ANOTHER VIEW OF THE ETHICS OF LAND-TENURE. By Prof. Simon N.
Patten.
MORAL TALES. By Clara E. Collet.
Mr. Leslie Stephen affirms that it is our duty to try to make men equal by raising the grade of culture in all classes. The distribution of classes would continue, but it would correspond purely to the telling off of each man to the duties which he is best fitted to discharge. The essential condition of all social improvement is that the individual should be manly, self-respecting, doing his duty as well as getting his pay. Nothing will do any permanent good which does not imply the elevation of the individual in his standard of honesty, independence, and good conduct.
One of the earliest studies of life, says Professor Toy, is that which is known as the clan-constitution of society, during which two important facts are exhibited, (1) ethical ideas are determined by those of the community, and (2) the deity of the community is regarded as a member of the clan. Both these characteristics have become modified in the progress of civilisation. Moral rules and principles have become clearer, broader, and higher, and society has come to be an efficient moral guide and support. Religion has moved away from the conception of the tribal god, and the conception has been formed of the absolute dominion of natural law in the moral world. The end to which human moral history points is a conscience absolutely independent and yet absolutely dependent,—independent in that it refuses to recognise any other authority than its own ideals, dependent in that it receives its ideals from the life of man, which is the highest revelation of God.
According to Professor von Gizycki, the ultimate basis of all ethical demonstration is the supreme standard of good and evil, the greatest possible happiness of all mankind. Various objections urged against this, as the final aim of life, are examined by Professor von Gizycki and declared not to constitute a decisive case against it. As to the desire to obtain peace of conscience he affirms that this can only follow upon such action as is in conformity with the greatest possible happiness of mankind. The Professor has modified his former position. The injunction, "Seek peace of conscience in devoting thyself to the welfare of mankind," which he had proposed in his "Moral Philosophy," implies an impracticable combination of two distinct final aims. Either the one or the other must abdicate the supremacy to its rival. We must invoke the aid of ethical self-love in order to insure the victory to the forces which make for good. But our ruling aim ought to be the advancement of the universal happiness of mankind.
The main purpose of Professor James's paper is to show that there is no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance. Three questions in ethics must be kept apart—the psychological, the metaphysical, and the casuistic. The psychological question asks after the historical origin of our moral ideas and judgments; the metaphysical question asks the very meaning of the words good, ill, and obligation; the casuistic question asks what is the measure of the various goods and ills which men recognise, so that the philosopher may settle the true order of human obligation. As to the psychological question,—relations exist in our thought which do not merely repeat the couplings of experience. Our ideals have certainly many sources. They are not all explicable as signifying corporeal pleasures to be gained, and pains to be escaped. As to the metaphysical question,—goodness, badness, and obligation must be realised somewhere in order really to exist. Without a claim actually made by some concrete person there can be no obligation, but there is some obligation wherever there is a claim. Claim and obligation are co-extensive terms. The words good, bad, obligation, are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold or anchorage in Being apart from the existence of actually living minds. "The religion of humanity" affords a basis for ethics as well as theism does. As to the casuistic question—The best of the marks and measures of goodness is the capacity to bring happiness, but in seeking for an universal principle we find that the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand. But the actual possible in this world is vastly narrower than all that is demanded, and the guiding principle for ethical philosophy must be simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can. So far as the casuistic question goes, ethical science is just like physical science, and must be ready to revise its conclusions from day to day. Concrete ethics cannot be final because they have to wait on metaphysics. The final conclusion is that the stable and systematic moral universe for which the ethical philosopher asks is fully possible only in a world where there is a divine thinker with all-enveloping demands. If he now exist, then actualised in his thought already must be that ethical philosophy which we seek after as the pattern which our own must ever more approach.
Professor Patten treats of the economical data bearing on the facts of land-tenure, and concludes that if no surplus land value goes to the monopolies or to privileged classes, there is no ethical problem involved. If some of the surplus goes in this way, then the ethical problem is the same as if all of the produce of industry above a minimum of wages went to increase the surplus. The growth of society in wealth and numbers often makes the man without wealth and land less productive, because he must use poorer land or less productive instruments. The loss being due to social changes the workman is entitled to compensation for which he should look to society, which may choose the concrete form in which it shall be made. The expense of doing this should be borne by those who have profited from the prosperity of society.
In her interesting paper on Moral Tales, Mrs. Collet passes in review certain books which, read in childhood, have left an indelible impression on her mind. Chief among them are the "Sandford and Merton" of Thomas Day, who was deeply impressed by the writings of Rousseau; the stories of Maria Edgeworth, the most truly democratic of our moral writers; and those of Dr. Aiken and his sister, Mrs. Barbauld, whose writings although pervaded by a strong religious spirit, are very striking for their unaggressive and yet open declaration of the right to think independently in religion. Mrs. Collet gives her verdict, with regard to the moral education of children, in favor of the voluntary "consumption of moral tales." (Philadelphia: International Journal of Ethics, 1602 Chestnut St.)
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.
CONTENTS: March, 1891. No. 183.