Throughout this treatise, he carefully notes the "jealousy of sectional interest and power and the determination to maintain this power even at a cost of a dissolution of the Union," In other words, the whole sectional struggle grew out of what he calls the effort to maintain the balance of power between two sections of the Union, with the slavery question contributing thereto. Facts set forth bring out very clearly that the South is not to be censured as being especially hostile to the Negro when on the statute books of the North there are found numerous laws to show that persons of color were not considered desirables in those States.
He raises the question as to whether the South violated the Missouri Compromise and considers it a revolution that public functionaries disregarded the rights of the owners of slave property when the highest tribunal, the Supreme Court, had sanctioned these rights. The act of secession is palliated too on the ground that the South had developed under the influence of that peculiar political philosophy which produced there a race that could never sanction passive obedience. In seceding the South was not attempting to overturn the government of the United States. It was not contemplated to interfere with the States adhering to the Union. They sought merely to "withdraw themselves from subjection to a government which they were convinced intended to overthrow their institutions."
The Civil War came in spite of the fact that the Convention that framed the Constitution negatived the proposition to confer on the Federal Government the authority to exert the force of the Union against a delinquent State. It was, therefore, a mere act of coercing a section preparing for self-defense. Reconstruction is treated very much in the same way. The laws under which it was effected were unjust, the men who executed them were harsh, and the weaker section had to pay the price.
The book cannot be classed as scientific work. The topics discussed are not proportionately treated, the style is rendered dull by the incorporation of undigested material, and the emphasis is placed on the political and legal phases of history at the expense of the social and economic. In it we find very little that is new. It merely presents the well-known political theory of the Old South. The chief value of the work consists in its being an expression of the opinion of a distinguished man who participated in many of the events narrated.
J. O. BURKE.
The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Harlan. By Floyd Barzilia Clark, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science in Pennsylvania State College. Series XXXIII, No. 4, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science under the direction of the Department of History, Political Economy, and Political Science. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1915.
This work is a legal treatise consisting of a scholarly discussion of the doctrines advanced by Justice Harlan during his service as a member of the Supreme Court of the United States. The book opens with a brief biography of the jurist, emphasizing the important events of his career to furnish a basis for the study of his theories. The author then takes up such topics as the "Suability of States," the "Impairment of the Obligation Contracts," "Due Process of Law," "Interstate and Foreign Commerce," "Equal Protection of the Laws," the "Jurisdiction of Courts," "Miscellaneous Topics," and "Judicial Legislation."
The author finds that in the treatment of these important legal questions Harlan measures up to the standard of an able jurist. Replying to those who have charged him with emphasizing too greatly the letter of the law, the writer says that such a contention is based on ignorance or prejudice. "No one who so interpreted the Eleventh Amendment," says the author, "as to maintain that a suit against the officer of a State in his official capacity was not a suit against a State could have held to the strict letter of the law." The author further contends that this criticism of the jurist arises from the fact that he did not believe in equivocation.
The interpretation of the laws relating to the Negro, the point on which he dissented from the majority of the members of the court, should have been given more prominence in this discussion. The discriminations against the Negroes are treated in connection with the chapters on "Interstate and Foreign Commerce" and "Equal Protection of the Laws." The Fourteenth Amendment is treated along with such miscellaneous topics as "Direct Taxation," "Copyrights," "Insular Cases," "Interstate Comity," and "Labor Legislation." Stating Justice Harlan's theory as to the position the Negro should occupy in this country, however, the author writes very frankly. Harlan, he thought, believed that they should occupy the position that historically they were intended to occupy by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He believed that the law should be interpreted as it was meant and not as the court thought expedient and wise. "Though it may be true that his relation to the negro in political matters may have made him more violent in his dissents, any one who will look fairly at the question must conclude that his doctrine was legally correct. And as time passes, and as both classes become better educated and broader in their views, it may be said that the tendency of the court is likely to be to interpret the laws largely as he thought they should have been interpreted, that is, as historically they were meant."
C. B. WALTER.