The war was carried on by the Chinese according to their usual mode of dealing with foreign nations.[16] They had no chance of success in open combat, so they had recourse to the ordinary stratagems adopted by uncivilized races. An “anti-barbarian committee” was formed among them, under the auspices of the mandarins. They offered premiums from 100 up to 100,000 ounces of silver for assassinations of “the barbarians,” according to the gradation of rank, and similar graduated rewards for the capture of vessels, for acts of incendiarism, for denouncing those who sent provisions to Hong Kong. Intercourse was prohibited under pain of death; and provision was promised to be made for the families of those who might perish in any desperate enterprise against the “foreign devils.” But so well was the government of Hong Kong served, that only one of many attempts to injure the colony had any success. In this, however, 360 persons of all nations were poisoned; but, happily, from the excess of arsenic employed, which led to an immediate perception of the danger, very few lost their lives. No less than 25,000 of the inhabitants fled to the mainland in consequence of the menaces of the mandarins; yet, though there were not 400 effective men in the garrison, such was the efficiency of the naval department, so active the police, and so well-disposed the mass of the Chinese population, that scarcely any damage was inflicted on the colony.
Canton was taken on the 29th of December. The resistance was ridiculous.[17] The walls were scaled by a handful of men, and Yeh, who had concealed himself, was captured. Why British authority, which would have been welcomed by the respectable part of the population, was not established under military law, and the whole administration of the public revenues taken into our hands, it is very difficult to explain. But at the meeting in which the English and French ambassadors informed the high Chinese authorities that the city had been captured and was held by the allied forces, both the governor of Kwang-tung and the Tartar general were allowed to be seated on the same elevation with the foreign ambassadors, and above the positions occupied by the naval and military commanders-in-chief who were left in charge of the city. Subordinate to these, an hermaphrodite government was created, called “the Allied Commissioners,” who were to be consulted on all occasions by the mandarins charged to carry on the administration of public affairs.
A grand opportunity was thus lost of exhibiting to the Cantonese the benefits of a just and honest, however severe, administration: they could not but have been struck with the difference between the humane and equitable laws of foreigners, as contrasted with the corrupt and cruel dealings of the mandarins. The Elgin Papers throw little light upon the atrocities which were perpetrated by the Chinese, long after our possession of the city. The prisons continued to be scenes of horrible tortures. It was thought necessary to destroy whole streets, in order to convey terror into districts where assassinations of the subjects of allied powers had taken place: all the eastern suburb of the city was razed to the ground, and not a respectable inhabitant was left amidst the desolation. There can be no doubt that Governor Pehkwei considered himself invested with supreme authority over Chinese subjects. He complains bitterly, in a despatch to Lord Elgin, of 31st January, 1858, of Consul Parkes’ interference—of his “overbearing” and unreasonably oppressive “conduct in disposing of Chinamen confined in the gaols of Canton. I ask, whether Chinese officers would be tolerated in their interference with British subjects confined in British gaols?” Lord Elgin does not, in his reply, assert British jurisdiction over the prisons in Canton; but says, Pehkwei will be required to release all prisoners entitled to the benefits of the amnesty; and in another despatch (p. 178), distinctly throws upon Pehkwei the responsibility of preserving the public peace. This anomalous state of matters awakened the attention of our Government at home: a despatch of Lord Malmesbury (14th June, 1858), says: “It will be a disgrace to the allied powers if they do not prevent such enormities as are practised in the prisons of Canton.” ... The “British name must be relieved from the disgrace and guilt of having connived at a state of things so monstrous and revolting.” As to the mixed authority of native mandarins and allied commissioners, Lord Malmesbury says: “It is wholly inefficient for all objects of administration and policy, and should be replaced by a military government acting under the rules of martial law.” He recommended that the allies should take possession of the custom-house revenues, and hold the balance after the payment of the local expenses. It is much to be regretted that these measures were not adopted. Undoubtedly, Lord Elgin exercised a sound discretion in not proceeding to Peking until “a lesson” had been given to Yeh’s obstinacy. Had he gone to the North it would have been deemed a confession that he had been foiled in the South, and compelled to appeal to the emperor, in order to relieve himself from the difficulties in which Yeh had placed him; for Yeh—who had chosen to represent the English “barbarians” as making common cause with the rebels, and in fact, being themselves in a state of rebellion against imperial authority—gave the court the assurance that, as he had been so successful in breaking up the native insurrection, so he would not fail “to drive the foreign ‘barbarians’ into the sea.” In short, there could be little doubt, that had his calculations proved correct, a hostile policy would have pursued us in all the other parts of China, and our immense interests there have been placed in jeopardy.
For some time the court ventured to dream that by Yeh’s indomitable bravery China might be wholly rid of the presence of the intrusive strangers.[18] It is known that the emperor was much displeased with a mandarin, who, having lived in Canton, and being acquainted with the power of the English, ventured to express doubts as to the trustworthiness of Yeh’s representations that he could bridle and extirpate the English barbarians;[19] and nothing less than the taking the Takoo forts by the allied forces, and an advance upon the capital (even after Yeh’s capture and humiliation) was likely to bring the court of Peking to a sense of its own weakness, and the necessity of listening to our representations and remonstrances.
Every effort had been made to obstruct the progress of the allied ambassadors towards Peking; but they wisely determined not to delay their voyage to the Gulf of Pecheli, and, on the 24th April, they announced to the Chinese prime minister their arrival, at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river. The usual evasions were brought into play; and it was soon discovered that the commissioners sent down had no sufficient powers. On the 18th May, therefore, after consultation with the admirals, it was determined to “take the forts,” and to “proceed pacifically up the river;” on the 19th, notice was given to the Chinese, and on the 20th, the forts were in the hands of the Allies. On the 29th, the ambassadors reached Tien-tsin. On the same day they were advised that “the chief secretary of state,” and the president of one of the imperial boards, were ordered to proceed without delay “to investigate and despatch business.” After many discussions the Treaty was signed on the 26th June.
