Büchner. Here is one fact: “That the world is not governed, as is frequently expressed, but that the changes and motions of matter obey a necessity inherent in it, which admits of no exception, cannot be denied by any person who is but superficially acquainted with the natural sciences” (p. 5). Now, if the world is not governed by a superior power, we cannot make it dependent for its origin on any superior power. This leaves no doubt as to the eternity of the world.
Reader. I wonder, doctor, if you have ever learned or understood the first principles of philosophy. Young students may teach you that, from the necessity to which matter is subjected of obeying certain laws of motion, it is absurd to infer the necessity of its existence. What is subject to obedience is not independent, and what has a necessity of obeying is essentially dependent. Moreover, do you not see that what is subject to change cannot be necessary, and cannot be eternal? You appeal to natural sciences. This is ridiculous. There is no need of modern sciences to know that the phenomena of the material world follow an invariable law. This was known in all past ages; yet no man in his senses has thought of concluding that therefore matter was a necessary being. Pagan philosophers, who had lost the primitive traditions of mankind, admitted uncreated matter without further examining the question; but none of them pretended to prove the eternity or necessity of matter from its subjection to definite laws of motion. The absurdity of such a deduction is manifest. Suppose a geometrician were to argue thus: What follows an invariable and necessary law exists from eternity; but every triangle follows this invariable and necessary law: that the sum of its angles equals two right angles; and therefore every triangle exists from eternity. What would you reply?
Büchner. I would reply that the laws of geometry are mere abstractions.
Reader. And so are all physical laws also. When a thing exists, it cannot but be what it is according to its essence. If it is a figure of geometry, it exists according to geometric laws, and has its geometric properties; and if it is a material substance, it cannot but have the properties of matter, and so long as it exists it cannot but retain [pg 446] the same properties. This is evident. But from the fact that a thing existing is necessarily subject to the laws of its nature you cannot conclude that it necessarily exists, unless, indeed, you are not even superficially acquainted with the laws of reasoning. Hence it is clear that your argument has no weight.
Büchner. “But that a power—taken for the once in its abstract sense—could only exist so long as it is active is no less clear. In assuming, therefore, a creative absolute power, a primeval soul, an unknown x—it matters not what name we give it—as the cause of the world, we must, in applying to it the notion of time, say that it could not have existed either before or after the creation. It could not have existed before, as the notion of power is not reconcilable with the idea of nothing or inactivity. It could not have been a creative power without creating something. We must, therefore, suppose that this power has for a time been inert in the presence of chaotic and motionless matter—a conception we have already shown to be absurd. It could not have existed after the creation, as rest and inactivity are again incompatible with the notion of force. The motion of matter obeys only those laws which are inherently active; and their manifestations are nothing but the product of the various and manifold accidental or necessary combinations of material movements. At no time and nowhere, even in the most distant space reached by our telescope, could a single fact be established, forming an exception to this law, which would render the assumption of a force external, and independent of matter, necessary. But a force which is not manifested does not exist, and cannot be taken into account in our reasoning” (p. 6). What do you answer, sir?
Reader. I answer that this pretended argument cannot entrap any one but an ignorant man, or one who desires to be cheated or to cheat himself. And first I observe that you begin by surmising that the Creator would be “an abstract power”; now, the surmise is an absurdity. Secondly, you suppose that we “assume” a creative absolute power—which is not the case; for we do not assume its existence, but we prove it. Thirdly, you call the Creator “a primeval soul, an unknown x”; and both expressions are very wrong indeed. Fourthly, you say that we must apply to the Creator “the notion of time”—which is sheer folly; as every one knows that time has no existence but in the successive changes of created things. Even you yourself say that “the mere application of a limited notion of time to the creative power involves a contradiction” (p. 7). And therefore, when you affirm that the creative power “could not have existed either before or after creation,” you commit a great blunder by assuming that before creation there should have been time. But leaving aside all this, and supposing that the phrase “before the creation” may be understood in a legitimate sense as expressing the priority of eternity and not of time, I will come directly to your argument.
You say that a creative power could not exist before creation, “as the notion of power is not reconcilable with the idea of nothing or inactivity.” This reason proves nothing, except, perhaps, your ignorance of logic. Try to reduce your argument to the syllogistic form, and you will see what it amounts to.
Büchner. The syllogism will run thus: A power can exist only as long as it is active. But the creative power before the creation was not active. Therefore the creative power could not exist before the creation. I hope this proves something else than my ignorance of logic.
Reader. And yet your logic is sadly at fault. Do you not see the equivocation lurking in the middle term? What do you mean by active? Does this word stand for acting, or for able to act? If it stands for acting, then your major proposition is false; for a power exists as long as it is able to act, although it is not actually acting. This is clear; for have you not a power of talking as long as you are able to talk, although you may actually be silent? If, on the contrary, the word active stands for able to act, then it is your minor proposition that will be evidently false; for the creative power, before the creation, was able to create the world, although we conceive it as not yet creating anything. Hence your nice syllogism is a mere sophism, and your conclusion a blunder.
Your other assertion, “It could not have been a creative power without creating something,” is likewise sophistical. For the epithet “creative” in your argumentation means “able to create”; and consequently it does not entail actual creation, but only its possibility. Thus the blunder is repeated.