These different opinions have been occasioned by an imperfect analysis of distinction. Those who originally treated of this matter called real all distinction which was not a mere distinction of reason, and overlooked the necessity of subdividing real distinctions into physical and metaphysical. Hence the modal distinction was simply called real, without further examining whether it had a physical or a metaphysical character; the more so as it was assumed that real modes were physical entities—which would convey the idea that real modal distinction is of a physical nature. But the assumption is not to be admitted, because, as we have remarked in another article, modes cannot be styled “physical” entities, as they have no possibility of separate existence. This being premised, let us briefly examine the three aforesaid opinions.
The first admits a modal distinction between spherical wax and its sphericity. Sphericity cannot exist without a subject; and therefore it must be ranked among metaphysical entities. On the other hand, spherical wax is a metaphysical compound of wax and sphericity. Hence, from what we have said above, the distinction of the one from the other is an inadequate metaphysical distinction.
The second opinion admits a modal distinction between the wax simply and its sphericity. Sphericity, as we have stated, is a metaphysical entity, and so is “wax simply” also; for wax, as such, is not yet spherical, although, as a subject of sphericity, it excludes every other form. Such a wax therefore has no form, and, as such, it cannot exist; and accordingly it is an incomplete being. Hence the distinction between the wax simply and its sphericity is that which intervenes between two principles [pg 301] of a complete being, and therefore is an adequate metaphysical distinction.
The third opinion alone gives the true notion of the modal distinction. For if a piece of wax which is spherical happens to acquire another form, say the cubical, the comparison of the cubical with the spherical wax will involve two terms physically real; and as the substance of the wax is still the same, no distinction will be found between the two terms, except that which arises from denying the identity of the cubical with the spherical form. We have thus a real and physical modal distinction: real and physical, because the spherical wax really and physically differs from the cubic wax; modal, because the negation of identity falls on the two modes, and not on the substance.
From this we learn that neither the first nor the second opinion above mentioned gives the true notion of modal distinction. The first denies only the identity of the spherical wax with its sphericity; the second denies only the identity of wax simply with sphericity. Now, it is evident that neither spherical wax nor wax simply is a mode. It is evident, therefore, that neither opinion denies modal identity. But modal distinction cannot be anything else than a denial of modal identity. Therefore neither opinion gives the true notion of modal distinction.
As modes are accidental formalities, the modal distinction may also be called formal. The Scotist philosophers imagined a formal distinction of another kind, which, according to them, was to be admitted between the attributes of real being, and which was neither real nor a mere distinction of reason, but something intermediate. They called it “formal distinction arising from the nature of the thing”—distinctio formalis ex natura rei. We need not refute this invention. We have already given in full the general theory of distinction, and we have found no room for any formal distinction intermediary between real distinctions and distinctions of reason; and, as to the attributes of real beings, we have shown, in the article before this, that they are not really distinct from one another, but admit of a simple distinction of reason, which, however, has a real foundation in the thing.
Sometimes distinction is styled formal as contrasted with virtual. Thus we may say that there is a formal distinction between two terms formally existing—e.g., two existing men, and a virtual distinction between two virtual terms—e.g., two possible men. And generally, whenever one and the same thing virtually contains two or more, these latter, as thus contained, are said to be virtually distinct. Thus intellect and reason are only virtually distinct, as they are one concrete power of acquiring knowledge which can perform its task by two different processes. This virtual distinction is, of course, nothing but a distinction of reason.
Sometimes, again, distinction is called positive as contrasted with negative. It is positive when the two terms of which we deny the identity are both positive, and it is negative when one of the two terms is negative; as when we distinguish the existent from the non-existent. Negative distinction is a real distinction; for the negation of real identity can be predicated not only of two real beings, but [pg 302] also, and with greater reason, of the existent as compared with the non-existent.
It may be remarked that distinction, difference, and diversity are not synonymous. Diversity is most properly predicated of two things that are not of the same genus; difference of two things that are not of the same species, and distinction of two things that are not numerically identical. Nevertheless, the terms distinct, different, and diverse are very frequently employed for one another, even by good authors.
We observe, lastly, that distinction, as such, is not a relation; for all relation presupposes some distinction between the terms related, as a condition of its possibility. Yet two positive terms really distinct have always a certain relative opposition, inasmuch as there is always something common to both (at least their being) which may be taken as a foundation of mutual relativity.