The Catholic World, Vol. 18, October, 1873, to March, 1874. / A Monthly Magazine of General Literature and Science

by Various

The formal principle, however, is an exception to this general doctrine, as formal principles do not differ from formal causes. The form, in fact, not only has within itself something through which it is fit to cause its effect, but also is itself that very something, and through itself brings its effect into existence. Thus the soul, which is the form of the body, through itself, and not through any of its faculties, actuates the body and vivifies it. On this account, then, any form might be indifferently called either a formal cause or a formal principle. But we must further consider that a form, as such, is an incomplete entity, since no formal act can exist apart from its essential term;[152] and on this ground we maintain that the name of principle suits it better than the name of cause.

And this conclusion will be approved even by those philosophers whose opinion concerning the distinction between cause and principle we have just refuted; for the two differences which they allege as characteristic of cause in opposition to principle have no room in formal causation or principiation, since we have seen that the formal act has no priority of nature with respect to its essential term, and identifies itself with the thing of which it is the act. Consequently, the form, even in the opinion of said philosophers, is not a cause, but a principle.

We hope to give a fuller explanation of this point on a later occasion; but what we have just said suffices to show what we at present intend, viz., that the doctrine which considers principles as appurtenances of causes admits of a remarkable exception in the case of formal principles, and by such an exception is competent to account for the existence of other principles importing real principiation without real causation. Now, this is exactly what the theological doctrine on divine processions requires. The fact, therefore, that the procession of one of the divine Persons from another involves no causation, but only principiation, can be accounted for by a simple reference to the nature of formal principiation. The Eternal Father is certainly not the efficient, but the formal, principle of His Eternal Son; and this already suffices to explain how the being of the Son is not a new being made by the Father, but is the very same being of the Father communicated identically to the Son. Thus, also, the Holy Ghost not efficiently, but formally, proceeds from the Father and the Son, through their conspiration into a simple actuality of love; and this suffices to explain how the Holy Ghost is not made by the Father and the Son, but is the very actuality of the one in the other.

To sum up: Formal principiation is not causation; hence, that which immediately proceeds from a formal principle is not caused by it, but only principiated; it is not its effect, but its connatural term; it has not a distinct nature, but the very nature of its formal principle identically communicated; lastly, it has no real dependence from its formal principle, but only real relative opposition; for real dependence has no place where there is identity of nature. This is eminently true of God, and, by imitation, of every primitive contingent being, which is strictly one in its entity, and consequently also of all the ultimate elements into which a physical compound can be resolved; for the ultimate elements of things cannot but be primitive beings.

The preceding remarks regard those formal acts which enter in the essential constitution of being as such, and which are called strictly substantial acts. Of accidental forms we have nothing to say in particular, as it is too evident to need explanation that they are not causes, but mere principles. It is, therefore, to be concluded that the distinction between cause and principle applies only to efficient, material, and final causality and principiativity. Thus, as we have said, the sun is the efficient cause of certain movements, and its attractive power is the efficient principle of those movements; the object is the final cause that moves the will, and the goodness, through which the object moves the will, is the finalizing principle of the volition: the steel is the material cause of the sword, but the material principle of the sword is the passive potency of the steel, which allows it to receive the form of a sword or any other form.

We must not forget, however, that the words cause and principle have been, and are, very frequently used without discrimination by philosophical writers, even of the highest merit. It is by no means uncommon to find, for instance, the premises described as the cause of the conclusion, the rules of the art as the cause of an artificial work, the exemplar as the cause of that in which it is reproduced or imitated. In these examples, the word cause stands for principle. The old Greek theologians even said that God the Father is the cause of his Eternal Son; the word cause being undoubtedly used by them in the sense of principle. We should not be astonished at this. Indeed, while we ourselves persist in giving the name of cause to the formal principle, we should be the last to be surprised at the Greek fathers doing the same.

And now, let us come to another part of our subject. Philosophers, when wishing to give a full account of things, besides principles and causes, point out metaphysical reasons too. We think it our duty to show in what such reasons consist, and in what they differ from principles.

A reason, in general, may be defined as that from which anything immediately results; and since a formal result is not made, but simply follows as a consequence from a conspiration of principles, we can see at once that a reason, or the formal ground of a given result, must consist in a conspiration of given principles. There are logical reasons, which give rise to logical results; and there are metaphysical reasons, which give rise to metaphysical results. We will give an example of each.

In a syllogism, the consequence is the result of a conspiration of two propositions, called premises. The propositions themselves are the principles from which the conclusion is to follow; but the actual following of the conclusion depends on the actual comparison of the two propositions, and on the actual perception of the agreement of two extreme terms with a middle one. It is, in fact, through the middle term that the two premises conspire into a definite conclusion. Hence, when we are asked the reason why a conclusion follows from two premises, we point out not only the fact that the two premises are true, but especially the fact that the extreme terms, which are to be directly united in the conclusion, are already both linked, in the premises, with the same middle term. For it is evident that the whole strength of a legitimate conclusion lies in the universality of the axiom, Quæ sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se. The words, sunt eadem uni tertio,[153] express the formal reason, and the words sunt eadem inter se[154] express the formal result. In scholastic language, the premises would be called the principium formale quod[155] of the conclusion, and the suitable connection of their terms would be called the principium formale quo,[156] or the ratio formalis[157] of the conclusion; whilst the conclusion itself would be called the rationatum.[158]

For an example of the metaphysical order, we will take a known subject, animal life, and ascertain its formal reason. Every one knows that the soul is a principle of life; but animal life, besides the vivifying soul, requires also an organic body as its other principle. These two principles, however, are, with respect to animal life, in the same relation as the two premises with respect to their conclusion. For as the conclusion proximately results from the connection of the premises and their bearing on one another, as we have just explained, so, also, animal life results from the connection of soul and body—that is, from the actuation of the latter by the former, and consequently by the completion of the former in the latter. Hence, the formal reason, or the principium formale quo, of animal life is the very information of the body by the soul, while the soul and the body themselves, taken together, constitute the principium formale quod.