But, in the second place, suppose it were possible to have a 'cessation of hostilities' without this preliminary acknowledgment of the Confederate independence, and that the war might be at an absolute stand still for a definite season, are we fully aware of the risks attending this measure? For the Chicago platform has left them out of sight. 'A cessation of hostilities' is an armistice; and there is no such thing known in the authorities on international law, or in history, as 'a cessation of hostilities' distinct from an armistice. In defining the incidents of war, Wheaton speaks of a 'suspension of hostilities by means of a truce, or armistice,' and uses the three terms interchangeably. In other words, whatever 'cessation (or suspension, as it is called in the books) of hostilities,' there may occur between the parties to a war, it is known among men and in history as an armistice, which is also the technical term for it. There would be no need to enlarge upon this point, if it had not been made already the basis of fallacious appeals to popular ignorance. Now, the incidents of an armistice are well defined, giving to both parties, besides the advantage of time to rest, full liberty to repair damages and make up losses of men and material; and it is perfect folly, or worse, to talk of 'a cessation of hostilities' without giving to the rebels these important advantages. But the controlling consideration in reference to this whole thing, and which every person ought to ponder carefully, is the effect of the proposed 'cessation of hostilities' upon our neutral neighbors. On this point the doctrine of international law is thus stated by the distinguished French writer, Hautefeuille, 'the eminent advocate of neutral rights,' as he is justly called by the American editor of Wheaton, and whose works on neutral relations are always cited with respect, and recognized as authority.
'The duties imposed on neutrals by the state of war belong essentially to the state of war itself. From the moment it ceases, for whatever cause, even temporarily, the duties of neutrals likewise cease; as to them, peace is completely restored during the suspension of arms. They resume then all the rights which had been modified by the war, and can exercise them in their full extent during the whole time fixed for the duration of the truce, if this time has been limited by the agreement; and until the resumption of hostilities has been officially announced to them, if it has not been limited.'[5]
Can language be clearer? It will not do to treat it lightly. It is a statement of what international law is on this point from an authority; and the reasons for the doctrine are clear and incontrovertible. Neutrality depends on the fact of war; when, for any cause, that fact no longer exists, neutrality ceases likewise, of course. It is only the application of a well-known maxim of law, that when the reason of a rule fails, the rule itself fails. Let there be 'a cessation of hostilities,' then, as proposed in the Chicago platform, and how long would it be before rebel ships of war from English ports would be ready to desolate our coast, destroy our shipping, raise the blockade, and give to the rebellion the aid and sustenance it must have ere long or perish?
There is still another difficulty in the way of suspending hostilities, which it is well for us not to ignore. If we propose to the rebels 'a cessation of hostilities,' does not the question immediately become one of negotiation between separate Governments? Have we not in that moment, and in that thing, then recognized the Southern Confederacy as a separate and independent Power? For does not 'a cessation of hostilities' presuppose parties of equal sovereignty on both sides? Indeed, The London Times of a recent date already declares that 'it would concede to the South a position of equality.' Such a concession cannot, for a moment, be thought of. For the very question at issue is our constitutional supremacy. When that is yielded, all is yielded. The exchanging of prisoners, and the numerous like questions that perpetually arise in the progress of war, are matters of common humanity, that depend upon their own law. They are totally independent of the questions at issue between the parties belligerent; and our dealings with the South, in reference to such matters, cannot be construed into a recognition of its separate independence. If we consent to treat with the rebel chiefs, however, in regard to the very question involved in the war, how can we longer compel the non-interference of foreign Powers? If we acknowledge the authority of Jeff. Davis to speak for the Southern people, we cannot then take offence if other nations acknowledge him as the representative and head of a new Government.
Such and so great are the consequences of a 'cessation of hostilities,' which the Chicago platform proposes to the serious consideration of the American people.
