So it happened that poor, gulled Folger eventually delivered to Congress, with all due ceremony, a package of blank paper, and was cast into prison for his pains. Duplicate despatches sent out by the Commission soon after Folger’s departure were lost at sea, and in consequence of the two calamities no official intelligence reached Congress from France between May, 1777, and May 2, 1778, the day of the arrival of the French treaty.
As to the effect of this circumstance, Deane is somewhat explicit. Mentioning Hynson’s exploit as “the only instance of our having our despatches intercepted,” he continues:
“At the time of making out the despatches our prospects both in France and in America were extremely discouraging. The Court of France appeared to view our cause as absolutely desperate, and even the appearance of what little countenance they had before shown us they gave the most unequivocal proofs of their resolution to disavow and leave us to our fate.... The Commissioners were at that time refused any access to the Minister, even in the most secret manner.
“... The Commrs. had not, for some time previous to this date, sent any information of their situation to Congress, for they scarcely knew what to write, and hitherto they had said nothing in a discouraging style, but, on the contrary, had said everything they could ... to encourage Congress to persevere, and ultimately to expect aid from France. In these (Folger’s despatches), though, ... they could not avoid the mention of facts from which the most unfavourable conclusions must have been drawn by Congress had Folger arrived with the dps. instead of blank paper....
“... On the other hand, the British Ministers, from the contents of those despatches and letters, found in what state we were with the Court of Versailles.... This encouraged them to prosecute the war with vigour, confident that it must soon terminate successfully on their part.”
The result of Hynson’s plot, if Deane’s conclusions be accepted, was, therefore, directly contrary to his aim. By his diversion of the despatches, British hopes were raised and British offers of concession delayed until the critical moment had passed and America’s courage had risen beyond all thought of compromise. Thanks to Hynson’s intervention,
“when the Commissioners on the part of Great Britain eventually arrived in America to propose terms of accommodation to Congress, no discouraging intelligence had been received ... from the Commissioners in Paris, and they (Congress) still relied on the effect which the victory at Saratoga was expected to have in their favour. They were not, as the event has shown, deceived.”
“In every age of the world,” Deane reflects, “many, if not most of the greatest events, have been produced from the most trifling causes.”
A defensible, if not a profitable, argument might be brought forward to prove the “honest Rascal” the savior of the republic. And, to split a hair still finer, Isabella Cleghorn might, by the same token, be hailed as that savior’s inspiration.
Lord Stormont believed in Hynson’s sincerity as would-be conciliator of the contending powers. Deane, despite heavy evidence, was never perhaps wholly convinced of his agent’s venality. And Hynson himself again and again protested to Smith: