DR. JAMES J. PUTNAM, Boston: I should be very sorry to be taken as wishing to put myself in the sort of adverse position which Dr. Prince and Dr. Williams believe me to assume. I accept, of course, the proposition that there are conflicts which are not ethical, and, as Dr. Williams says, the average man would naturally come to different conclusions from those of the trained man in ethical matters. I want to make a slight movement towards restoring a balance which it seemed to me had become tipped too far one way. Psychoanalysts, for example, actually deal with metaphysics and yet they do not really study out what this involves. If we were nothing but scientific men we could say, "very well, let metaphysics go." But we are not. We are dealing with individuals who are thrilling with desires, hopes and fears, the movements of which cannot be expressed in scientific formulae. Dr. Williams speaks of Darwin. It can be asserted with justice, however, that the genetic method of investigation which is exemplified by Darwin's study of evolution is an imperfect method for discovering the aims of human beings. I refer to the interesting book of Prince Kropotkin in which he studies mutual aid as a factor in evolution, mutual aid being something not adequately contemplated by Darwin, who considers conflict as the essential influence in evolution. Prof. Judd showed in a paper a few years ago the change which has taken place in the attitude of a good many students of economics through the introduction of human intelligence and desires as something quite distinct from the conflicts of interests, and similar arguments have been brought forward by students of evolution. Among others Prof. Cope, the distinguished Zoologist of Philadelphia and Prof. Hyatt of Boston, showed very clearly how the course of evolution becomes materially changed when desires and will become prominent as factors. I agree that, as a partial motive, structure does limit and determine function. There is no question about that. I merely want to say that logically function precedes structure, inasmuch as the wish and desire to do a thing precedes the means by which we secure for ourselves the power to do it. But of course all energies must work through structural media. In regard to hedonism, one must recognize that pleasure counts as a partial motive, but when it comes to taking it as the final motive it fails utterly. Our lives contain determinants which we cannot range under the category of pleasure. We act in certain ways because our structure and our functions and our wills are what they are, and not exclusively by our temporary wishes. Our "meanings," when thoroughly studied are found to coincide with the meaning of the universe as a whole. It is only through getting hold of the entire scheme that you have something that you can use as a criteria. The nearest approach to this is obtained through the study of the most broadly developed, public spirited men, and such men do not work in accordance with hedonistic principles. President G. Stanley Hall, of Worcester, Mass., read a paper entitled, "The Application of Freudian Mechanisms to Other Emotions."[*]
[*] Published in the June-July number, p. 81, of this Journal.
DISCUSSION
DR. JOHN T. MAC CURDY, New York City: I have been so interested in the paper by Dr. Hall that I have been distinctly delighted by it and with your permission I will refer to a point in Dr. Putnam's paper directly pertinent to the issues raised by Dr. Hall. Dr. Putnam has spoken of the necessity for metaphysics by which I presume he means the necessity for formulation. Yesterday there was some antagonism in a discussion on formulation. We cannot avoid formulating. Our advance in knowledge is purely empiric unless it is directly dependent on formulation. We have not formulated enough. We have stuck too much to our empiric data, have not made the necessary deductions from it. What formulations there are have been based on therapeutic data and explain the productions of symptoms. No attention has been paid to the general psychoneurotic or psychotic Anlage. When this is done I am sure that it will be found that there are just such primordial reactions as President Hall has been talking about lying back of all the sexual impulses. Sexual reactions have in the course of development come to be the vehicle for more primitive ones. We know by observation that the infant demonstrates anger in a much greater degree, and long before he gives evidence of things sexual, in anything approaching the adult sense of that term. The temporary formulation of psychoanalysts who attempt to explain anger or temper by sadism are really ridiculous. President Hall rightly says that sadism must be explained by anger. That is one of the primitive emotions. Sex is merely a vehicle. The importance of this transference is that the sex emotions are peculiarly adapted to repression and when once unconscious, continue to operate all through the life of the individual. This is less likely to occur in the sudden reaction of anger, which is much more apt to be blown off at the time.
