A monistic explanation of the rise of mind from elements that are not mind is possible only on the supposition that the objective processes of motion are not mere motions but that they are at the same time elements of feeling.
Is this not the same position as Professor Mach's, where he says that "the first step towards a competent monism lies in the assertion that the same A B C … are both physical and psychical elements"? and again: "The same A B C … are both elements of the world (the 'outer'[83] world namely) and elements of feeling."
[83] Professor Mach here says "outer world." I should prefer to replace it by the expression "objective world," because the motions of a man's brain belong to the outer world of all other men. To make sure of including the actions of my own body in this outer world, I should prefer the term "objective world," making feelings alone (to the exclusion of the subject's own motions) the constituents of the subjective world.
#Agreement with Professor Mach.#
Considering the two last-quoted sentences of Professor Mach, it appears to me that all differences vanish into verbal misunderstandings. Yet since I am not at all sure about it, I may be pardoned for becoming rather too explicit. The adjoined diagram may assist me in making my ideas clear.
[Illustration: Fig. I. Fig. II.]
#Explanation of the diagrams.#
Let the large circle of both figures represent a sentient being, a man. The periphery is his skin. The small circle enclosing K and L is a sensory organ; the other small circle enclosing M and N represents the hemispheres of his brain. A and B are processes taking place outside of the skin of this man. A produces an effect in K; B in L. The line R represents a reflex motion. M and N are concepts and abstract ideas derived from such impressions as K and L. The line S represents an act of volition.
All these symbols represent motions in the objective world. We know through physiological investigations that K, L, M, and N are motions; in our individual experience they appear as feelings.
The second figure represents in agreement with my system of symbols the states of awareness, in Greek letters. Certain physiological processes (K L R, M N S of Figure I) appear subjectively as states of awareness (i. e. κ λ ρ, μ ν ς of Figure II). Yet A and B remain to the thinking subject mere motions. If they possess also a subjective side, although only in the shape of potential feeling, it does not and it cannot appear.