We answer, first, that, to fill space, continuous matter would be needed; and, as continuous matter has no existence in nature, no space can be filled with matter so as to exclude real vacuum. We answer, secondly, that, were it possible to admit continuous matter, filling the whole interval of space between two distant terms, the reality of that interval would still remain independent of the matter by which it is assumed to be filled; for matter is not space; and, on the other hand, if all the matter which is supposed to fill the interval be removed, the distance between the terms will not vanish; which shows that the filling of space, even if it were not an impossible task, would not in the least contribute to the constitution of real distances. Hence, space, even if it were assumed to be full of matter, would not found the relation of distance by its fulness, but only by its being terminated to distinct terms, so as to leave room between them for a certain extension of local movement.
A third objection may be the following: True though it is that real attributes are predicated of void space, it does not follow that void space is an objective reality. For, when we say that space, as such, is infinite, immovable, etc., we must bear in mind that we speak of a potential nature, and that those predicates are only potential. Again, though we must admit that void space can be measured by movement, we know that such a mensuration is not made by terms of space, but by terms of matter. Lastly, although space is the capacity of receiving bodies, it does not follow that there is in space any receptive reality; for its capacity is sufficiently accounted for by admitting that space becomes real by its very occupation.[121]
To the first point of this objection we answer, that space may, perhaps, be called a “potential nature” in this sense, that it is susceptible of new extrinsic denominations; but if by “potential nature” the objector means to express a potency of being, and to convey the idea that such a nature is not real, then it is absolutely wrong to say that void space is a potential nature. Space is not in a state of possibility, and never has been, as we shall presently show. Hence the predicates, infinite, immovable, etc., by which the nature of space is explained, express the actual attributes of an actual reality. The author from whom we have transcribed this objection says that such predicates of space are real, not objectively, but only subjectively. He means, if we understand him aright, that the reality of such predicates must be traced to the bodies which occupy space, not to space itself, and that, though we conceive those predicates to be real owing to the real bodies we see in space, yet they are not real in space itself. As for us, we cannot understand how “to be infinite, to be immovable, to be occupable, etc.,” can be the property of any body which occupies space, or be the property of space, by reason of its occupation and not by reason of its own intrinsic nature. Space must be really occupable before it is really occupied; and nothing is really occupable which is not real, as we have already established. Whence we conclude that this part of the objection, as confounding the possibility of occupation with the possibility of being, has no weight.
To the second point we answer, that the thing mensurable should not be confounded with that by which it can be measured. Whatever may be the nature of the measure to be employed in measuring, no mensuration is possible unless the mensurable is really mensurable. Hence, no matter by what measure space is to be measured, it is always necessary to concede that, if it is really measured, it is something real. The assertion that space is measured “by terms of matter” can scarcely have a meaning. Terms, in fact, measure nothing, but are merely the beginning and the end of the thing measured. Space is measured by continuous movement, not by terms of matter; but before it is thus measured, it is mensurable; and its mensurability sufficiently shows its objective reality.[122]
To the third point of the objection we reply, that space is not a subject destined to receive bodies; and therefore it is not to be called “a capacity of receiving bodies.” Hence, we admit that space has no “receptive” reality. But there are realities which are not receptive, because they are not intrinsically potential; and such is the reality of space, as we shall hereafter explain. With regard to the assertion that “space becomes real by its very occupation,” we observe that, if space void of matter is nothing, as the objection assumes, it is utterly impossible that it become a reality by the presence of bodies in it. The presence of a body in space is a real relation of the body to the space occupied; and such a relation presupposes two real terms—that is, a real body and a real space. If space, as such, is nothing, bodies were created in nothing, and occupy nothing. Their volumes will be nothings of different sizes, their dimensions nothings of different lengths, and their movements the measurement of nothing. It is manifest that real occupation presupposes real occupability, and real mensuration real mensurability; and, since mensurability implies quantity (virtual quantity, at least), to say that occupable and mensurable space is nothing, is to pretend that nothingness implies quantity—a thing which we, at least, cannot understand. Moreover, to consider void space as a potency of being, destined to become a reality through the presence of bodies, is no less a blunder than to admit that the absolute is nothing until it becomes relative, or to admit the relative without the absolute. In fact, the space occupied by a body is a relative space, as its determination depends on the relative dimensions of the body. On the other hand, the relative dimensions of the body are themselves dependent on space, for without space there are no dimensions; and the space on which such relative dimensions depend must be a reality in itself, independently of the same dimensions, it being evident that the dimensions of the body cannot bestow reality upon that which is the source of their own reality. To say the contrary is to destroy the principle of causality, by making the absolute reality of the cause dependent on the reality of its effects. The assertion that “the absolute is nothing until it becomes relative,” leads straight to Pantheism. If you say that absolute space is nothing until it is occupied by bodies, and thus actuated and exhibited under determinate figures, the Pantheist will say, with as much reason, that the absolute being is nothing until it is evolved in nature, and thus actuated and manifested under different aspects. If you say that absolute space, as such, is but an imaginary conception, he will draw the inference that absolute being, as such, is similarly a mere figment of our brains. If you say that the only reality of space arises from its figuration and occupation, he will claim the right of concluding, in like manner, that the only reality of the absolute arises from its evolution and manifestation. We might dilate a great deal more on this parallel; for everything that the deniers of the reality of void space can say in support of their view can be turned to account by the deniers of a personal God, and be made to serve the cause of German Pantheism—the manner of reasoning of the latter being exactly similar to that of the former. This is a point of great importance, and to which philosophers would do well to pay a greater attention than was done in other times, if they admit, in the case of space, that “the absolute is nothing until it becomes relative,” they will have no right to complain of the Pantheistic applications of their own theory.
Vacuum unmade.—The third thing we have to ascertain is, whether void space, absolutely considered as to its reality, be created or uncreated. This point can be easily settled. Those who say that vacuum has no objective reality have, of course, no alternative. For them, vacuum must be uncreated. But they are probably not prepared to hear that we too, who defend the reality of void space, do not differ from them in the solution of this question.
To prove that space void of matter is not created, the following plain reasons may be adduced. First, space void of matter is neither a material nor a spiritual creature. It is no material creature; for it excludes matter. It is no spiritual creature; for, whether there be spiritual creatures or not, it is necessary to admit occupable space.
Secondly, no created thing is immovable, unchangeable, and unlimited. Absolute space is evidently immovable, unchangeable, and unlimited. Therefore, absolute space is not a product of creation.
Thirdly, space considered absolutely as it is in itself, exhibits an infinite and inexhaustible possibility of real ubications. But such a possibility is to be found nowhere but in God alone, in whom all possible things have their formal possibility. And therefore, the reality of absolute space is all in God alone; and accordingly, such a reality not only is not, but could never be, created.
Fourthly, whatever is necessary, is uncreated and eternal. Space considered absolutely as it is in itself is something necessary. Therefore, absolute space is uncreated and eternal. The major of this syllogism is evident; the minor is thus proved: Space absolutely considered is nothing else than the formal possibility of real ubications; but the possibility of things contingent is necessary, uncreated, and eternal; for all contingent things are possible before any free act of the creator, since their intrinsic possibility does not depend on God’s volition, as Descartes imagined, but only on his essence as distinctly and comprehensively understood by the divine intellect.