You say that 'the word government has, indeed, two meanings.' Webster gives a round dozen. In its political applications it has four. You add, 'In order to relieve the subject from ambiguity'—though there is in this case no ambiguity to relieve—'that the ordinary meaning of government in free countries is that form of fundamental rules and principles by which a nation or state is governed,' etc. No doubt this is one of the meanings of the word. No doubt government, considered with reference to its quality or the manner of its constitution, does often signify a system of polity, a determinate organization and distribution of the supreme powers of the state. But this is not its 'ordinary' meaning—either in the sense of its being the most correct and proper, or the most frequent use of the term. The other meaning to which you refer—that which makes it 'synonymous with the administration of public affairs'—is equally legitimate, and a great deal more frequent. The word not only 'sometimes' has this meaning, but has it, I presume to say, ten times oftener than it has what you call its 'ordinary meaning,' and for the sufficient reason that there is occasion to speak ten times of Government as an actual exercise of the supreme powers where there is to speak of it once as an abstract system of polity.
But you say that when the word is used in 'a meaning synonymous with administration of public affairs, then 'the Government' is metonymically used for administration, and should not be confounded with the original and true signification of the term Administration, which means the persons collectively who are intrusted with the execution of the laws, and with the superintendence of public affairs.'
Pardon me, but this strikes me as a singular combination of futilities and falsities. In the first place, when the word government is used synonymously with administration, to signify in a general way the conduct of public affairs, there is nothing 'metonymical' in the case: one word is not rhetorically put for the other; either word may be rightfully used to signify the same thing, that is, they are so far forth simply synonymous terms. In the next place, what in the world do you mean by saying that the 'original and true' signification of the term administration is the persons collectively who are intrusted with the execution of the laws, and with the superintendence of public affairs? It is one of the meanings of the word indeed, and so a 'true' one—though no more true than its other authorized meanings, but it is not the 'original' one; on the contrary, it is secondary and derived. And finally, what earthly warrant have you for talking of 'confusion' being made when the Government is used to signify 'the persons collectively' by whom public affairs are conducted? It is just as correct to use the word Government in this sense, as it is to use the word Administration. Both words are rightfully so used; and you would here, I suppose, be in no error in saying 'metonymically' used, if you have a fancy for that epithet: Administration is 'metonymically' put for the official persons and acts of the persons who have the direction of national affairs, and Government is just as often 'metonymically' put for the same persons and acts—and with equal right; for it is authorized by established usage, which is the supreme law of language. By what right, then, do you assume to limit the term government to signifying a 'form of fundamental rules and principles,' or at least to insist that when used synonymously with administration, it shall not be used to signify the 'persons collectively' by whom the affairs of the nation are conducted; and when Mr. Crosby uses it—as he obviously does—in that sense, to talk to him of 'error and confusion?' When Lord Russell spoke the other day in the British Parliament of 'awaiting an explanation from the American Government' in the matter of the Peterhof, and when the London Times spoke of 'the Government at Washington being anxious,' you might as properly have taken them to task for the 'error' and 'confusion' of talking as if our 'form of fundamental rules and principles' could give an explanation, or feel disturbed in mind. Mr. Crosby had a perfect right to use the word in the sense in which he obviously did use it. He fell, therefore, into no 'error.' He 'confounded' nothing; he did not identify different things, nor wrongfully put one thing for another.
In short, your distinction between the Government and the Administration falls away into a sheer, absurd futility. And well if it escape a harsher judgment; for when you go about to make irrelevant distinctions in a plain case, where there is none to be made, and tax your correspondent (no matter in what soft phrase) with errors and confusions when he was guilty of none—it will go nigh to be thought by many an unworthy subterfuge, serving no other purpose than the fallacious one of shifting the question, and misleading dull minds.
Of the same sort is what you further say in support of this futile distinction. You talk of the Administration being 'utterly destroyed without affecting the health of the Government,' of the Government 'remaining intact, unscathed, while the Administration is swept out of existence;' and you say 'every change of Administration, at every election, exemplifies this great truth'!
By Government, I suppose you here unconsciously mean something different from what you had before defined as its 'ordinary meaning,' for you would hardly talk of the 'life' and 'health' of an abstract scheme of polity, of a set of 'rules and principles.' I take it, therefore, that you mean, or ought to mean, a living, acting something. Now imagine a Government without an Administration, with its Administration 'utterly destroyed,' 'swept out of existence.' How long afterward would it continue to exist? One day? One hour? One moment? No; the 'life' of a Government implies the perpetual, uninterrupted exercise of the supreme powers of the state, and that depends upon the undying official life of living administrative functionaries; and therefore to say, as you do, that the Administration is 'utterly destroyed,' 'swept out of existence,' every time new members are elected to fill the place of those whose term of office has run out, is an absurd exaggeration of language, and certainly serves no good purpose, but only affords to those who are capable of being deceived by it a fallacious show of support to a distinction which I have proved to be irrelevant and futile in this case.
It seems to me it is not for you to talk about 'the prejudices and befogged intellects' of those who are unable to see 'in the light' of your notable 'explication' that 'opposition to the Administration'—such as you now make—'is not opposition to the Government.' And your pretension 'to rally in support of the Government,' and to 'uphold and strengthen' it, by such opposition, will, I am afraid, be looked upon by intelligent men and good patriots as absurd and impudent to the last degree-an outrage, in fact, on language and on common sense.
But enough for your verbal distinctions—a great deal too much, indeed, were it not that if you can put forth such things in good faith, it is to be presumed that there may be others of easy faith enough, through disloyal predisposition of feeling, to take them as sound and valid, and so find comfort in error and an evil course.
To come now to the real merits of the case. You denounce the Administration, and seek to stir up popular disaffection to it, not for heartlessness, hesitation, and feebleness in prosecuting the war, but precisely for whatever of earnestness, promptitude, and energy it displays—not, in short, for what it does not do, but for what it does do, in striking down the rebellion. It is vain for you to justify your conduct by professions of allegiance to the sovereign people and loyalty to the Government. Why, it is the great will of the sovereign people (to whom you profess such faithful allegiance) that the Government (to which you profess such devoted loyalty) should be saved from destruction by crushing to utter extinction the armed rebellion that seeks its overthrow. And the Administration—and I may include Congress, since the action of that body is also the object of your denunciation—is the organ of the sovereign people, carrying out its sovereign will in all the acts you denounce. I do not say that the conduct of affairs has been in all respects satisfactory to the people. There have been too many things that looked to them like want of heart, want of earnestness, want of energy, want of wisdom, particularly in the earlier conduct of the war—too many indications of a disposition, if not to protract the struggle, yet to make this terrible crisis of the nation a time for political combinations and contractors' gains. They have seen these things with grief and stern displeasure. But the acts you denounce meet their sovereign approval. They are in favor of all earnest and vigorous measures for subduing the rebels, and for repressing and punishing traitorous sympathy with them, and treasonable aid and comfort to them.