Kroman looks upon the law of inertia as a special application of the causal law. To him the conservation of matter and energy is an hypothesis. Höffding looks upon the law of inertia as a material principle. Where Kroman speaks of energy, Höffding speaks of corporeal energy. (It may be that here the German translation körperliche Kraft is at fault.) As a material principle the law of inertia is something more than a mere corollary of the causal law, for in its present form it has made science possible. The conservation of matter and energy is conceived in an analogous manner, but considered as natural laws both propositions possess a mere hypothetical value.
It appears to us that the law of cause and effect lies deeper still, and there can be no doubt that the law of the conservation of matter and energy is the same thing only formulated for different purposes. Hume's merit was exceedingly great when he laid his finger on the sore spot of philosophical thought, pointing out the prevailing confusion about the law of causation. But when investigating the subject, he led us on a wrong track. Cause and effect are not two objects following one another, and not even two phenomena following one another. It is not a synthesis of two events. It is on the contrary an analysis of one event. Cause and effect is a change. In this change the same amount of matter and energy is preserved, yet the form is altered. Hume broke the process of cause and energy into pieces, he lost sight of their interconnection and was astonished that one piece was not exactly the same as the other. Hence his skepticism.
The law of cause and effect can be proved, except to him who would obstinately refuse to acknowledge the law of identity that A=A. There may be some one who thinks that something can come out of nothing, or that something can suddenly disappear into nothing. If there is, the weight of the argument rests with him, yet we shall not listen to him until he presents an unequivocal case in which we can observe a transition from being into not-being or vice versa. Until then we consider the law of identity and also its practical application and corollary, the conservation of matter and energy as unrefuted.
The law of cause and effect and its corollary the conservation of matter and energy rest ultimately upon our recognition of the Gesetzmässigkeit of formal laws. He who acknowledges the correctness of the statement "2×2=4" as universal and necessary, implicitly accepts also the law of causation and of the conservation of matter and energy. The law of the conservation of matter and energy contains no other proposition than this that 2×2 will always be 2×2 or its product, i. e. 4; it will never be less, it will never be more.
The ultimate basis of the law of causation lies in the laws of form. We may call causality and the law of inertia and the conservation of matter and energy hypotheses, but in that case the meaning of the term hypothesis would have to be changed, for if these laws are hypotheses, the statement 2×2=4 would be just as much an hypothesis.
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In psychology Kroman and Höffding are more antagonistic than in any other subject. Both consider the soul as an x, but Kroman attributes to this x, unity and the faculty of feeling, willing and thinking; Höffding however looks upon feeling and motion as two sides of the same unknown object. Kroman in spite of his formal opposition to metaphysicism still believes in a subject underlying the acts of consciousness. After all, the name only of metaphysicism seems to be dead in Denmark, not metaphysicism itself. Höffding has shown how Kroman's psychological theory has led him into a highly mythical conception of the activity of the soul.
We may add that the proposition of non-interference with theological views may be excellent in preserving peace, but we cannot help considering this kind of peace as a mistaken policy. If there are conflicts between theology and philosophy, they should be settled, for there cannot be two contradictory truths, and it is wrong also to leave errors alone simply for the sake of peace. Yet it is objected that religion is a matter of the heart and philosophy a matter of the brain. Certainly, but the heart should have its emotion regulated by the brain. If our world-conception is the product mainly of our emotions and of our imagination, it would be simply foolish to let the heart build its world-conception just as it pleases without consulting the head. Wherever philosophy and religion or our world-conception (the latter considered as the product of our emotion) have nothing to say to each other, wherever they are kept distinct, it will lead to confusion in all the departments of our existence, it will put our philosophy, our scientific thought, and our ethics out of joint. A rent will go through the world of our life producing disharmony in every spot and the end will be a dreary pessimism. Our emotions are not a separate chamber of our being which should be kept private and unaffected by scientific knowledge, our emotions are springs of action, and it is of paramount importance to keep them in harmony with our knowledge of facts. The policy of theological non-interference may do for some time, but certainly not long. It is a mere armistice but no peace, and honest war is better than a sham-truce which is an ill-concealed state of intolerable hostility. (Heidelberg: G. Weiss.)
κρς.
VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII. Vol. II. No. 3. March, 1891.