It is worth noticing that the word “relation” is used by philosophers in two different senses. Sometimes it is used as meaning simply “the respect of a subject to a term”; as when we say that the father by his paternity is related to his son, or that the son by his filiation is related to his father. Here paternity and filiation are simple relativities, which may be called “transitive relations,” as the one leads to the other. But sometimes the word “relation” is used as meaning “the tie resulting between two terms from the conspiration of their distinct relativities”; as when we say that between the father and his son there is a tie of consanguinity. Relation in this sense is nothing else than the actuality of two correlatives, inasmuch as connected by their distinct relativities, and may be styled “resultant relation,” or “intransitive relation,” as it does not lead from the subject to the term, but is predicated of both together.
The precise distinction between relativity and resultant relation is marked out by the two prepositions to and between. Relativity relates the subject to its term; resultant relation, or correlation, intervenes between two terms. Relativity needs completion in a term having an opposite relativity, as it is evident that paternity has no completion without a son; and thus one relativity essentially needs to be completed by the other; but correlation is perfectly complete, as it is the result of the completion of one relativity by the other. And, lastly, the formal reason or foundation of the simple relativity is that which induces the connotation, or the respect of one term to another; whilst the formal reason of the correlation is the conspiration of two relativities. Thus the foundation of paternity and of filiation is generation, active on the part of the father, and passive on the part of the son; but the formal reason of consanguinity is not the generation, but the conspiration of paternity and filiation into a relative unity. This shows that these two kinds of relation are [pg 294] entirely distinct, though they are essentially connected with one another in the constitution of the relative being.
Let us now inquire in what the reality of relations consists. Here again we have to make a distinction; for among the relations which are called real, some are real in fact, as the transcendental relations, and others are real by denomination only, as all the predicamental relations.
Transcendental relation is that which intervenes between the act and the term, or the formal and the material principles of one and the same being. Such a relation is called “transcendental,” because it transcends the limits of any particular predicament, and, like being, extends to all predicaments. This relation is truly real, whether we take “relation” as a simple relativity or as a resultant correlation. For the relativity of an act to its term is nothing less than the actuality of the act in the same term; in like manner, the relativity of a term to its act is nothing less than the actuality of the term in the same act. We know, in fact, that the common foundation of the two relativities is actuation, active on the part of the act, and passive on the part of the term; and from actuation nothing but actuality can result. And since by such an actuation the act and the term are really constituted in one another, hence their relativities need nothing extrinsic for their completion, but the one intrinsically completes the other in the same individual being, and both conspire into one absolute actuality, which is the formal complement of the same being, as we have shown in another place.
But with predicamental relations the case is different. The subject and the term of the predicamental relation do not communicate with one another through themselves immediately, but through something else, and are always physically distinct, as we shall see hereafter; whence it follows that the predicamental relativity always refers the subject to a term extrinsic to it, and thus needs something extrinsic for its entitative completion. But nothing which is extrinsic to the subject can complete anything intrinsic to it so as to form a real entity. Therefore the relativity of the subject to its term is not a real entity of the subject, but only a real denomination. The minor of this syllogism can be easily proved; for two things which are, and remain, extrinsic to one another cannot conspire into one real unity; but the subject and the term of predicamental relations are, and remain, extrinsic to one another; they cannot, therefore, conspire into one real unity. Hence they cannot give rise to any new real entity; for unity and entity are convertible terms.
Moreover, predicamental relations arise between two absolute terms without anything new being introduced into them. For if we have two real terms, A and B, possessing something which is common to both, their communication in this common thing will make them relative. Yet such a communication leaves A and B in possession of that reality which is said to be common, and adds no real entity to them. If A and B are both white, the whiteness which is in A is by no means modified by the existence of whiteness in B. The fact that A and B are both white, simply means that whiteness is not confined to A; but it does not imply any new real entity in A, and [pg 295] therefore A remains identically the same, whether there is another white body, B, or not; and if there were one thousand white bodies, A would become related to them all, and acquire a thousand relativities, without the least real modification of its entity.
Not even the relation between agent and patient, which is the nearest possible imitation of the transcendental relation between the essential constituents of absolute being, is a new entity. A being which acts is an agent; and a being which is acted on is a patient. Agent and patient are connected by predicamental relation, the act produced by the first, and received in the second, being the foundation of their relativities. Now, is the relativity of the agent to the patient a new real entity above and besides the substance of the agent and its action? By no means. For such a relativity arises from this only: that the act produced by the agent is received in the patient; and as the patient is a being distinct from the agent, the reception of the act in the patient cannot concur to the constitution of any new reality in the agent. Hence the whole reality of the agent, as such, consists in its substance and its action; while the reception of its action elsewhere can add no real entity to it, but simply gives it a real denomination desumed from the reality of the effect produced. For the same reason, the relativity of the patient to the agent is no new real entity above and besides the substance of the patient and its passion. This relativity, in fact, arises from this only: that the act received in the patient comes from the agent; and as the agent is a being distinct from the patient, the coming of the act from the agent cannot concur to the constitution of any new reality in the patient. Hence the whole reality of the patient, as such, consists in its substance and its passion, or reception of the act; while the coming of this act from a distinct being can add no real entity to it, but simply gives it a real denomination desumed from the reality of the causation.
From what precedes we may conclude that the reality of predicamental relations requires no new real entity superadded to the real terms and the real foundation of their relativity, and accordingly predicamental relations are only nominal realities.
Relations are either virtual, formal, or habitual. Virtual relativity is predicated of a subject which contains in itself virtually (in actu primo) something through which it can communicate with a distinct term. Thus everything visible has a virtual relativity to the eye before it is seen; because all that is visible has the power to make an impression upon the eye. Hence visibility is a virtual relativity, or, if we may so call it, a mere referability. In Latin, it is called ordo—“ordination”; and in the language of the schools, the visible would be said to have “a special ordination to the eye”—visibile ordinem habet ad oculum. In the same manner, the eye has a special ordination to the visible, the intellect to the intelligible, etc.
The formal relativity is predicated of a subject which is formally (in actu secundo) connected with its correlative by the formal participation of a common entity. Thus, when the visible object strikes the eye, the action of the one upon the other entails a formal link of relativity between the two, and it is thus that the previous virtual relativity [pg 296] of the one to the other becomes formal. This formal relativity in Latin is often called respectus—“a respect”; and the things thus related are said “to regard”—respicere—one another.