The second reason adduced in the objection is a mere petitio principii. For he who says that God can create “a solid body as perfectly continuous as a geometric volume” assumes that such a continuous body involves no contradiction; he therefore begs the question. On the other hand, to affirm that God can create a solid body as perfectly continuous as a geometric volume, is to affirm that God can create a body of infinite density—that is, an infinite mass within finite dimensions. For the mass of a body of matter is the product of its volume into its density; hence, if its volume be finite, and its density infinite, the mass will be [pg 501] infinite. Now, a body materially continuous implies infinite density; for it excludes porosity, and it supplies matter for an endless division. Hence a continuous mass of matter filling a finite volume would be an infinite mass contained within limits. We think we are not presuming too much when we say that God cannot create such a metaphysical monstrosity.
“Such a body,” says the objection, “though divisible into any number of parts, would not be a compound.” This is evidently false; for all that is divisible into parts has parts, and therefore composition. Nor is it true that the parts of a continuous body “would be merely possible, not actual”; for if such parts are not actual, how can the body be actual? No actual continuum can exist without actual parts. The divisibility of continuum is not the possibility of actual parts, but the possibility of their actual separation.
The third reason is based on our admission of a vacuum between material points. Such a vacuum, it is objected, is a continuous (virtual) extension, founding the possibility of some other (formal) extension. This we concede; but when it is argued that this other extension which is possible between the material terms is the extension of continuous matter, we deny the consequence. It is only continuous local movement, not continuous matter, that can formally extend from term to term, as we have proved. When two real points of matter have a distinct ubication in space, the interval between them cannot be estimated otherwise than by the extent of the movement which can be made from one point to the other. We cannot perceive the distance between two terms, except by drawing, at least mentally, a line from the one to the other; and for this reason, as we have remarked elsewhere, the relation of distance is conceived by us as a quantity measured by movement, not by matter, and representing the extension of continuous movement, not of continuous matter. Hence a vacuum intercepted between real points is a real, though only virtual, extension; and that other real and formal extension, which is possible between the same real points, is the extension of local movement. Our opponent concedes that “the real extension possible between real terms is not a series of points touching one another; for such a series, as all admit, is impossible.” Now, this suffices to show that the real extension possible between such real terms is not the extension of continuous matter; for such an extension, as we have abundantly proved, would be made up of nothing but of a series of points touching one another.
Nothing, perhaps, more evidently shows the unquestionable solidity of the thesis we have undertaken to defend than the necessity felt by our opponents of admitting in matter an extended simplicity and a simplicity divisible into parts, as witnessed by this last objection, which we have transcribed from a grave and learned professor of philosophy. Extended and simple matter is such an absurdity as few would admit to be a corollary of their own theories; yet it cannot be escaped by those who consider the first elements of matter as endowed with bulk. For physical simplicity is an essential attribute of all primitive beings; and, if primitive elements are nevertheless supposed to be intrinsically extended, [pg 502] it is plain that their simplicity will be an extended simplicity.
The main reason why some philosophers still cling to material continuity is their fear of actio in distans. We have already shown that such a fear, though very common, cannot be justified. We grant that, owing to popular prejudice and an incorrect notion of things, many are apt to dread action at a distance as a dangerous shoal; but when they resort to an “extended and divisible simplicity,” they steer their ship directly against the reefs.
To Be Continued.
Christmas In The Thirteenth Century.
Few are the hearts that do not feel the benign and joyful influence of Christmas. It is the one feast that neither the all-destroying zeal of the Reformation nor the cold indifferentism of the present age has dared to abolish or desecrate. To how many is it the sole remaining word that reminds them of the sacred name of Christ! There was a time when Christmas was but one of the many holydays that with each succeeding month recalled to Christian hearts some great event in the life of their divine Master; but heresy has swept away one by one those sacked days of repose and prayer. Even in Catholic countries the church has found it necessary to reduce the number of Days of Obligation, so cold have grown both faith and devotion.
Wealth and material prosperity—these are the sole ends for which a heartless world would have us exert all our energies, and it would fain clog with the sordid love of gain all the higher aspirations of the soul.