The political life of the Papacy has been wholly spent in combating Cæsarism. It struggled against the Roman emperors for three centuries, and then against the heresies of Byzantium. In our age, Napoleon exhausted all his arts and violence on Pius VII. Pius IX. found himself at issue with Louis Napoleon, and Victor Emanuel, the Italian representative of Cæsarism. The contest of the popes with the emperors of Germany is celebrated. It was the Papacy that preserved human liberty throughout the middle ages. Germany had seized the imperial sceptre that had fallen from the hands of the weak successors of Charlemagne. In the XIIIth century, the Cæsarean rule threatened the whole of Europe. Frederic II., more perverse and more able than his namesake of the XVIIIth century, found himself the master of Germany. He triumphed in Italy through the support of the legists, and extended his claims to the rest of Europe. Innocent IV., by issuing the bull of excommunication against Frederic II. at the Council of Lyons, stopped the German Cæsar in his career, and put an end to the invasions of Italy he was constantly making. Italy, under the auspices of the Papacy, displayed a long career of municipal liberty.
The development of Cæsarism in France as well as in Germany has followed the overthrow of the temporal power of the Holy See. But the German Empire will always retain an immense superiority over the French Empire. It is less revolutionary, less democratic, less at variance with its past history. It is not impossible that it may combine with the local and municipal institutions of the country. Prussia is far from our absolute centralization, and there is nothing to indicate that she is to be subjected to it. She remains the ally of the great powers of the Continent. She could easily have rallied all Europe against imperial and Byzantine France. Let us not deny it: no victory of Louis Napoleon’s could have secured the left bank of the Rhine. The German coalition would very soon have drawn the rest of Europe after it. This struggle of one against all is a necessity of Bonapartism. Nothing can check it. Softness of manners, a refined civilization, pretended condemnation of war, philanthropy bordering on religion, boundless industry and credit, the military incapacity of Louis Napoleon, nor anything else, could have prevented the war from breaking out. “Revolution is war and bankruptcy,” said Royer-Collard. It obeys its nature. It upheld the Bonapartes in spite of a kind of material order and discipline they forced on the people; it required of them an armed propaganda which they were more capable of managing successfully than the republic itself. Louis Napoleon, with his mildness of character, and talent as a writer, desired a peace that would enable him to continue his utopian experiments in journalism. But he was not his own master. He felt that a revolution at home constituted only one-half of his obligations; the other half—revolution abroad—he was also determined to effect, though to his regret. He regarded the bombs of Orsini as a salutary warning, and submitted to his destiny. He extended revolution to Italy and Mexico. He destroyed the influence of Austria. Prussia profited by these disturbances to unite Germany. But Louis Napoleon made a pitiful failure. He dashed against a wall with his eyes shut. The pretext of a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne was ridiculous, and the legislative corps and senate that countenanced it showed the measure of their political knowledge and independence.
It is difficult to comprehend by virtue of what principle or interest he opposed the choice of a Hohenzollern. Had he not rejected the hereditary principle? Had he not aided in overthrowing all the princes of the House of Bourbon who still reigned through this principle? Was not his own power based on election? And what did it matter to France whether that pitiful Spanish crown was on one head rather than another? What gratitude could he expect from those revolutionary sovereigns whose patron or director he constituted himself? He took the petty Subalpine king by the hand, and led him to the Crimea, and to the Congress of Paris, and thence into all the capitals of Italy. His plans were unveiled when he forced the unhappy Victor Emanuel to give his daughter to the imperial cousin. Who then could cherish any illusion as to the result? It was unfolded. Did the revolutionary union of the south spring from it? This union could only be effected by the unity of despotism. Napoleon knew it: his nephew forgot it. Revolutionary nations are necessarily at war or distrustful of one another, as the revolutionary factions of a nation are always contending, unless some master—no matter whether it is an individual or a party—succeeds in suppressing the rivalry.
This was the state of the case in our Revolution. Is it not a matter of public notoriety that the name of Napoleon excites only horror and disgust in Spain and Italy?
