“On Monday morning, 27th August, about an hour before sunrise, a report was received from the outposts, distant about six miles, that the enemy was advancing. The troops were immediately assembled, having the night before received orders to be under arms two hours before day-break. The troops and cannon were then posted on a position previously taken, where they remained until seven o’clock. They were 1,600 or 1,700 cavalry and infantry, ten pieces of cannon and a howitzer. The ground was very strong by nature; the French were about 700, having left 100 at Ballina and 200 at Killala. They did not land above 1,000 rank and file. They had with them about 500 rebels, a great proportion of whom fled after the first discharge of cannon. The French had only two 4-pounders and from thirty to forty mounted men.
“Nothing could exceed the misconduct of the troops, with the exception of the artillery, which was admirably served, and of Lord Roden’s Fencibles, who appeared at all times ready to do their duty. There is too much reason to imagine that two of the regiments had been previously tampered with; the hope of which disaffection induced the French to make the attack, which was certainly one of the most hazardous and desperate ever thought of against a very superior body of troops, as their retreat both on Killala and Ballina was cut off by Sir Thomas Chapman and General Taylor.
“When the troops fell into confusion without the possibility of rallying them, there was scarcely any danger; very few men had at that time fallen on our part: the French, on the contrary, had suffered considerably. They lost six officers and from 70 to 80 men, which was great, considering how short a time the action lasted and the smallness of their numbers. I am convinced that had our troops continued firm for ten minutes longer, the affair must have been over to our entire advantage, but they fired volleys without any orders at a few men before they were within musket-shot. It was impossible to stop them, and they abandoned their ground immediately afterwards.”
Although the French did not attempt to pursue, the defeated army of Lake never halted till they reached Tuam, nearly forty English miles from the field of battle. On the evening of the same day they renewed their flight, and retired still farther towards Athlone, where an officer of Carabineers, with sixty of his men, arrived at one o’clock on Tuesday, the 29th August, having achieved a retreat of above seventy English miles in twenty-seven hours! All Lake’s artillery fell into the hands of the French. As soon as Lord Cornwallis heard of the invasion, conscious of the uncertain temper of the troops upon whom he had to rely, he determined to march in person to the west, collecting, as he came, such a force as must at once overwhelm the enemy.
Meantime the victorious French were met on the 5th of September at Colooney by Colonel Vereker, of the Limerick Regiment, an energetic officer, who had hastened from Sligo to attack them with 200 infantry, 30 dragoons, and two guns. After a gallant struggle he was compelled to retire with the loss of his guns, and the French advanced into Leitrim, hoping to find elsewhere stouter and more helpful allies than they had hitherto found amongst the half-starved cottiers of Mayo.
Crawford, afterwards the celebrated leader of the light division in Spain, rashly attacked them on the 7th of September with an inferior force near Ballynamore, and was very roughly handled by them; but on the 8th, Humbert, closely followed by Lake and Crawford, found himself confronted at Ballynamuck by Cornwallis and the main army. In this desperate situation, surrounded by upwards of 25,000 men, Humbert coolly drew up his little force, with no other object, it must be presumed, than to maintain the honour of the French flag. His rearguard, again attacked by Crawford, surrendered, but the remainder of the French continued to defend themselves for about half-an-hour longer, and contrived to take prisoner Lord Roden and some of his dragoons. They then, on the appearance of the main body of General Lake’s army, laid down their arms—746 privates and 96 officers; having lost about 200 men since their landing at Killala, on the 22nd of August.
The loss of the British at the battle of Ballynamuck was officially stated at three killed, and thirteen wounded. Their losses at Castlebar and elsewhere were never communicated to the public.
Plowden, who gives a detailed account of Humbert’s invasion in his Historical Review of the State of Ireland, published but five years after the event, observes:—“It must ever remain a humiliating reflection upon the power and lustre of the British arms that so pitiful a detachment as that of 1,100 French infantry should, in a kingdom in which there was an armed force of above 150,000 men, have not only put to rout a select army of 6,000 men prepared to receive the invaders, but also provided themselves with ordnance and ammunition from our stores, taken several of our towns, marched 122 Irish (above 150 English) miles through the country, and kept arms in their victorious hands for seventeen days in the heart of an armed kingdom. But it was this English army which the gallant and uncompromising Abercromby had, on the 26th of the preceding February, found ‘in such a state of licentiousness as must render it formidable to every one but the enemy.’”
Although the private letters of Lord Cornwallis, General Lake and Captain Herbert Taylor, which are now submitted to us, breathe nothing but indignation and disgust at the misconduct, insubordination, and cruelty of their panic-stricken troops, the public despatches, as the custom is, contain unalloyed praise.
A lengthy despatch penned by General Lake, on the evening of the surrender of Humbert’s little band, is worded almost as emphatically as Wellington’s despatch after Waterloo; about thirty officers are especially mentioned in it by name, and the conduct of the cavalry is sub-sarcastically described as having been “highly conspicuous.” Lord Cornwallis’s general order, too, dated on the following day, declares “that he cannot too much applaud the zeal and spirit which has been manifested by the army from the commencement of the operations against the invading enemy until the surrender of the French forces.” Such is too often the real value of official praise.