It seems to us that before we can employ a good English text-book of philosophy for the use of schools to the best advantage, we must be provided with a great, sound, and exhaustive philosophical work in our own language, to which the student would refer for all those questions and difficulties which cannot be sufficiently explained in an elementary course. We think that even F. Hill's English Elements of Philosophy, excellent as it is, needs to be supplemented by a higher English philosophical work. Those of his pupils who cannot consult the Latin volumes of the schoolmen may frequently remain in doubt as to the proper settlement of many important questions which their professor did not judge necessary or possible to examine thoroughly in his valuable book; and we have no doubt that all professors of philosophy will agree with us that such a great English work as we suggest—a very arsenal of good philosophical weapons—is one of the greatest necessities of our time and of our country. Without it, all our philosophical efforts are doomed to be more or less insufficient and unsuccessful.
And now, let us come to another consideration. If any book needs to be extremely correct in its expressions and definitions, surely elementary text-books for beginners must be so; for, if the foundation is wrong, what is built upon it cannot be right. Now, we are sorry to say that F. Louage's Course of [pg 236]Philosophy teems with false notions and incorrect expressions. Dr. Brownson openly rejects the author's definition of philosophy, of being, of existence, of possibility, of essence, of science; and in the main he is evidently right. Yet, while we admit with Dr. Brownson that “the science of the supersensible” is not a good definition of philosophy, we do not adopt his own definition, “the science of principles”; because we know that the true definition of philosophy is “the science of things (supersensible or not) through their highest principles.” Nor do we agree with him that F. Louage's definition of being—“that which exists or may exist”—is incorrect; for, although what may exist, but does not exist, is no thing in the real order, yet it is something in the ideal order, as an object of thought; and therefore F. Louage's definition of being is perfectly correct.
His definition of possibility, as “the agreement of the attributes which constitute a being, in such a way that its existence does not involve any contradiction,” we do not approve, not exactly for the reason adduced by Dr. Brownson, that the non-existent has no attributes, but because the definition considers the attributes as “constituents” of being (which they are not), and because the word “agreement” should either be replaced by “non-repugnance,” or at least qualified by the epithet “intellectual,” referring to the divine intellect, in which all possibilities are ideally contained.
That “the essence of a being consists of the collection of its essential attributes,” as the author of the “text-book” says (p. 7), is certainly a great error. The attributes of a being are not the material components of its essence, nor do they precede the essence; it is, on the contrary, from the essence itself that all the attributes flow. The essence of any given being is nothing else than “the ratio of a given act to its term,” as has been clearly established by a writer in The Catholic World, March, 1874, and the attributes of any given being are nothing else than different aspects of the actuality of its essence.
It is no less erroneous to say that “a genus is a collection of beings having one or more attributes common to each” (p. 8). This definition might be admitted in natural history; but, in philosophy, genus is not a collection, nor is it conceived by composition, but by abstraction. Genus is usually defined to be “a ratio which can be found in many things, and be predicated of each of them when an incomplete answer is given to the question What is it?” To confound the universal with the collective is inexcusable, we think, in a “text-book” of philosophy.
“A species,” says the author, “is a collection of beings belonging to one and the same genus, but having particular and constitutive properties” (p. 8). Same remark as above: Species, in philosophy, is not a collection, but is “a ratio which can be found in many things, and be predicated of each of them when a complete answer is given to the question, What is it?” Species, like genus, is a universal.
“Being, the most general genus, is divided into two species, corporeal and incorporeal beings” (p. 8). No philosopher of good reputation has ever considered being as a “genus.” It is known that “being” is above all genus, and accordingly is called “transcendental.” [pg 237] If “being” were a genus, nothing could save us from pantheism.
“Science ... is objective, when we consider it as existing in the object contemplated” (p. 9). Can science be considered as existing in the moon?
“Art is the application of science to external things according to determined rules” (p. 9). If so, then all artists and artisans should be men of science; which, unhappily, is not true. Art is usually and rightly defined as Recta ratio factibilium—“a right method of making anything” with or without the application of science.
“Logic is the first part of philosophy—the part which treats of the first efforts of the human mind to discover truth” (p. 17). We think that apprehension, judgment, and reasoning, which are the proper object of logic, are no efforts of the human mind, but very natural and spontaneous operations.