Louis Napoleon’s aim was not to subdue Europe by war, but to effect an internal change of government by means of revolutionary principles. This resulted in exciting all the great powers against him. He thought there would be a revolution in Russia in consequence of the emancipation of the serfs which he recommended to the Czar Alexander. He overthrew the German Confederation though it was so powerful a guarantee for the safety of France. It was he who made William Emperor of Germany. The overthrow of the Confederation under the circumstances in which it took place necessarily led to the empire, as the overthrow of ancient France led to the imperial régime that has lasted till now. We need not be astonished at the efforts of the King of Prussia to re-establish Louis Napoleon. They were accomplices, though Louis Napoleon has been taken for the dupe. Not that he was not conscious of the situation, but he warded off the flashes of reason and common sense he had, and gave himself up to a hallucination. France imitated him, with the conscript fathers of the senate and the legislative corps at its head. Louis Napoleon contended for an idea, and he triumphed after his manner, after the manner of his uncle. Conquered and made prisoner, he was humiliated, not by defeat, which does not humiliate the brave, but by accepting his defeat. He yielded to the conqueror, he surrendered his sword. Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, but he was not really cast down till he found himself on board the Bellérophon. Then he realized who was victor. The lamentations of St. Helena reveal the liberal despot. Louis Napoleon also became an author and a journalist. He dreamed of returning to France. He published at Cassel under the name of his friend, M. de Grécourt, a brochure designed to influence Germany in his favor. He had no doubt of being as warmly welcomed by France as Napoleon was when he returned from the island of Elba.
There was no change in France. Our social institutions were still standing. The republicans had found nothing to modify in the wonderful machinery of despotism. There was nothing to prevent him from resuming his place. There was the invasion besides. Did the disasters of 1814 prevent Napoleon’s reascendancy in France in 1815? Was there any lack of senators and representatives to welcome Cæsar? Was not the popularity of the uncle the foundation of the nephew’s success? That was the sole cause of Louis Napoleon’s accession. This popularity was nothing more than the result of success. Power and success united and counted the votes, and proclaimed the result. The revolutionary power was not entirely destroyed by the events of 1814 and 1815; it became an organized system, having its regulations, its leaders, its journals, its secret societies, and its permanent committees variously disguised under the forms of beneficence, pleasure, science, etc. No regular government at variance with this many-sided, intangible power could be established. The regular government of France especially—the hereditary monarchy—could not take root again. Public opinion and enthusiasm are like stage machinery that rises and falls. We witnessed the workings of this machinery from 1848 to 1852. The inventors did not even give themselves the trouble to hide the workings from the eyes of the public. This reign of opinion has continued. The word of command from the emperor was echoed by the ministers, and from them by the préfets, sous-préfets, and mayors. The entire administration in all its gradations walked in the same footsteps. By the public works, loans, and illusory promises, the mass of electors were so fascinated that they could refuse nothing to a government that was promoting such benefits. Universal suffrage is the character in the comedy—the simple, good-natured Demos of Aristophanes. In reality, it is the emperor—he who has the imperium, individually or by a number of individuals, who votes at the general election. In the Cæsarean system, the emperor alone acts, but he acts in the name of the people, and as the representative of the people. He is the voice of the people. This must not be lost sight of when we judge the acts of Louis Napoleon.
In his brochure, he claims the good-will of the King of Prussia and Germany, because it was France alone that desired the war. He did not desire it; he was not responsible for it. This was pleading his own imbecility and the culpability of France. What! he did not set France against Germany? He did not break the treaties of 1815, or officially condemn them? He did not constantly propose the policy of his uncle as an example to France? He followed it without condemning an act or a principle. The Jacobinism of his later years was a mere imitation of the liberal ideas his uncle brought back from the island of Elba, and continued to cultivate at St. Helena—ideas that M. Thiers, in his voluminous compilation concerning the empire, regarded as serious! This was why Louis Napoleon declared him “the national historian,” and presided at the obsequies of Béranger, “the national poet.” This Bonapartism in verse and prose had only one practical aim—the conquest of the Rhine provinces. That was the favorite topic of old soldiers and the zealous members of the imperial entourage. People of more sense, who were not overscrupulous, resigned themselves to it as a necessity of the situation. Ever since 1852, it had been thought there would be a sudden blow aimed at Belgium or Germany. Was not Austria attacked in 1859 without any reason or pretext, and, it may be said, without a declaration of war, and in violation of all the laws of nations? When and where did universal suffrage countenance this? Where was it discussed by the ten million voters? What authority did they give their representatives? The imperialists and liberals have refused the electors the right which they enjoyed in 1789 to give directions to those they elected. The member represents, then, only himself, though individually he may have been acceptable to his constituents at the time of the election. The elector is not free in his vote, because he does not know his so-called deputy. And these representatives of Cæsarism have never been free. No sooner are they nominated, than they forget their orders and electors, and only aim at “the glory of obedience” to Cæsar, like the senators of Tiberius.