It thus appears how irreconcilable are the expressions in that platform in regard to the preservation of the Federal Union, with the clearly announced determination to propose immediately 'a cessation of hostilities.' They are vague generalities, and can have no other purpose than to catch the popular ear so as more effectually to deceive the popular heart. That this is not a harsh judgment, consider how the four resolutions that treat of the war all hinge upon the proposition to suspend hostilities. For they concern themselves with what? With condemnation of the rebellion, its authors, and objects, suggesting, at the same time, how more effectually to bring upon it its righteous retribution? Far from it. Indeed, a stranger to all that has passed in our country during the last three years, would suppose, from a study of these resolutions, that the United States Government had usurped the power of a despotism, and that all who are not arrayed in open rebellion, against its authority were groaning under the yoke of a tyrant. The platform throughout ignores the one supreme question that is before the people to-day. That one question is, Shall we maintain the integrity of the nation? It is vain to introduce other issues; they must abide the event of arms. The old maxim that in the midst of war the laws are silent, is not to be condemned. For our laws are of no avail, the nation cannot enforce them, so long as armed rebellion threatens its existence. With the nation, all its laws, principles, vital forces, are equally menaced and imperilled; and they are, in virtue of that very fact, in abeyance, in order that they may be saved. It is said that the Constitution is not suspended because of rebellion, and this is the basis of much declamation, both in the Chicago platform and elsewhere, against the exercise of extraordinary powers on the part of the President. But the Constitution authorizes the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, that great writ of right which is the bulwark of our Anglo-Saxon liberty, 'when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it;' and confers upon Congress full power to legislate for the defence of the nation, making it then the duty of the President to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' What more is needed as a warrant for extraordinary power? The Chicago Convention has appealed to the Constitution, and in that has done wisely. But what is the Constitution? It is the organic law of the nation. In virtue of it the nation exists, and by the supreme warrant of it the nation maintains its existence against parricidal treason. Under the Constitution all power is granted to the public authorities to quell insurrection; and the grant of a power, by one of the first principles of law, as also of common sense, implies every essential incident to make the grant effectual.
In support of these views it is pertinent to cite the authority of an approved text writer on municipal law, whose book has appeared since they were first written, and who has elaborately investigated the points involved. The result of his patient and thorough study is stated in these propositions:
'That no civil power resides in any department of the Government to interfere with the fundamental, personal rights of life, liberty, and property, guaranteed by the Constitution; that a warlike power is given by the Constitution to the President temporarily to disregard these rights by means of the martial law; that under the sanction of this species of law, the President and his subordinate military officers may, within reasonable limits, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, cause arrests to be made, trials and condemnations to be had, and punishments to be inflicted, in methods unknown to the civil procedure, but are responsible for an abuse of the power; and that the martial law, as a necessary adjunct of military movements, may be enforced in time of invasion or rebellion, wherever the influence and effect of these movements directly extends.'[6]
These conclusions of the law are worthy to be considered carefully in view of the solemn resolutions of the Chicago platform, that 'military necessity' and the 'war power' are 'mere pretences' to override the Constitution.
It remains to say, with reference to the third and fifth resolutions of this platform, that they are chargeable with an equal and common ignorance: the third, in ignoring the necessity of the presence of the military at the elections referred to, in order that disloyalty and treason might not openly defy the authority of the nation; the fifth, in ignoring two things, first, the monstrous baseness of the rebel treatment of our prisoners, who have been starved alive, with a refinement of cruelty reserved for this Christian age, and practised only by the Christian chivalry of the South; and secondly, the rebel refusal to exchange prisoners man for man; the resolution seeking, moreover, to charge upon the United States Government the fault of both these rebel violations of humanity. It may be asked, moreover, in further reference to the third resolution, if the convention really meant to pledge itself to revolution;[7] and why, if the President, as chief of 'the military authority of the United States,' should be guilty of any abuses, the proper remedy is not by impeachment, as provided in the Constitution? The language of this resolution is gravely suggestive, and cannot be too closely criticised. It seems to shadow forth some dark design, which surely is in harmony with the whole tone of hostility to our Government that pervades the platform. Taken, moreover, in connection with the fact that the Chicago Convention declared itself a permanent body, subject to the call of the chairman, this criticism does not seem unreasonable; for permanent conventions have generally been the beginning of revolution.