The Journal of Negro History, Volume 2, 1917

by Various

Now let us see just what the facts were and are. In 1875 there was just one State officer to be elected, that of State treasurer, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of George H. Holland, who was elected on the ticket with Ames in 1873. The Democrats nominated Hon. Wm. L. Hemingway, of Carroll County, whose nomination was favorably received. He had the reputation of being a capable, an honest and upright man. In addition to this, he was identified with that wing of his party which was known to be progressive, liberal and fair. In the early days of Reconstruction, the Democratic party in the State was sharply divided into two factions. One, the major faction, adopted what they termed a policy of "masterly inactivity," which meant that the white Democrats should take no part in the organization of a State government under the Reconstruction Acts of Congress, with a view of making the work of Reconstruction as odious, as objectionable and as unpopular as possible. The other faction believed it to be the duty of the white Democrats to take an active part in the formation of a State government, elect as many Democrats to the State Constitutional Convention of 1868 as possible with a view of framing a new constitution that would have very few if any objectionable clauses. Wm. L. Hemingway was one of that number, and as such he was elected to the convention from Carroll County. The nomination of Hemingway for State treasurer by the Democratic State Convention in 1875 was looked upon as a concession to that element of the party.

The Republicans did not fail to see that in order to carry the State they must nominate their strongest and best man, even if the election should be fair and honest, which they hoped would be the case, but which hope they had good reasons to apprehend would not be fully realized. Capt. George M. Buchanan, of Marshal County, was nominated. Buchanan had been a brave and gallant Confederate soldier. He had served as sheriff of Marshal County for a number of years. He was strong, able and popular. He was known to be the best fitted and best qualified man for the office of State treasurer. With a half-way decent election his triumph, even over so popular a man as Wm. L. Hemingway, was an assured fact. The Democrats, however, had decided that the time had come for the State to be "redeemed," peaceably and fairly if possible, violently and unfairly if necessary. With George M. Buchanan as the Republican candidate, it was necessary to employ means which Mr. Rhodes so much regretted, but which he justifies because, as he understands it, they were employed in the interest of good government.

Was that true? Let us see. Buchanan, of course, was declared defeated and Hemingway declared elected. Mississippi was thus "redeemed, for which all lovers of good government must rejoice," but Mr. Rhodes failed to record the fact that this man who was the representative of the redemption of the State had been in office a comparatively brief period when the discovery was made that he was a defaulter to the amount of $315,612.19.[405] It would be a reflection upon Mr. Rhodes's intelligence to assume that he was ignorant of this important fact. Oh, no! he must have known about it, but to make any allusion to it would be out of harmony with the purposes he evidently had in view. It is safe to assume that, if the will of a majority of the legal voters of the State had not been violently suppressed in the interest of good and honest government, which would have resulted in the election of honest George M. Buchanan, while the State would not have been redeemed, it would have been saved from the loss of $315,612.19. The writer of these lines has never believed that Hemingway was the personal beneficiary of this money or any part thereof, but that he was the instrument in the hands of others. Still he was the official representative of the redemption of the State for which "all lovers of good government must rejoice."

That there was a material increase in the population and in the wealth of the State will not be denied. These results would have followed, even if the State had never been redeemed. They were not due to redemption but in spite of it. In fact, there was a marked increase in population and in wealth before as well as subsequent to the redemption. But when the author states that the bonded indebtedness and taxation are low, the impression necessarily made, and intended to be made upon the mind of the reader, is that after the redemption took place and as a result thereof, the rate of taxation was reduced, the volume of money paid into the State treasury annually for the support of the government was less than it had been before, and that there had been a material reduction in the bonded debt of the State, neither of which is true.[406] If Mr. Rhodes had been disposed to record the truth and nothing but the truth, which is presumed to be the aim of an impartial historian, he could have easily obtained the facts, because they are matters of record. To give the reader an idea of what the facts were and are, I will take, for purposes of comparison, one year prior and one subsequent to the redemption of the State. In 1875, the year that the redemption took place, the assessed value of taxable property was $119,313,834. The receipts from all sources that year amounted to $1,801,129.12. Disbursements for the same year, $1,430,192.83. In 1907 the assessed value of taxable property was reported to be $373,584,960. Receipts from all sources, same year, $3,391,127.15. Disbursements, same year, $3,730,343.29. The above figures speak for themselves. They are from the official records, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned.[407] The records show too that during the administration of Governor Ames, which was about half over when the redemption took place, the rate of taxation had been reduced from seven mills to four mills and that a material reduction had been made in the bonded debt of the State and that after the redemption took place the tax rate was increased from four mills to six mills and that by 1907 $732,890.74 had been added to the bonded debt of the State. And yet in the opinion of Mr. Rhodes, these are conditions for the deliverance from which the employment of regrettable means was necessary, at which, however, "all lovers of good government should rejoice," since their employment resulted in the redemption of the State.