Louis Napoleon played to perfection the game of Cæsarism. Conqueror or conquered, he always kept a foothold. Victory immortalized him, and assured perhaps his son’s future career. And defeat was not to be imputed to him. As the representative of the people, he was only a passive agent. A docile instrument of the passions and sentiments of the people, he sacrificed himself. Did not this entitle him to the gratitude of his fellow-citizens? He regarded the republic as less popular than himself, and condemned by universal suffrage. Besides, he affected to personify in a supreme degree the republican element. It was not with respect to France he was anxious. He knew that the Cæsarean constitution of France left a sure way always open of regaining the throne. It was by foreigners he was overthrown. He preferred this fall to the necessity of presiding over new disasters. He was not sorry, either, to see the city of Paris, which of late had been constantly opposed to the empire, and whose enmity daily increased under its liberal laws, chastised by Prussia. King William thus effected a coup d’état which did not injure the emperor, and made a return to despotism easier than at the beginning of the empire. La Situation, the Bonaparte organ at London, insinuated that Prussia had an interest in allying itself with Louis Napoleon, in order to reconstruct the map of Europe. And it did not conceal that the neutral countries, Belgium and Holland, were to pay for this reconciliation. In this way, Bonapartism, though apparently crushed, showed signs of life, and fostered its hopes. This was a sign it was not morally subdued. It was overcome only to be restored. But the French republic was not in a condition to restore it, because it confounded itself with it. It must be ascertained if Europe feared Bonapartism or France. Bonapartism aside, France is now a really peaceful, honest, Christian nation. She has only been formidable since 1789 through the principles of dissolution she has carried within herself and diffused abroad by means of newspapers, secret societies, and armies.
The idea of giving Holland to Prussia, and Belgium to France, was worthy of Louis Napoleon. Would Europe allow it? Prussia already preponderates. France would gain nothing. She could not rise from the inferiority into which she has fallen through late events. The humiliation that Cæsarism has inflicted on our country is not a thing of yesterday. Napoleon stated the problem clearly: France must subject Europe to revolution, or disappear before a torrent of invasions. These two alternatives have been successively more or less realized. The Restoration gave peace once more to France and to Europe. France, regaining her rank, menaced no one, and sustained herself by her alliances. She fell again in the Revolution of 1830. Foreign sympathy was withdrawn from us. All the alliances were broken off. The various governments, stunned by the rebound of the Revolution, stood on their guard. The monarchy of July sought to favor revolution moderately abroad, and to direct it with skill at home. From that time, Europe formed a coalition against us. During the first ten years of the Revolution of July, the public mind was disturbed as to the possibility of a great war with Germany. The liberal party used every effort to bring it on, without any reason certainly, in order to fulfil one of the conditions of the revolutionary programme, which is an armed propaganda. It was with such views that the fortifications of Paris were conceived by M. Thiers. The equilibrium of Europe was destroyed, therefore, to our sole injury. The empire developed the seeds of revolution sown by the government of July. France descended lower than in 1830; she even lost all regard to decency, by giving herself up to the revolutionary current. The distinguished men of talent who devoted themselves to the service of Louis Philippe withdrew from the scene, and were replaced by a crowed of nobodies. Assemblies, ministers, and emperor entered on such a contradictory course that one might believe our country had fallen into its dotage.
The Mexican war made America aware of our political weakness; and, in the East, our diplomacy lost the last remnant of its influence by taking a stand apart from Catholicism. The war of 1859 set Italy against us—a country so lately governed by princes favorable to France. The Italian unity and German unity consigned France to a secondary rank. Finally, the commercial treaties have made us subservient to England. Thus, in renouncing all idea of conquest, Louis Napoleon did not give up disturbing Europe. France served as the instrument of this work, and ended by being the victim. The material disproportion of forces could only produce a catastrophe. Europe was arming its men, while France, under Louis Napoleon’s direction, was plunged in revolutionary metaphysics. It does not require any great sagacity, however, to perceive that a revolutionary nation could not be in a condition to sustain a conflict with a nation that has remained true to conservative principles. What could be effected by combining all these shattered elements? How could we depend on these bruised reeds?