DR. SMITH ELY JELLIFFE, New York, N. Y: I cannot quote the line, but in Shaw's "Doctor's Dilemma," recently presented in New York, there is an exchange of words during which the heroine tells the surgeon that she is tempted to pass from loving him to hating him. He replied that one is surprised after all what an amazing little difference there is between the two different attitudes of mind. Dr. Jelliffe said he was quite in sympathy with what Dr. MacCurdy had been saying, with reference to the need for formulation: We all know how these formulations have grown and how they are utilized practically. For instance, we formulate an attitude towards space. We wish to handle space and say 3 ft. or 7 ft. in order to handle space relations. In other words, to handle space we utilize a formulation which we call a measure of space. In the same manner in order to handle time we make a hypothetical unit to be pragmatic. In handling the phenomena of electricity, we formulate other units. In my own mind there has grown up therefore the analogy that in order to handle psychological phenomena we have formulated the Oedipus by hypothesis. This hypothesis I would define as the unconscious biological directing of the energy of the child towards the parent of the opposite sex and away from that of the same sex. This is the unconscious basis of what in consciousness we call love and hate. The boy is unconsciously directed away from the parent of the same sex. He develops according to the Oedipus hypothesis the desire to get away from the father or the father image. All other men are patterned after the father image and if this strong biological direction fails to take place, his interest not being directed in an opposite direction, he fails to mate and thus fails in his reproductive function. The reproductive function cannot go on without this biological thrust towards the proper object. By Narcissism is meant the formulation that a new development is taking place in the infantile Oedipus fantasy. The child cannot hold on to the mother image. He passes it to others nearer his own age. He does it first through his own identification with the female. His bisexuality permits this. Similarly the infantile father protest must be supplanted by an evolved brotherly love. The competition with the father image must take a new form. It must be a mutual competition with mutual productivity. Any contact between man and man that does not ensue to the value of both in some degree, therefore, registers a failure to sublimate the unconscious gather hatred of the infantile stage of development. Sublimated hatred of the father image is brotherly love. Sublimated love of the mother image is taking one's place in the world as a father for the continuance of the race. In the unconscious the formula of direction against same sex and towards opposite sex, means therefore that in the unconscious love and hate are the same; one cannot give them these names however.
Thus I would enlarge the Oedipus formula and say that it is useful not only in understanding the neurotic, but it can be used to measure up all psychological situations.
DR. JAMES J. PUTNAM, Boston: I deeply appreciated and enjoyed what Dr. Hall said and I have no question whatever that we all who are so interested in psychological work profit by arguments of this sort being brought before our notice. I think it is an unfortunate thing that Adler, who was on that line and did such good work in it, coupled his statements with a sort of denunciation of Freud's views. It seems to me to have been entirely unnecessary. One of the remarkable stories of O. Henry, who was a keen observer of human nature, deals with a frontier army officer who exposed continually himself to danger, desiring to work out in an indirect way this feeling of conquering one person by another, only it was himself, his own cowardice, that he wished eventually to conquer. I would ask Dr. Hall if the notion of which Royce has made so much, namely, the social concept, is not one which perhaps would act as the common denominator in these cases. We cannot assert ourselves and get angry without virtually having reference to other persons, neither can we have sex feelings without such reference. It seems that the social instinct or imagination which is carried around by every individual and which determines his acts is as natural and as invariably present as the existence of a desire to live, not to speak of the desire to conquer.
DR. MORTON PRINCE, Boston: I feel extremely thankful to Dr. Hall for his very interesting and satisfying presentation of the thesis which he has given us. I remember an old gentleman once saying to me, in speaking of another man with whom he had been conversing, "He is a very intelligent man. He thinks just as I do." So I think Dr. Hall is a very intelligent man; he thinks just as I do. I am entirely in accord with his views which he has so well expressed. What he has said is in principle the basis of the paper which I intended to present this morning but which, in view of the length of our programme, I have decided to withdraw.
The principle underlying the large number of concrete facts which he has given is that besides the sexual instinct there are a large number of other instincts—one of which is anger—which have a very important place and play important parts in personality. Some of these instincts play not only as important a part as the sexual instinct but even a more important part. And, as Dr. Hall has said, the Freudian mechanisms can be applied to them just as well and just as logically. If an analysis is fully carried out along the directions of these instincts we find, according to my observations, the same disturbances that we find from conflicts with the sexual instinct and effected by the same mechanisms. Amongst these instincts besides anger there is the parental instinct, containing, if we follow Mr. McDougall's terminology, tender feeling or love. At any rate love is an instinct entirely distinct from the sexual instinct. There are also the instinct of self-assertion and, fully as important as any, that of self-abasement. This last, according to my observations and interpretations plays a very important part in many cases of psycho-neurosis and leads through conflicts to the same disturbances of personality that one finds brought about by conflicts between the other instincts. That love may be something entirely separate and distinct from the sexual instinct is a view which is generally recognized and accepted by psychological writers but entirely ignored, as a rule, by Freudian writers. A criticism which I would make of the work of the Freudians is that while they recognize these instincts they do not give them their full value nor study them as completely and thoroughly—nor do they carry their studies to the final logical conclusion—as they do with the sexual instinct. So far as they may do so they subordinate these instinctive emotions entirely to the sexual instinct so that these latter simply make use of them. When the psycho-neuroses are completely studied we will find the same repression of the various instinctive dispositions and impulses to which I have referred in the one case as in the other, and of ideas organized with these disposition. We find the same conflicts and resulting disturbances. The sexual instinct has no hegemony. To my mind each occupies precisely the same position and may play the same part in personality.
When you bear in mind that psychologically it is a fact, as I believe, that sentiments are formed by the organization of emotional instincts with ideas, with the memories of experiences, as Shand has pointed out, and when you remember that it is through the force of emotional instincts thus organized that an idea, i e., a sentiment, acquires its driving force which tends to carry the idea to fulfilment, and when you bear in mind that sentiments thus formed are derived from antecedent experiences sometimes dating back to childhood and sometimes persisting through life, we can understand how conflicts arise between antagonistic sentiments and the part which the different instincts, through the force of their impulses, play in these conflicts.