Assonance consists simply in the similarity of the final, or last two vowels in the line, e. g., luna, juzoa, culpas, gula, suma. These all are considered to rhyme because they have the same vowels, u-a; honor, sol, hoy, dió, cuatro, are examples of single asonantes in o.

Dean Trench calls this the “ghost and shadow of a rhyme.” How well Mr. MacCarthy has succeeded in reproducing it the reader can see in the above extract. The asonantes in the original are u-a, for which Mr. MacCarthy has substituted u-e.

[57] See Daniel, chap. v. 10, 11.

[58] Dico ergo primo: Materia prima ex se, et non intrinsece a forma, habet suam entitatem actualem essentiæ, quamvis non habeat illam nisi cum intrinseca habitudine ad formam.—Disp. Metaph. 13, sect. 4, n. 9.

[59] Dico secundo: Materia prima etiam habet in se et per se entitatem, seu actualitatem, existentiæ distinctam ab existentia formæ, quamvis illam habeat dependenter a forma.—Ibid. n. 13.

[60] Subjectum secundum privationem.—Arist. 8. Metaph., n. 1.

[61] Si enim materia prima haberet aliquam formam propriam, per eam esset aliquid actu; et sic, quum superinduceretur alia forma, non simpliciter materia per eam esset, sed fieret hoc vel illud ens; et sic esset generatio secundum quid, et non simpliciter. Unde omnes ponentes primum subjectum esse aliquod corpus, ut aërem et aquam, posuerunt generationem idem esse quod alterationem.—In 8. Metaph., lect. 1.

[62] Cardinal Tolomei, who was not only a well-read man, but also a peripatetic at heart, candidly confesses that the peripatetic view of generation has never been substantiated. “Depend upon it,” says he, “either no sound argument can be adduced in proof of the peripatetic system, and we must, accordingly, simply postulate it; or, if any proof can be adduced, it consists in the sole argument from authority.” Crede mihi; vel solidi nihil afferri potest pro systemate peripatetico adstruendo, adeoque simpliciter erit postulandum; vel unico a nobis allecto argumento (auctoritatis) satis est roboris ad ipsum confirmandum.—Phil. Mentis et Sensuum, diss 8, phys. gen. concl. 2. And speaking of the argument drawn from substantial changes, he declares it to be a mere sophism: Est mera petitio principii, et æquivocatio inter materiam primam ab omnibus philosophis admissam, et materiam primam Aristotelicam.—Ibid. See Tongiorgi, Cosmol., lib. 1, c. 2, n. 42 et seq.

[63] On the difference between substantial and essential forms, see The Catholic World, November, 1873, p. 190.

[64] Summa Theol., p. 1, q. 76, a. 4.