By June 13, 1775, it had been resolved that twenty-three regiments should be commissioned, exclusive of one regiment of artillery, which latter was to consist of ten companies, and had already been partly organized. Such were the constituent parts of the army organized by Massachusetts inside of two months after the 19th of April, 1775, from her local militia; and it was these same raw and undisciplined levies, assisted by the contingents from the neighboring Colonies, which had assembled at Cambridge and Roxbury upon news being conveyed to them that Massachusetts had accepted the gage of battle, who time after time repelled the attacks of picked regiments of troops of Great Britain, until compelled to leave the field by lack of ammunition upon the seventeenth day of June, 1775. No better test of the mettle of the American militiaman, when converted into a soldier, can be conceived than was furnished upon that day when a number of these hastily organized regiments met and shrank not from the attack of trained soldiers. Although, naturally enough, regarded as a defeat, and, therefore, in a measure discreditable to the provincials, so much so that in after years veteran survivors cared not to exploit their participation in the battle, it really had a tremendous moral effect upon each side, the provincials being assured thereafter that under anywhere near like equal conditions they could defeat the British, while for the enemy there resulted the enforced conviction that the colonists were not unworthy foes, and that like victory would be altogether too dearly bought.
The encouragement offered to men to enlist into the eight months’ service would hardly be considered in the light of a very extravagant bounty in these days. The Provincial Congress provided that a woollen coat should be supplied to every soldier who enlisted, in addition to his wages and travel allowance. These coats were to be provided by the different towns throughout the Province; and a schedule was made up, allotting a definite number to be furnished by each town. They were to be of a uniform pattern, as far as the style of the coat was concerned; but apparently the only distinctive military attachment in connection with them was the buttons, which it was enacted should be of pewter and bear the regimental number, when the coats were distributed to the men belonging to the different organizations. It may well be imagined that this method of securing coats did not result in very prompt delivery, and in consequence it was provided later in the year that soldiers might receive a money equivalent for the value of the coat. Inasmuch as many of the men served the full term of their enlistment without ever being gratified with the sight of the promised bounty coat, it is not to be wondered at that thousands of them accepted the money equivalent, and received it in some instances after the expiration of their term of service. With the appointment of Washington as commander-in-chief by the Continental Congress, the Massachusetts army, raised as I have described, together with the levies raised by the other Colonies, became a part of the Continental establishment. The eight months’ men raised by Massachusetts can properly be regarded accordingly as Continental soldiers, although originally raised under State auspices, without any outside encouragement or assistance. The actual transfer of State stores, supplies, etc., did not take place for some little time after Washington had taken command at Cambridge; and many of the officers exercised the duties of their positions under their State commissions, and did not receive Continental commissions until September or October, 1775.
It may be interesting to note how the effective forces at Washington’s disposition compared with the authorized number directed to be raised by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts. They had provided for an army of 13,600 men; but on July 10, 1775, Washington expressed his concern at finding the army inadequate to the general expectation and the duties which might be required of it. In this communication he states that the number of men fit for duty of the forces raised by the Province, including all the outposts and artillery, did not amount to 9000. He also states that the troops raised in the other Colonies were more complete, although they also fell short of their establishment; and his estimate at that time of the total number of men at his disposition available for duty was not more than 13,500. The proportion, however, of the troops furnished by the different Colonies, and composing the army that invested Boston, is shown by a general return, signed by Adjutant-General Horatio Gates in July, 1775. It gives twenty-six Massachusetts regiments (an additional regiment not being completed is not included in the number), four independent companies, also of Massachusetts, with a regiment of artillery, three Connecticut regiments, three New Hampshire regiments, three Rhode Island regiments, and a Rhode Island company of artillery, making altogether a total force of 17,355 men.
At a council of war, July 9, 1775, it was estimated that the force of the enemy amounted to 11,500, and that the army investing Boston ought to consist of at least 22,000 men; and it was recommended, in order to supply the deficiency, that an officer from each company raised in Massachusetts Bay should be sent out to recruit all the regiments up to their standard efficiency as fixed by the Provincial Congress, Rhode Island and Connecticut being at the time engaged in recruiting for the purpose of filling up their quotas of troops to the full establishment. Naturally enough, the commander-in-chief found much to lament over in the deficiencies both as to number and equipment of the army he found almost ready made to his hand, and yet so lacking in all things from a military point of view; but there is little of criticism in his letters of the period, although they are filled with pleadings, expostulations, and exhortations for the purpose of bringing up the army to a desired state of efficiency.
While the enlisted men comprising this eight months’ army held the line and were being brought more or less under military discipline and system, there were times when their numbers fell short of the estimated number required for a besieging army, where it was at any time possible that the enemy equal in effective force might make an attack and break the line. It was found necessary from time to time to call forth the local militia from the towns in the vicinity of Boston to do duty for longer or shorter periods; but then, as later, the general officers criticised the efficiency of the militia thus called upon, as they could not be depended upon for a continuance in camp for any definite period, or regularity and discipline during the time they might stay. Such criticism was inevitable, and was applied during the whole term of the Revolutionary War to the militia contingents that were called forth in all the Colonies by the officers commanding the regulars or the Continental forces.
After the expiration of the term of service of the eight months’ men a call was made for twelve months’ men; and many of those who served the first term or first campaign, as it was called, both officers and men, engaged for the second campaign. The organization of the standing militia thereby became broken up and disrupted by the depletion of the local organizations. It therefore became necessary to make a reorganization and redistricting of the militia of the Province. An act was accordingly passed January 22, 1776, by which this object was attained. It provided that all able-bodied male persons from sixteen years of age to fifty, with certain specified exemptions, in every town and district should be considered members of the train band. The alarm list should consist of all male persons from sixteen years of age to sixty-five, not liable to be included in the train band and not exempted under special provision. Each company was to consist of sixty-eight privates, exclusive of the alarm list, officered by a captain and two lieutenants, non-commissioned officers to be four sergeants, four corporals, with a drummer and fifer for each company. A brigadier-general was directed to be chosen for each county, and under him the field officers of the different regiments were authorized to divide up and district the regiments, each regiment having a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and two majors. Three major-generals were also to be chosen by the Council or House of Representatives. Under this enactment the county regiments were numbered, officered, and their organizations established, and from the standing militia thus provided for all detachments and drafts of Massachusetts militia that were made, either for short terms of service upon alarms or as re-enforcements to the Continental Army, were made during the remaining period of the war. This establishment for the militia continued in force until after the adoption of the State Constitution in 1780.
Boston.
James J. Tracy.
(Read before the Massachusetts Sons of American Revolution, 1904.)