Sixth question.—“In what does the ‘when’ of a contingent being precisely consist?” From the preceding considerations it is evident that the “when” of a contingent being may be understood in two manners, viz., either objectively or subjectively. Objectively considered, the “when” is nothing else than a simple and indivisible term in duration formally marked out in it by the actuality of the contingent being. We say a simple and indivisible term, because the actuality of the contingent being by which it is determined involves neither past nor future, neither before nor after, but only its present existence, which, as such, is confined to an indivisible Now. Hence we do not agree with those philosophers who confound the quando with the tempus—that is, the “when” with the extent of flowing duration. We admit with these philosophers that the “when” of contingent things extends through movement from before to after, and draws, so to say, a continuous line in duration; but we must remind them that the before and the after are distinct modes of being in duration, and that every term of duration designable between them is a distinct “when” independent of every other “when,” either preceding or following; which shows that the tempus implies an uninterrupted series of distinct “whens,” and therefore cannot be considered as synonymous with quando.
If the “when” is considered subjectively—that is, as an appurtenance of the subject of which it is predicated—it may be defined as the mode of being of a contingent thing in duration. This mode consists of a mere relativity; for it results from the extrinsic termination of absolute duration, as already explained. Hence the “when” is not received in the subject of which it is predicated, and does not inhere in it, but, like all other relativities and connotations, simply connects it with its correlative, and intervenes or lies between the one and the other.
But, although it consists of a mere relativity, the “when” still admits of being divided into absolute and relative, according as it is conceived absolutely as something real in nature, or compared with some other “when”; for, as we have already explained when treating of ubications, relative entities may be considered both as to what they are in themselves, and as to what they are to one another.
If the “when” is considered simply as a termination of standing duration, without regard for anything else, it is called absolute, and is defined as the mode of being of a thing in absolute duration. This absolute “when” is an essential mode of the contingent being no less than its dependence from the first cause, and is altogether immutable so long as the contingent being exists; for, on the one hand, the contingent being cannot exist but within the domain of divine eternity, and, on the other, it cannot have different modes of being with regard to it, as the standing duration of eternity is all uniform in its infinite virtual extension, and the contingent being, however much we may try to vary its place in duration, must always be in the very middle of eternity. Hence the absolute “when” is altogether unchangeable.
If the “when” of a contingent being is compared with that of another contingent being in order to ascertain their mutual relation, then the “when” is called relative, and, as such, it may be defined as the mode of terminating a relation in duration. This “when” is changeable, not in its intrinsic entity, but in its relative formality; and it is only under this formality that the “when” (quando) can be ranked among the predicamental accidents; for this changeable formality is the only thing in it which bears the stamp of an accidental entity.
The before and the after of the same contingent being are considered as two distinct relative terms, because the being to which they refer, when existing in the after, excludes the before; though the absolute “when” of one and the same being is one term only. But of this we shall treat more fully in the sequel.
Seventh question.—“What is relative duration?” Here we meet again the same difficulty which we have encountered in explaining relative space; for in the same manner as relations in space are usually confounded with space itself, so are the intervals in duration confounded with the duration which is the ground of their extension. But, as the reasonings by which we have established the precise notion of relative space can be easily brought to bear on the present subject by the reader himself, we think we must confine ourselves to a brief and clear statement of the conclusions drawn from those reasonings, as applied to duration.
Relative duration is the duration through which any movement extends; that is, the duration through which the “when” of anything in movement glides from before to after, and by which the before and the after are linked in mutual relation. Now, the duration through which movement extends is not exactly the duration of the movement itself, but the ground upon which the movement extends its own duration; because movement has nothing actual but a flowing instant, and therefore it has no duration within itself except by reference to an extrinsic ground through which it successively extends. This ground, as we have already shown, is standing duration. And therefore relative duration is nothing else than standing duration as extrinsically terminated by distinct terms, or, what amounts to the same terminated by one term which, owing to any kind of movement, acquires distinct and opposite formalities. This conclusion is based on the principle that the foundation of all relations between before and after must be something absolute, having in itself neither before nor after, and therefore absolutely standing. This principle is obviously true. The popular notion, on the contrary, that relative duration is the duration of movement, is based on the assumption that movement itself engenders duration—which assumption is false; for we cannot even conceive movement without presupposing the absolute duration upon which the movement has to trace the line of its flowing existence.
Thus relative duration is called relative, not because it is itself related, but because it is the ground through which the extrinsic terms are related. It is actively, not passively, relative; it is the ratio, not the rationatum, the foundation, not the result, of the relativities. In other terms, relative duration is absolute as to its entity, and relative as to the extrinsic denomination derived from the relations of which it is the formal reason. Duration, as absolute, may be styled “the region of all possible whens,” just as absolute space is styled “the region of all possible ubications”; and, as relative, it may be styled “the region of all possible succession,” just as relative space is styled “the region of all local movements.” Absolute standing duration and absolute space are the ground of the here and now as statical terms. Relative standing duration and relative space are the ground of the here and now as gliding—that is, as dynamically considered.
Eighth question.—“What is an interval of duration?” It is a relation existing between two opposite terms of succession—that is, between before and after. An interval of duration is commonly considered as a continuous extension; yet it is primarily a simple relation by which the extension of the flowing from before to after is formally determined. Nevertheless, since the “when” cannot acquire the opposite formalities, before and after, without continuous movement, all interval of duration implies movement, and therefore may be considered also as a continuous quantity. Under this last aspect, the interval of duration is nothing else than the duration of the movement from before to after.