And now, with regard to the essence itself of a complete being, the question arises whether it should be held to be, or to have being, in the sense of the distinction already made. S. Thomas seems to hold that the essence of creatures cannot be said to be, but only to have being; for he teaches that in creatures the essence is to its existence as a potency is to an act. If this doctrine were to be applied to possible essences only, we might admit it without discussion; but the holy doctor seems to apply it to the actual essence also; for "to be," says he, "is the most perfect of all realities, because it performs the parts of an act with regard to them all; as no thing has actuality but according as it is; and therefore to be is the actuality of all things, even of the forms themselves; and for this reason existence is not compared to any existing thing as a recipient to that which is received, but rather as that which is received to its recipient. For when I mention the existence of a man, or of a horse, or of anything else, existence stands for something formal and received, and not for that to which it belongs."[288]
It is clear, however, that the actuality of anything is not an act really received in the essence of the thing as in a potency. For, according to S. Thomas himself, nothing is educed from potency into act, except through an act which is not originated by that potency; and therefore no potency contains in itself the formal reason of its actuation, but all potency is actuated by an act originated by an extrinsic agent. Now, such is not the case with real essences; for every real essence contains in itself all that is required to give rise to its actuality, as we have proved; and consequently, as soon as the essential act actuates the essential term, the actuality of the essence springs forth by spontaneous resultation, as the consequence from the premises, with no need of an extrinsic agent producing a new act. Granting, then, that existence is something formal, as S. Thomas truly says, yet it does not follow that it is an act received; it is only a resulting actuality. And therefore the real essence is not the potency of existence, but its formal reason. Existence is the complement of real essence, and presupposes it; and consequently gives it nothing but the real denomination of existent—and, perhaps, this is all that S. Thomas intended to teach, though his words seem to imply a great deal more. For, on the one hand, he very often employs the word potentia, not in the sense of passive potency, but in that of virtuality; and, on the other, he frequently gives the name of forms to those formalities from which things receive their proper denomination, and considers them as received in the things to which they give such a denomination. But in such cases their reception is of course only logical, not real, and accordingly the thing denominated by them is only a logical, not a real, potency, as it already possesses the reality of that by which it receives its special denomination. Thus we say that in man rationality is to animality as act is to potency; but this is true in a logical sense only, because man's animality implies in its constitution a rational soul, and therefore is already in possession of rationality.
To conclude: the essence of all actual beings is to be said to be or to exist rather than to have being or to have existence; and in the same manner the essence of a possible being is to be called a potency of existing rather than of receiving existence, so far, at least, as it is considered in connection with its intrinsic principles. The reader, if not accustomed to metaphysical investigations, will think that we, in this last question, have only amused ourselves with splitting hairs; to correct such a judgment, he has only to ask himself whether between being rich and holding borrowed riches the difference be important or trivial.
TO BE CONTINUED.
FOOTNOTES:
[276] Catholic World, Feb., 1874, page 578.
[277] S. Thomas says intus-legere, "to read within," which amounts to the same.
[278] This third proof and the following apply to created beings only; but creatures, as we hope to explain later, inasmuch as they are beings, are so many imperfect likenesses of their Creator, and unmistakably show that he himself is an infinite Act actuating (out of himself, not out of nothing) an infinite Term, and possessing an infinite Actuality. And accordingly, what we have said of the intrinsic constitution of a created being must be true, in an eminent manner, of the Creator also.
[279] Omne agens agit in quantum est in actu; et omne patiens patitur in quantum est in potentia.—S. Thomas, passim.
[280] Pure potency is quod potest esse et non est, according to S. Thomas, Opusc. De Princ. Naturæ.