But another evidence of Mr. Rhodes's careless and reckless manner of stating alleged historical facts will be found in a paragraph on page 132 of his seventh volume. In speaking of Governor Ames's unsuccessful efforts to have troops sent to the State to assist in maintaining order and insuring a fair and peaceable election, he says: "A number of the white Republicans of Mississippi who had quarrelled or differed with Ames, among whom were both the United States senators, used their influence against the sending of federal troops to Mississippi and none were sent." The two United States Senators at that time were J.L. Alcorn and B.K. Bruce. Bruce was a strong friend and loyal supporter of Ames and did all in his power to have Ames's request granted. This statement is based upon my own knowledge. Senator Alcorn was one of the few white Republicans who had quarrelled with Ames. In fact, he ran as an Independent for governor against Ames in 1873. But he was a Republican United States Senator and as such he had no sympathy with the Democratic party. My relations with both senators were cordial. If Alcorn had used his influence to prevent having federal troops sent to the State, I am sure I would have known it. If he raised his voice or used his pen for such purpose, that fact was never brought to my notice and I am satisfied it was never done. My own opinion is that he remained reticent and refused to take sides. The true reason why troops were not sent in compliance with the request of Governor Ames was that, although the President once directed that the requisition be complied with, he later rescinded the order when informed by Republicans from Ohio that such interference would cause the loss of Ohio to the Republicans at the October election and would not save Mississippi.[408]

Referring to the Reconstruction policy, Mr. Rhodes says: "Stevens' Reconstruction Acts, ostensibly in the interest of freedom, were an attack on civilization.[409] In my judgment Sumner did not show wise constructive statesmanship in forcing unqualified Negro Suffrage on the South."[410] The truth is that Stevens and Sumner were wiser than their day and generation. They were not favorable to an immediate restoration of the States lately in rebellion upon any conditions. They knew that after the cessation of hostilities, the flower of the Confederate Army, an army which it took the entire North with all of its numbers, immense wealth and almost limitless resources four years to conquer, would be at the South and that upon the completion of Reconstruction and the withdrawal of the federal troops, that army could be utilized to bring about practically the same conditions that existed before the war. They, therefore, opposed immediate restoration. This is what Mr. Rhodes characterizes as an attack on civilization. To what civilization does he refer? He surely could not have had in mind the civilization which believed in the divine right of slavery and which recognized and sanctioned the right of one man to hold another as his property; and yet this was the only civilization upon which the rebuilding of the rebellious governments was an attack. But for the adoption of the Congressional plan of Reconstruction and the subsequent legislation of the nation along the same line, the abolition of slavery through the ratification of the 13th Amendment would have been in name only, a legal and constitutional myth. This is the civilization, however, an attack upon which Mr. Rhodes so deeply deplores. It is fortunate for the country that a majority of Mr. Rhodes's fellow citizens did not and do not agree with him along these lines.

Since Stevens and Sumner could not secure the adoption of the plan advocated by them, they proceeded to secure the adoption of the best one that it was possible to obtain under conditions as they then existed. Hence they insisted, successfully, as was then believed, that the legislation, including the 14th Amendment, should be so framed as not only to create national citizenship, as distinguished from State citizenship, but that it should be made the duty of the Federal Government to protect its own citizens, when necessary, against domestic violence, to protect its citizens at home as well as when they are abroad. The closing clause of the 14th Amendment, therefore, declares that Congress shall have power to enforce the provisions of the amendment by appropriate legislation.

But Mr. Rhodes says the Congressional plan of Reconstruction was a failure. The defeat of the Republican party at the North, especially in 1874, he believes "was due to the failure of the Southern policy of the Republican party." In speaking of the action of President Hayes, he says: "Indeed it was the final admission of the Republican party that their policy of forcing Negro suffrage upon the South was a failure." Is it true that Reconstruction was a failure? That depends upon the view one takes of it. Admitting that some of the things expected of it by many of its friends and supporters were not fully realized, its failure even to that extent was, in a large measure, one of the results but not one of the contributory causes of the Democratic national victory of 1874. On the contrary, that policy was a grand and brilliant success.

In the first place, when the split between Congress and President Johnson took place, there was soon developed the fact that the enfranchisement of the blacks was the only plan which could be adopted and by which the one advocated by the President could be defeated. It had been seen and frankly admitted that the war for the preservation of the Union could not have been brought to a successful conclusion without putting the musket in the hands of the loyal blacks. The fact was now made plain that the fruits of the victory that had been won on the battlefield could not be preserved without putting the ballot in their hands. Hence, it was done.

Was this a mistake? Mr. Rhodes says it was; but the results prove that it was not. But for the enfranchisement of the blacks at the South at the time and in the way it was done the 14th and subsequently the 15th Amendment to the Federal Constitution never could have been ratified. The ratification of these two measures alone vindicated the wisdom of that legislation. The 14th Amendment, among other things, made the colored people American citizens. It was, in effect, a recall of the famous Dred Scott decision. The 15th Amendment gave the colored American access to the ballot box, in every State in the Union. The fundamental principles that were carried into effect through the Reconstruction acts of Congress were embodied in these two amendments. After the ratification of these measures, what had previously been local to the South became national. No State north, south, east or west can now legally and constitutionally make or enforce any law making race or color the basis of discrimination in the exercise and enjoyment of civil and public rights and privileges, nor can it make race or color the basis of discrimination in prescribing the qualification of electors. By the ratification of those amendments the right of an American citizen to the exercise and enjoyment of civil and political rights and the right to vote ceased to be local and became national. But it is claimed by some that because the 15th Amendment has been successfully evaded in certain States, it is, for that reason, a failure. I will state here in passing, however, that there has never been made nor can be made any law or constitution that can not at certain times and in some places be successfully evaded. But this does not necessarily prove that the law or constitution in question was a mistake and should, for that reason, be repealed. To this extent and for the reasons and purposes above stated, the wisdom of the Reconstruction Acts of Congress has been more than vindicated.