3d. That in case neither of these things could be done, then that the Government bestow upon me some mark of public confidence, as its opinion of my ability warranted.
None of these things have been done,” etc.
He continues: “You know me well enough I think, to understand that I will never submit if I can help it. The court of inquiry, which you inform me has been ordered, will amount to nothing for several reasons. It is too late, so far as I am concerned. Its proceedings, I presume, will be secret, as in Harper’s Ferry business. The principal witnesses are here with me, and I myself should be present. The Mississippi River closes by the 25th of November [Note that date!]; frequently sooner than that. It is then next to impossible to get away from this place. A journey through the snow of 200 miles is required to communicate with any railroad.”[24]
And on the very day which Pope had named, November 25, 1862, General-in-Chief Halleck issued his order for the court-martial of Fitz-John Porter, and issued his report certifying to the efficiency of General Pope, thus avoiding the court of inquiry which Pope had threatened to demand.
Such a court, if honestly conducted, would have laid bare the truth, and shown to the world that Halleck himself had prevented the reinforcements from reaching Pope, caused the defeat of Second Bull Run, imperiled the national capital, and opened the door of Maryland to Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee.
This conclusion is supported both by Halleck’s official report and by his testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. In the former, he says: “Had the Army of the Potomac arrived a few days earlier, the rebel army could have been easily defeated and, perhaps, destroyed.” His testimony before that committee, on March 11, 1863.[25]
“Question. To what do you attribute the disastrous result of General Pope’s campaign?
Answer. I think our troops were not sufficiently concentrated so as to be all brought into action on the field of battle; and there was great delay in getting reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac to General Pope’s assistance.
Question. To what is that delay attributable?
Answer. Partly, I think, to accidents, and partly to a want of energy in the troops, or their officers, in getting forward to General Pope’s assistance. I could not say that that was due to any particular individual. It may have resulted from the officers generally not feeling the absolute necessity of great haste in re-enforcing General Pope. The troops, after they started from the Peninsula, were considerably delayed by heavy storms that came on at that time.”