even if the worst things said against him be true, there is no reason why we should not make use of every thing good in his works, as we do in those of Tertullian, Photius, and the Port Royal divines.