I have no objection to an ethics of welfare; on the contrary, I consider every ethics as an ethics of welfare. My objection to Professor Höffding's ethics is solely directed against his definition of welfare as "a continuous state of pleasurable feelings." Welfare is according to my terminology that state of things which is in accord with the natural law of ethics, and it so happens that welfare must as a rule not only be bought, but also constantly maintained with many pains, troubles, anxieties, and sacrifices. It is true that upon the whole there may be a surplus of happiness and of satisfaction, if not of pleasures; but the surplus of happiness (important though it is) does not constitute that which is morally good in welfare. Morally good (the characteristic feature of the ethical idea of welfare) is that which is in accord with the natural law of ethics.
If the term "utility" were defined by Utilitarians in the sense in which I define welfare, I should also have no objection to utilitarianism. The Utilitarians, however, define their theory as "the Greatest Happiness Principle," and if "useful" is taken in its ordinary sense as that which is profitable or advantageous, it makes of utilitarianism an ethics of expediency.
IV. FEELINGS AND JUDGMENTS.
The fundamental difference between Professor Höffding and myself, and as it seems to me his πρῶτον ψεῦδος, lies in his definition of ethical judgments. He says:
"Ethical judgments, judgments concerning good and bad, in their simplest form are expressions of feeling, and never lose that character however much influence clear and reasoned knowledge may acquire with respect to them."
I am very well aware of the fact that all thinking beings are first feeling beings. Thought cannot develop in the absence of feeling. Without feeling there is no thought; but thought is not feeling, and feeling is not thought.[131] By thought I understand the operations that take place among representative feelings, and the essential feature of these feelings is not whether they are pleasurable or painful, but that they are correct representations. Judgments are perhaps the most important mental operations. There are logical judgments, legal judgments, ethical judgments, etc. In none of them is the feeling element of mental activity of any account. That which makes of them judgments is the reasoning or the thought-activity. Whether a judgment is correct or not does not depend upon the feeling that may be associated with it, but it depends upon the truth of its several ideas and the propriety of their connection.
[131] See the chapter "The Nature of Thought" in The Soul of Man, p. 354.
A judgment, be it logical, juridical, ethical, or any other, is the more liable to be wrong, the more we allow the feeling element to play a part in it. Judgments swayed by strong feelings become biassed; they can attain to the ideal of truth only by an entire elimination of feeling.[132]
[132] Professor Höffding says: "The feeling of pleasure is the only psychological criterion of health and power of life." Every physician knows the insufficiency of this criterion. Many consumptives declare that they feel perfectly well even a few hours before their death.
Ethics in which the feeling element is the main spring of action, is called sentimentalism. Sentimental ethics have no more right to exist than a sentimental logic or a sentimental jurisprudence.