Very soon after his arrival in England VanGogh gained an audience with the king who, in reply to his demands, answered that as yet his knowledge of the Holmes' affair was very imperfect; that he had not given Holmes orders to seize Cape Verde; and that in case he had exceeded his instructions he would be punished upon his return, according to the exigency of the case[99]. Such a reply sounded too much like the king's former promise of August 14, 1661, to satisfy DeWitt. He instructed VanGogh to insist that his Majesty make these promises in writing[100]. VanGogh answered DeWitt that it was hopeless to think of inducing the English to return Cape Verde, in view of the preparations then in progress for carrying on trade to the west coast of Africa. He declared that already they were boasting in London that a contract was to be made with the Spanish for the delivery of 4,000 slaves per annum[101]. As early as the middle of June the Royal Company had eight ships loading in London with goods worth 50,000 pounds destined for the Guinea coast[102].
In midsummer, 1664, Andries C. Vertholen and other Dutchmen, whom Holmes had carried from Cape Verde to the Gold Coast, returned to Holland, where they reported at length Holmes' actions at Cape Verde and on the way to the Gold Coast[103]. These details did not tend to DeWitt's peace of mind. Hence it is no wonder, upon Downing's return to Holland, that the two men "fell very hard upon the busines of Cabo Verde" in their very first conversation. As he had instructed VanGogh to do, so DeWitt demanded of Downing that the English king make a written promise that no more hostilities would be committed on the Guinea Coast, or the Dutch would be in duty bound to assist their company. Downing, who now felt the advantage which the success of Holmes' expedition gave him, replied to DeWitt as follows: "I must say," that the West India Company has "ever since his Majtye's return played the devills & pirats, worse thn Argiers, taken 20 English ships, hindered others, putt out a declaration whereby they claymed al the coast to thmselves; & was it lawfull for thm so to demean thmselves & only lawfull for the English to suffer, tht yet his Majty did not intermeddle, but only the one company against the other, & no wonder if at last the English did stirr a little; & tht Holms was the companye's servt & tht should his Majty have given or lent thm an old ship or two, yet he had nothing to doe in the ordering their designe." Furthermore, he declared that if the Dutch took it upon themselves to assist the West India Company "his Majty would find himself equally obliged to assist his company."[104]
To every one it now seemed as if an open conflict must come. Toward the last of July, Pepys declared that all the talk was of a Dutch war,[105] although even Coventry, a director of the Royal Company, admitted that there was little real cause for it and that the damage done to the company, which had brought on Holmes' expedition, did not exceed the paltry sum of two or three hundred pounds.[106] In Holland, also, the disposition toward war was increased by the realization that the next report from Holmes might bring news of the total loss of the Gold Coast, including the main fortress of Elmina. Under these circumstances the king's promise to punish Holmes according to the exigency of the case meant little or nothing. The maritime provinces, especially Holland, were determined to assist the West India Company against English aggression in Africa.
When Downing discussed the situation with DeWitt, however, he was surprised to hear him still express the possibility of giving satisfaction for the seizure of the Royal Company's ships, and not "so hott" for sending a fleet immediately to Guinea as he had been at first.[107] Even Downing was for the time being deceived. His spy, who was well within DeWitt's immediate circle, for once was not on duty to give his usual faithful report to his benefactor. DeWitt was accustomed to resort to the same trickery and deceitful diplomacy that was so characteristic of Downing. Indeed it would be difficult to decide which of these two men was the greater master of this questionable art. The English had sent Holmes to Africa totally unknown to the Dutch and had taken half the coast from them before they were even aware of the expedition. It is little wonder then that the idea occurred to DeWitt to retaliate in kind on the English and to keep his plans a profound secret.
In 1661 the Dutch had sent a fleet under Admiral DeRuyter to the Mediterranean Sea in conjunction with an English squadron commanded by Sir John Lawson, for the purpose of punishing the Algerian and other pirates who had been infesting Dutch and English commerce. DeRuyter and Lawson had succeeded in making a number of favorable treaties with the pirates, though the task of quelling them was by no means complete. DeWitt realized that a fleet could scarcely be dispatched to Guinea from Holland without being discovered. Therefore, he together with six of his councillors decided to send secret orders to DeRuyter to sail at once for the coast of Guinea. On account of a peculiarity of the Dutch government, however, it was impossible to dispatch these orders without first securing a resolution of the States General. DeWitt was well aware that somehow these resolutions of the States General usually became known to Downing and the English. He therefore determined that, while the States General should pass the order, he would arrange the matter so that no one would know of it, except those who were already in the plan. On August 11, 1664, the secretary of the States General read the resolution very quickly, during which time DeWitt and his six cohorts raised so much disturbance by loud conversation that no one in the room heard what was being read.[108] The trick succeeded admirably. DeWitt was now in possession of the necessary authority, and orders were dispatched at once to DeRuyter to leave his post in the Mediterranean and to sail for the west coast of Africa without revealing his destination to Lawson, the English commander. He was instructed to recover for the West India Company those places which Holmes had seized and to deliver to Valckenburg, the Dutch general on the Gold Coast, all the effects of the English which were not necessary for the different factories of the company.[109]
