#Feeling described.#

By feelings I understand those features of our experience which constitute what may be called the awareness of the present state. Feeling comprehends all the many degrees of awareness in pleasures and pains, sensations and thoughts, emotions and ideals. It constitutes the subjectivity of our existence and furnishes the basis of all psychic life. Feeling is the most general term of its kind.

#Motion described.#

By motion I understand all kinds of changes in the objective world that can either be directly observed or are supposed to be observable. Indeed all changes taking place must, objectively represented, be thought of as motions.

Feeling and motion being each the broadest concept of its kind, the question, In what relation do motions stand to feelings? appears to be quite legitimate.

* * * * *

Concerning the relation that obtains between feeling and motion, Professor Mach objects to the use of the expression "feeling accompanies motion." "Material processes," he says, "are not accompanied by feeling, but both are the same." And in another passage, "The parallelism stands to reason, since everything is parallel to itself."

#The term "accompany" inadequate.#

I grant most willingly that the term "accompany" is inadequate, and I admit that a certain feeling and a certain motion form one inseparable process. There is no duality of feeling and motion, both are different abstractions made from one and the same reality. I do not say that feeling and motion are identical, not that they are one and the same; but I do say that they are one. There is no such thing as pure feeling; real feeling is at the same time motion. Feeling by itself does not exist in reality. Pure feeling is a mere abstraction. And wherever the expression parallelism between feeling and motion has been used, it can mean only a parallelism between the two spheres of abstraction.

Professor Mach continues: "They [motion and feeling] are not two sides of the same paper (which latter is invested with a metaphysical rôle in the simile), but simply the same thing."