The progress and the result of these negotiations only demonstrate that where our policy has failed, and where it will always fail in China, is in placing confidence in the Chinese. Our distrust must be the groundwork: it is the only sound foundation of our security. When the four ambassadors were at Tien-tsin, and had extorted from the fears of the Chinese treaties more or less humiliating to Chinese pride, according to the amount of pressure employed, it should have been foreseen that on the removal of that pressure the Chinese mind would resume its natural obstinacy. A treaty with China will always be waste paper, unless some security is obtained for giving it due effect. It is, therefore, greatly to be regretted that the ambassadors should have left the most difficult of questions, one most wounding to Chinese pride—the reception of foreign ministers at Peking, and the initiation of their constant residence at court—to be settled by their successors, who had neither the same high diplomatic position, nor the same large naval and military forces at their disposal. It may, indeed, be a question whether it was desirable to force upon the Chinese the recognition of our right to have an ambassador permanently fixed at the capital; but if we thought fit to insist on such recognition, there should certainly have been no vacillation—no disposition shown to surrender in any shape or on any terms the right which had been conceded. We could not plead want of experience, for we had abundant evidence of the determination of the Chinese to repudiate and deny every concession, the enjoyment of which was either rediscussed or deferred. We should have avoided, above all things, the transfer of the Canton question to Peking. Our right to enter Canton was incontestable. Shufflings and subterfuges on the part of the Chinese, hesitation and an erroneous estimate of the importance of the question on the part of the British Government and the British functionaries in China, led to one delay after another, and ended by an absolute denial of our treaty right, and an arming of the Chinese population to enforce that denial, accompanied at the same time by a Chinese proclamation mendaciously averring that we had withdrawn our claims. A similar course has been pursued at Peking. The Chinese, who have no notion—what Oriental has?—of privileges possessed and not exercised, saw in the willingness to give way to their representations, not, as we might have supposed, a consideration for their repugnancy, and a magnanimity in refraining from the enjoyment of a privilege distasteful to them, but an infirmity of purpose—a confession that we had asked for something we did not want, and which they felt to be a degradation needlessly and gratuitously imposed upon them. There is, in fact, neither safety nor dignity in any course but the stern, steady persistence in the assertion and enforcement of whatever conditions are the subject of imperial engagements.
Lord Elgin returned to England, and Mr. Bruce was appointed his successor. It was at first announced that he had been furnished with ambassadorial powers, but as such powers would have entitled him to demand a personal reception by the emperor, it was, on reconsideration, very judiciously thought better to avoid a question which might lead to great embarrassments, and he was accredited as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Peking court. To our judgment it appears the instructions of Lord Malmesbury were too peremptory as to the course Mr. Bruce was to pursue; and if that course was to be insisted on, most inadequate means were provided.[20] It is but another example of those in the distance imagining they see more clearly than those who are near, and assuming an acquaintance with local circumstances—subject every hour to change—which, without the attributes of omnipresence and omniscience, it is impossible they should possess. Whatever may have been the views of the Cabinet at home, it is obvious that the forces which accompanied Mr. Bruce were as superfluous for peace as they were insufficient for war, and that he was placed in the embarrassing dilemma either of disobeying his orders, or of incurring great risk in the attempt to execute them. That the Admiral singularly overrated his own force, and under-estimated that of the Chinese, admits now of no controversy. But an indulgent judgment should be awarded to one so personally brave and self-sacrificing, and who was entitled to confide in the indomitable bravery of those he commanded; whose experience, too, of the general character of Chinese warfare was not likely to teach them prudence or caution.
The first and the most natural inquiry is, what is likely to be the result of these disastrous events? If negotiations are wisely conducted, the probability is that the emperor will throw the blame on the local authorities, attribute to the misrepresentations which have been made any approval he may have given to those who attacked the Allies, and repudiate any intended complicity in the mismanagement of foreign relations. For it has hitherto been the invariable policy of the Chinese government to localize every quarrel, and to avoid any general war. There is no scruple about sacrificing any mandarin whose proceedings, though lauded and recompensed at first, have in the sequel proved injudicious or injurious.
We cannot look forward, however, without apprehension—apprehension not from the possible defeat of our arms—they will be too strong, too efficient for defeat by any Chinese forces—but from their successful advance and overthrow of all resistance. Nothing can arrest their course to Peking, nor prevent the capture of that vast capital; but its possession may prove our great embarrassment. If the emperor, accompanied by his court, should retreat into Manchuria—if Peking be deserted, as Canton was, by all that is respectable and opulent—the Allies may find themselves amidst vacant streets, abandoned houses, a wandering, a starving population, too poor to migrate with their betters. Winter will come—the cruel, bitter winter of northern China; the rivers will be frozen, communications cut off; and with no war-ship in the Gulf of Pecheli, supplies must be inaccessible. Peking may even prove another Moscow to its conquerors.
The condition of the French and Spanish expedition in Cochin China is full of present instruction. They are acting against a miserable and despised enemy. They have been for more than a year in possession of Turon, the principal harbour of the country; but they have not ventured to attack the adjacent capital. Disease has thinned their ranks; victories have brought no results, but ever new disappointment: every calculation of success having been thwarted by a patient but stubborn “no surrender.” It is a resistance that cannot be reached by strength of arms, nor dealt with by the cunning of diplomacy. May it serve as a warning in that wider field upon which we are entering in China!