In order not to arouse Downing's suspicions by apparent apathy, the Dutch began to prepare several ships ostensibly for Africa. For the purpose of misleading Downing still further the Dutch agreed to accept an offer made by the French for mediation of the difficulties. DeWitt still insisted, however, that a written promise be given him that the forts and factories which Holmes had seized on the African coast would be restored to the West India Company.[110] Later, in the same month of August, 1664, Downing submitted to the States General the draft of a proposed agreement for the settling of future disputes in the East Indies and in Africa.[111] Downing was of the opinion that, although the Dutch could never be depended on to keep such an agreement, it would be a good thing in the East Indies because "ye (the English) are the weaker ther." In Africa the situation appeared different to Downing, for there the English had the advantage. "I hope in the meantime," he declared, "while we are (negotiating) Holmes will doe the work ther," because there "never will be such a opportunity as this to make clear work in Affrica."[112] A few days later he advised that everything on the African coast should be done "so as (the) king of England may not appeare in it, but only (the) Rll Company, & they takeing occasion from our affront."[113] Still later he asserted that even in Holland everyone believed that since the king and the Royal Company had gone so far, they would seize the entire African coast so that the whole affair might be worth while.[114]
Although DeWitt had been successful in sending the secret orders to DeRuyter concerning his voyage to Guinea, he could not long hope to deceive the ever-watchful Downing. Indeed with all due respect to his crafty rival one is almost surprised that Downing's suspicions were not aroused for more than a month after the commands were despatched. When the possibility of DeRuyter's having been ordered to Africa dawned on Downing, he at once demanded of DeWitt where DeRuyter was going when he left Cadiz. Without hesitation DeWitt replied that he had returned to Algiers and Tunis to ransom some Dutch people.[115] The bald falsehood disarmed Downing's suspicions and, although he advised that Sir John Lawson keep a watchful eye on DeRuyter, he assured Bennet that the report that the latter had gone to Guinea was without foundation.[116] The report continued to be whispered about,[117] however, and although two weeks later DeWitt repeated his falsehood, Downing began to fear that he was being deceived. He declared that although he was certain that the States General had given no orders in the usual way for DeRuyter's departure to Guinea, he was very well aware that the Dutch could find means to do those things which they deemed necessary. The more he considered the matter, the likelihood of secret orders having been given to DeRuyter seemed to him more and more probable. "I am sure if I were in their case, I would do it," he finally declared, and therefore he again advised Bennet to have Sir John Lawson watch DeRuyter closely.[118]
The news of Holmes' success at Cape Verde had stirred up extraordinary activity in the Royal Company. In September, 1664, the company was busily enlisting factors and soldiers for the Guinea coast. A number of ships, several of which belonged to the king, and some of which the company hired, were being prepared for the voyage to Guinea.[119] To add to the company's bright prospects, a vessel from the Gold Coast arrived in England at the end of September,[120] bringing the account of Holmes' capture of Cape Corse and other factories on the African coast. The Royal Company now saw itself master of West Africa. Pepys declared that the news from Holmes would certainly make the Dutch quite "mad."[121] It did indeed create a very great impression in Holland, where many had believed that Cape Corse was impregnable. Downing, of course, rejoiced exceedingly. Oftentimes in the past he had supported the Danish and Swedish claims to Cape Corse, but now he found no difficulty in showing Carisius and Appleborne, the Danish and Swedish representatives at The Hague, that their claims were as before, against the Dutch. Omitting to say anything of the English claim to Cape Corse, Downing explained to them that since the Dutch had been in possession of Cape Corse, Holmes had seized it together with other places on account of the numerous injuries done to the Royal Company. "They both replied that they took it so."[122]
In London, VanGogh lost no time in obtaining an interview with Charles II concerning Holmes' latest activities. Again the king asserted that Holmes' violent actions on the African coast were without his knowledge, especially the affair at Cape Verde, which place he declared was of no importance and not worth one hundred pounds.[123] Regarding his responsibility for the capture of Cape Corse he refrained from committing himself so definitely, but he assured the Dutch ambassador that Cape Corse belonged to the English; that their claim to it would be satisfactorily established; and that he intended to preserve these new acquisitions by sending Prince Rupert with a fleet to the coast of Africa.[124] On the 28th of October, after learning of Holmes' capture of New Amsterdam, Charles II boldly threw aside his reserve and declared that the taking of Cape Corse, as well as of New Amsterdam, "was done with his knowledge & by his order as being a business wch properly belonged to the English, that the ground was theirs & that they had also built upon the same, that the same was afterwards taken from the English by the Netherlands West India Compa, & ... that the English will justify & demonstrate their right to all this."[125] If Holmes' actions in Guinea have so far seemed very extraordinary, they can hardly be so regarded any longer in view of the light which the king himself threw over the whole situation in this remarkable statement. To be sure he had not as yet assumed responsibility for the capture of Cape Verde. However, his direct responsibility for the other actions of Holmes, which were much more important, makes it a matter of little consequence whether the capture of Cape Verde is to be attributed to him or not.
It may have seemed to Downing that there was less excuse for the seizure of Cape Verde than for the other places. At any rate he held out some hope to DeWitt that it would be restored to the Dutch. This must have been a bitter sop to DeWitt, who was well aware that as for Cape Corse he need entertain no such hope.[126] There was one feature of the situation, however, which somewhat pleased DeWitt,[127] Downing could no longer maintain that the troubles in Guinea were merely quarrels between two commercial companies in which the king had no direct interest or connection. DeWitt would not therefore be at a loss to find numerous reasons why DeRuyter had been sent to Africa when the time came for defending that action.